Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,876 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,951
1,378
313
289
239
Contributors
1,807
1,529
1,304
180
173
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
Platforms
3,744
1,857
1,076
782
160
Products / Services
2,238
1,434
1,273
746
582
MITRE Techniques
2,448
2,148
1,129
937
787
CVEs
19
15
9
7
5
IDS Classtypes
834
334
94
23
20
IDS Protocols
689
276
235
117
23
Detects behavior patterns consistent with Remcos RAT, specifically: 1) unauthorized process injection (CreateRemoteThread/ProcessInjection) into common host processes, 2) spawning of browser-related processes (iexplore.exe, ieinstal.exe, ielowutil.exe) from non-standard parent processes, and 3) anomalous outbound network connections from these injected processes over non-standard ports.
This rule detects the installation and execution of malicious typosquatted npm packages associated with the Polymarket Trap campaign. It monitors for the creation of specific directory names within node_modules, npm install commands referencing these package names, and network activity or DNS lookups to 'log-taker' infrastructure from Node.js processes.
This rule detects processes making a high volume of network connections (10 or more within an hour) to URLs containing 'release' or 'download'. This behavior can be indicative of malware downloading additional components, updates, or exfiltrating data, but could also be legitimate software updates or large file transfers.
Detects network connections to common IP lookup services (e.g., ip-api.com, ipify.org) initiated by processes often associated with malware, such as Remcos RAT components or hijacked system processes like iexplore.exe. This activity is frequently used by adversaries for reconnaissance or C2 heartbeats to identify the external IP address of a compromised host.
Detects network traffic on port 443 originating from non-browser processes destined for known DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9). This behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass standard network DNS filtering or to establish Command and Control (C2) communication channels using the DoH protocol.
Detects network traffic on port 443 originating from non-browser processes destined for known DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9). This behavior can indicate an attempt to bypass standard network DNS filtering or to establish Command and Control (C2) communication channels using the DoH protocol.
Detects exploitation of the Flowise MCP environment variable case-sensitivity bypass vulnerability. Adversaries leverage this flaw to circumvent denylist validation by supplying lowercase or mixed-case variable names (e.g., node_options), facilitating malicious code preloading via '--require', unauthorized environment secret exfiltration, or spawning child processes from the Flowise application.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with FortiBleed activity, categorizing them by their suspected role (e.g., C2, pentest lab, credential validation, sniffer node). It monitors both successful connections and connection attempts.
Detects HTTP GET requests to a specific self-hosted GitLab domain 'gitlab.bzctoons.net' that attempt to download a file named 'protected.zip', which is associated with the retrieval of StealC information-stealing malware by the Amadey loader.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with LokiBot malware beaconing to a hardcoded command and control (C2) endpoint. The rule specifically looks for established network connections to identified malicious domains or IP addresses using the /fre.php URI path.
Detects the LokiBot information stealer by identifying its characteristic aPLib compressed payloads, specific C2 URI patterns, known C2 infrastructure, and credential theft routines targeting applications like 1Password, Keepass, and WinBox.
Detection rule monitoring for indicators of compromise related to SolarWinds Serv-U, including anomalous Content-Encoding headers, unexpected child process execution, large file staging indicative of data exfiltration (Cl0p-style), outbound exfiltration, SQL injection artifacts, and unauthorized LDAP/Active Directory object enumeration by the Serv-U process.
Detects anomalous activity associated with information stealing malware, including unauthorized access to browser credential files (Login Data, Cookies), remote thread injection into browser processes, outbound connections to the Telegram API by non-browser processes, and rapid bulk access to multiple sensitive credential or crypto wallet files.
This rule monitors for indicators associated with MiniUpdate/MiniJunk V2 RAT and general .NET AppDomainManager hijacking. It detects suspicious registry keys (AppDomainManagerAssembly/Type) or environment variable manipulation used to hijack .NET application execution flow. Additionally, it identifies .NET host processes loading DLLs from user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and tracks suspicious beaconing patterns to known Azure CDN domains often used by these threats for Command and Control.
Detects execution of a renamed pythonw.exe (userscreen.exe) from a suspicious location (Public\AccountPictures) that demonstrates short-lived execution characteristics indicative of a sandbox/VM evasion check, immediately followed by network connectivity to known NarwhalRAT C2 domains or pcloud infrastructure.
This rule detects network activity associated with the StealC information stealer, specifically focusing on HTTP POST requests made to known command-and-control (C2) domains. It identifies characteristic URL patterns, such as randomly generated 16-character PHP files or specific index.php structures, which are used for bot registration and communication. The detection includes patterns indicative of RC4-encrypted payloads and behavior mimicking Amadey bot status checks.
Detects FTP protocol traffic (on port 21) initiated by a process named 'squid.exe' or containing 'squid' in its filename. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts related to the Squidbleed vulnerability, where a compromised Squid proxy might be used for unauthorized FTP communications.
This rule monitors for the execution and network activity of known data exfiltration tools such as WinSCP, rclone, and MegaSync. It also tracks the creation of configuration files associated with these tools and monitors DNS requests and browser navigation to known cloud storage and file-sharing destinations. This behavior is indicative of data staging and unauthorized exfiltration.
Detects non-browser applications (Python, PowerShell, cURL, wget, node) communicating directly with OpenAI or ChatGPT API endpoints, indicative of automated AI tradecraft by threat actors. This rule specifically looks for network connections to api.openai.com initiated by these common scripting or command-line tools.
Identifies AI agents (python.exe or node.exe) making outbound GET requests where sensitive local data is extracted and appended as URL parameters for exfiltration. This rule specifically looks for URL parameters like 'q', 'data', 'context', or 'query' containing at least 50 alphanumeric characters, underscores, or hyphens, while excluding legitimate API calls to OpenAI and Anthropic.
Detects outbound network connections to major Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoints (OpenAI, Google, Anthropic) initiated by processes not explicitly identified as standard web browsers or command-line utilities. This pattern may indicate automated data exfiltration ('prompt stealing' or unauthorized access to corporate data) using custom or malicious tools executing from suspicious directories like temp, appdata, or public folders.
Page 205 of 280