Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects phishing emails that spoof specific healthcare domains (nhs.uk, mayoclinic.org, clevelandclinic.org) using invoice or payment-related subjects, characterized by DMARC/DKIM/SPF authentication failures. The detection correlates these emails with a subsequent user network request to known open-redirect or intermediary SaaS platforms (holabrief.com, loopedin.io) within a 10-minute window, indicating a likely credential harvesting or malware delivery sequence.
Detects potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) in an AutoGen Studio environment by correlating an unexpected outbound network connection from the AutoGen process to an external endpoint, followed by the immediate spawning of a command interpreter (shell) child process containing common command-line interface indicators (e.g., whoami, curl, wget, encoded PowerShell).
Detects a potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) chain originating from AI orchestration frameworks (such as AutoGen/Uvicorn). The rule identifies an execution flow where an AI framework launches a browser automation process (e.g., Playwright/Chromium), which subsequently spawns a suspicious OS shell or LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary) that immediately initiates an external network connection. This behavior is indicative of an AI agent being coerced to bypass security controls via MCP (Model Context Protocol) WebSocket loopback trust, leading to command execution and external C2 communication.
Detects malware checking internet connectivity via external IP services
Detects access to paid threat intelligence portals for target research
Detects concurrent suspicious network beaconing to Telegram API or IPInfo and high-volume destructive file operations (deletion or modification) on a specific host, indicative of TrymeLocker ransomware activity.
This rule detects processes other than common web browsers (e.g., chrome, firefox, msedge) initiating outbound network connections on ports 80, 443, or 8084 to specific domains commonly associated with CDN, telemetry, or cloud-based update services. This behavior might indicate unauthorized processes communicating with external infrastructure, potentially for command and control or data exfiltration, masquerading as legitimate traffic.
Detects anomalous outbound TCP network connections on port 8084 originating from non-browser processes to known CDN providers (Akamai, Microsoft). This behavior is characteristic of VSHELL RAT C2 beaconing using domain blending techniques to mask communications within expected network noise.
Detects network communication with known SNOWLIGHT dropper C2 infrastructure (IP 38.60.253.35, port 8084), as well as unauthorized network activity originating from the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe) and suspicious file execution of a known malicious hash associated with this activity.
Detects core indicators of Grixba malware, including the persistence path of GT_NET.exe in the Public Music directory, the loading of the associated malicious CoreScanner module (inf_g.dll), staging of reconnaissance output files, and the use of GT_NET.exe to perform network lateral movement via WMI/WinRM ports.
This rule detects connection attempts to common administrative and remote access ports (RDP, SSH, SMB, RPC) from non-internal IP address ranges. Such activity may indicate an attempt to bypass Zero-Trust network policies or unauthorized remote access attempts from external or untrusted segments.
This query detects network communication to known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses used by the Medusa ransomware group, often via malicious SimpleHelp RMM servers.
Detects Node.js processes associated with NodeBB making outbound network connections to suspicious paths (/users/, /activities/, /inbox, /.well-known/webfinger). This activity may indicate exploitation of the NodeBB ActivityPub plugin (attributedTo UID spoofing), where an attacker forces the application to fetch attacker-controlled URIs.
Detects evidence of the NodeBB ActivityPub UID spoofing proof-of-concept (PoC) script (poc.js). The rule identifies the execution of node processes using specific command-line arguments (--target-base, --actor-origin, --spoof-uid, --recipient-uid) associated with the exploit, as well as Node.js processes making outbound network connections to ActivityPub path components (/inbox, /activitypub) over non-standard network ports. This activity is indicative of vulnerability testing or exploitation attempts.
Detects evidence of libssh2 publickey list heap corruption exploitation, including the presence or execution of known proof-of-concept (PoC) binaries, malicious SSH server connection patterns on port 2228, and suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, calc.exe) spawned by SSH clients or daemons.
Detects network connections attempting to exfiltrate data via Discord webhooks. This rule specifically looks for POST requests to the Discord API webhook endpoint.
Detects shell commands querying attacker-controlled domains disguised as Apple driver stores to fetch malicious macOS backdoors, specifically looking for 'coreaudiod' or 'audio-issue-fix.sh' in the URL.
Detects network connections to specific IP addresses associated with websocket protocols
This rule detects network connections to specific domains known to be associated with malicious activity or to URLs matching a common Command and Control (C2) communication pattern. The domains 'openanyworddocument.com', 'kittyfreespace.com', 'searchdocumentsfree.com', 'autoupdatet.com', 'autoupdaters.com', and 'autoupdatethis.com' are explicitly listed as indicators. Additionally, the rule identifies C2 communication attempts via a regex pattern '/api/(init|cl)/[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}' within the RemoteUrl field, which often indicates communication with a C2 server using a UUID-like identifier.
This rule detects WebSocket communication attempts from a device to known command and control (C2) IP addresses associated with the Remcos Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It specifically looks for network events where the remote URL contains 'ws://', 'wss://', or 'websocket' and the remote IP address matches one of the listed indicators of compromise (IOCs).
This rule detects various methods of establishing a reverse shell on Linux systems. It looks for process creation events involving common shell interpreters (bash, sh) attempting to connect to network devices via /dev/tcp or /dev/udp. It also identifies the use of network utilities like netcat (nc, ncat, netcat, nc.traditional) and socat when used with command execution flags (-e, -c, EXEC) and shell interpreters. Additionally, it flags direct outbound network connections initiated by these shell interpreters or network utilities, which could indicate a reverse shell communication channel.
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