Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,876 detections
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Detects svchost.exe (hosting Windows Store Install Service) loading InstallServicePlugin.dll from a UNC path or making outbound SMB connections as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. This indicates successful UNCanny coercion where the SYSTEM-level service performs LoadLibraryW against an attacker-controlled UNC path, enabling NTLM machine account capture or SYSTEM code execution.
Detects potential browser fingerprinting and network reconnaissance behavior associated with Bluekit BitM PhaaS campaigns. The rule correlates large suspicious JavaScript file downloads (excluding common CDNs) with STUN server connectivity within a 10-minute window, a pattern often used by adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) frameworks to fingerprint victims and establish WebRTC channels.
This rule detects the execution of known remote access tools (such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or RustDesk) that are spawned as child processes from common web browsers. It correlates process creation events with subsequent network connections by these tools to public IP addresses over specific ports commonly used by remote access software, within a 30-minute timeframe of the process start.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. These IP addresses have been categorized based on their observed roles in FortiBleed attacks, including C2, pentest lab, credential validation, and sniffer nodes. Monitoring these connections can help identify compromised systems communicating with FortiBleed infrastructure.
Detects anomalous behavior associated with msiexec.exe that aligns with activity patterns of infostealer malwares like Lumma Stealer and Amadey Bot. This includes cross-process injection from unsigned processes, spawning of msiexec.exe by LOLBins or script interpreters, suspicious outbound network connectivity, and unauthorized access to browser credential storage files.
Detects outbound network connections to major Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoints (OpenAI, Google, Anthropic) initiated by processes not explicitly identified as standard web browsers or command-line utilities. This pattern may indicate automated data exfiltration ('prompt stealing' or unauthorized access to corporate data) using custom or malicious tools executing from suspicious directories like temp, appdata, or public folders.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. These IP addresses have been categorized based on their observed roles in FortiBleed attacks, including C2, pentest lab, credential validation, and sniffer nodes.
Detects DNS lookups and network connections to known AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language) initiated by non-standard processes. This rule excludes common web browsers, productivity applications, and development tools to identify potentially unauthorized or suspicious interaction with AI services from internal processes.
Detects DNS lookups and network connections to known AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language) initiated by non-standard processes. This rule excludes common web browsers, productivity applications, and development tools to identify potentially unauthorized or suspicious interaction with AI services from internal processes.
Detects potential execution chains related to QR code phishing (Quishing) by monitoring for suspicious process creation or outbound network connections originating from document readers, office applications, and QR scanner utilities. It covers three primary vectors: suspicious process spawning (e.g., Office apps launching cmd or powershell), non-standard network connections from document readers, and malicious URL-based LNK files spawned via explorer.exe.
This rule detects potential persistence via Registry Run keys (T1547.001) where a value is added pointing to a file in an AppData or Temp directory, followed by a successful outbound network connection from a process located in those same directories. This behavior is indicative of malware or an adversary establishing persistence and immediately reaching out to a command-and-control (C2) server.
Detects high-frequency HTTPS network connections to Google Drive or Google APIs originating from processes that are not common web browsers or productivity software. This behavior is indicative of the GearDoor backdoor, commonly used by APT41, which leverages Google services as a command-and-control (C2) channel.
Detects FTP protocol traffic (on port 21) initiated by a process named 'squid.exe' or containing 'squid' in its filename. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts related to the Squidbleed vulnerability, where a compromised Squid proxy might be used for unauthorized FTP communications.
Detects network communication from processes to known ClickFix autoupdate domains such as 'autoupdatet.com', 'autoupdaters.com', and 'autoupdatethis.com'. This activity could indicate the presence of unwanted or malicious software attempting to update itself.
Identifies DNS queries sent to unauthorized external DNS resolvers (rogue IPs instead of corporate/ISP assigned servers).
Detects anomalous process execution patterns where a database process (postgres or postmaster) or a common system utility (nc, python, bash) is observed initiating unauthorized network connections to a known external C2 IP or accessing sensitive cryptographic files (e.g., server.key). This behavior is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity, specifically the exfiltration of credentials or sensitive data via database-level command execution (sys_eval) or direct file manipulation.
Detects suspected NarwhalRAT activity where a process (e.g., userscreen.exe or pythonw.exe in suspicious locations) communicates with the pCloud API to resolve a dead-drop location, followed within 60 seconds by a beacon connection to a different remote IP, characteristic of C2 communication.
This rule monitors for network connections to a specific remote IP (62.171.185.97) associated with suspicious activity. It flags connections involving specific high-risk ports, the use of Wget/1.18 for user agents, or access to the '/pwned' URL path, which are common indicators of automated attack tools or post-exploitation activity.
Detects the use of PowerShell to archive files (using Compress-Archive) followed by an HTTP network connection to a suspicious external IP address (91.196.32.232) within a short time window. This sequence is often indicative of data staging followed by exfiltration.
Detects evidence of potential data exfiltration activities including the execution of known exfiltration scripts, the use of netcat for unauthorized data transfer to a specific C2 IP, and the presence or access of BloodHound dump files. The rule also monitors for network communication with a known command and control IP address.
Detects potential Windows executable or DLL file downloads originating from or directed to a specific suspicious external IP address (154.49.70.216) over HTTP port 80, based on signature-based alerts from network security tools.
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