Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network communication to well-known public DNS resolvers (1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, 9.9.9.9) or DNS queries for their domains, initiated by processes other than standard web browsers. This behavior is often associated with non-browser applications, potential C2 channels, or hidden network activity bypassing system DNS configurations.
This rule detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts by identifying emails containing financial keywords sent to sensitive finance/accounting roles from domains that have not been observed in the last 180 days. It then correlates this email event with subsequent device-level network activity involving banking or financial URLs initiated by the recipient user, which may indicate follow-up reconnaissance or unauthorized access.
Detects network connections from non-browser processes executing from the ProgramData directory to known dead-drop resolver forums (digitalpoint.com, letsdiskuss.com) used by Lorem Ipsum for C2 resolution. This rule specifically targets the Rapid Brigantine threat.
Detects native Windows command and scripting interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) initiating external network connections to multiple distinct IP addresses, which is often an indicator of automated C2 beaconing or lateral movement activity.
This rule monitors for three categories of potentially suspicious network behavior: connections to common CDN providers over non-standard ports, high-volume HTTPS connections directly to IP addresses (IP-direct) bypassing standard domain resolution, and high-volume traffic to CDN infrastructure that may indicate domain fronting or C2 communication. Such patterns are often used by adversaries to mask egress traffic or exfiltrate data.
This rule detects pre-payload beaconing activity associated with the Meow RAT malware. It covers both network-based detection (outbound HTTP POST to known C2 domains and paths) and endpoint-based detection. Endpoint detection includes 'curl' processes communicating with known C2 infrastructure, 'osascript' processes spawned in the context of 'curl' C2 communication, and 'curl' commands using specific flags ('-k', '-s') along with a known build hash. This activity typically occurs before the main destructive payload is delivered.
This rule correlates multiple suspicious activities indicative of ransomware or destructive attacks. It detects a combination of volume shadow copy deletion, bulk file modifications, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, and network connections occurring during periods of high file write activity. The rule triggers when multiple signals are observed or when specific high-fidelity destructive indicators are present.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with web browser processes, including the execution of Python scripts, the loading of browser extensions from non-standard directories like AppData or Temp, the creation of Python scripts by browsers in temp folders, and outbound network connections by Python processes following browser activity. These patterns are often associated with browser-based exploitation, extension-based malware, or initial access stages where a browser is used as a conduit for malicious code execution.
Detects a suspicious execution chain potentially associated with Deed RAT (used by Mustang Panda/Twill Typhoon), consisting of DLL sideloading by a legitimate signed executable followed by persistence mechanism creation (Registry Run keys or Scheduled Tasks) on the same host. Additionally, it identifies devices exhibiting repeated outbound connections to the same remote public IP over multiple days, serving as an indicator of potential re-compromise or persistent C2.
Detects network and DNS activity involving domains known to be used by the threat actor APT28 for command and control, specifically for hosting WebDAV payloads, malicious LNK files, and weaponized documents.
This rule detects the suspicious initialization of the Common Language Runtime (CLR) components (mscoree.dll, clr.dll, or oleaut32.dll) within the explorer.exe process, followed closely by an outbound HTTPS connection to filen.io domains. This pattern is indicative of fileless .NET-based C2 implants, such as those generated by the Covenant framework, executing within the context of a legitimate Windows shell process.
This rule detects the suspicious initialization of the Common Language Runtime (CLR) components (mscoree.dll, clr.dll, or oleaut32.dll) within the explorer.exe process, followed closely by an outbound HTTPS connection to filen.io domains. This pattern is indicative of fileless .NET-based C2 implants, such as those generated by the Covenant framework, executing within the context of a legitimate Windows shell process.
Detects network connections over port 3389 (RDP) initiated by processes other than standard Remote Desktop clients (mstsc.exe). This rule specifically looks for suspicious indicators such as execution from non-standard or temporary file paths, or the use of common living-off-the-land binaries (like powershell.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe) that might be acting as a proxy for remote access or lateral movement.
Detects processes attempting to query the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254) that are not recognized as legitimate cloud agent software (such as AWS, Azure, or Google cloud agents). This behavior is often indicative of SSRF or unauthorized discovery attempts by an adversary on a compromised cloud instance.
Detects processes attempting to query the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254) that are not recognized as legitimate cloud agent software (such as AWS, Azure, or Google cloud agents). This behavior is often indicative of SSRF or unauthorized discovery attempts by an adversary on a compromised cloud instance.
Detects network connections initiated by a non-Microsoft signed rundll32.exe process. The rule identifies processes named rundll32.exe that are not signed by Microsoft and are communicating over common ports associated with malicious activity, specifically focusing on external IP addresses and multiple connection attempts.
This rule detects network connections on port 443 made to common public DNS resolvers (1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4, 9.9.9.9, 149.112.112.112) by processes other than known web browsers. This behavior is atypical for standard endpoint processes and may indicate the use of DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) for command and control or data exfiltration to bypass network filtering.
Identifies outbound C2 connections to domains generated by MLTBackdoor DGA.
This rule detects outgoing network connections from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to public-facing URLs that match common Microsoft Office WOPI (Web Application Open Platform Interface) request patterns, but are directed to domains other than trusted Microsoft-affiliated infrastructure. This behavior can be indicative of a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempt, where an attacker tries to coerce the server into making unauthorized requests to external resources.
This rule detects network connections over WinRM ports (5985, 5986) originating from potentially suspicious processes that are not standard Windows remote management binaries. It explicitly identifies activity where SharePoint-related processes initiate WinRM, which may indicate lateral movement patterns such as those seen in activity attributed to Storm-2603.
This rule detects network connections over WinRM ports (5985, 5986) originating from potentially suspicious processes that are not standard Windows remote management binaries. It explicitly identifies activity where SharePoint-related processes initiate WinRM, which may indicate lateral movement patterns such as those seen in activity attributed to Storm-2603.
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