Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,876 detections
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Detects anomalous activity associated with Amazon Q processes, including unauthorized access to SSH agent binaries, attempts to read SSH configuration files or keys in ~/.ssh/, and suspicious outbound network connections over port 22, potentially indicating lateral movement.
This rule detects processes launched from common user-writable or temporary directories (Downloads, AppData/Temp, etc.) that initiate a network connection more than 60 seconds after the process start time. This behavior is indicative of a delayed C2 beaconing or a dormant malicious payload being activated.
Detects outbound network communication from node.exe to the domain 'stitch-production.org'. This domain is associated with the 'Miasma' (also known as Mini Shai-Hulud) campaign, which uses malicious npm packages with post-install scripts to steal developer credentials, including Git, Docker, SSH, and cloud service configuration files.
Detects a potential multi-stage attack sequence where a file (archive or browser-related) is executed, followed by a script interpreter (wscript/cscript), and finally followed by a remote connection to common remote access ports (RDP, FTP, SMB, SSH). The rule correlates these events within a specific timeframe per device to identify likely lateral movement or remote command and control initialization.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities characteristic of an SSH-based worm. The rule correlates non-standard processes reading SSH private keys, the presence of known cryptominer components (lambsys, procq, isp.sh), and subsequent SSH network fan-out activity from the same host, indicating lateral movement.
This rule detects the execution of common scripting interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript) that include command-line arguments referencing major cloud storage providers and file-hosting services. This behavior is frequently associated with data exfiltration or the staging of malicious payloads using legitimate web services.
Detects outbound network connections to URLs containing strings associated with Qakbot (Qbot) malware infrastructure and common ports used by the malware for command-and-control communication.
Detects the 'lambsys' malware terminating competing cryptocurrency miner processes (such as xmrig, kinsing, or watchdog) using process termination commands (pkill, kill, killall) from a non-root shell. The detection further correlates this activity with the launch of a new miner binary from temporary directories and subsequent outbound network connections to common mining pool ports.
Detects the Gamaredon PteroVDoor malware chain, including initial execution of obfuscated VBScript files from Office applications or temporary folders, the spawning of PowerShell with obfuscated arguments, subsequent C2 communication over common ports to dynamic DNS domains, and secondary WMI event subscription persistence.
Detects the Lambsys cryptominer malware performing SSH credential harvesting by accessing user SSH keys (known_hosts, authorized_keys, id_rsa) with unauthorized processes, staging these files in temporary or hidden directories, and subsequently initiating outbound SSH connections for lateral movement, all correlated by process group ID.
Detects execution chains attributed to the Gamaredon threat group (also known as Shuckworm/ACTINIUM). The rule monitors Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Equation Editor) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, where the child process contains suspicious patterns such as base64 blobs, script download commands, or known Gamaredon Ptero-toolset strings (PteroPaste, PteroVDoor, PteroDee). This activity is correlated with a network connection to non-Microsoft infrastructure within 60 seconds of process execution.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands associated with the Gamaredon Group's Ptero malware family. This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command lines (including encoded commands and common obfuscation patterns) originating from Office applications or temporary directories, correlated with network connections to known Gamaredon C2 domains or registry modifications to Run keys for persistence.
Detects network activity associated with the ROOTBOY actor, specifically identifying internal devices communicating with known malicious command and control (C2) IP addresses and subsequently attempting to access specific suspicious domains or URLs linked to the actor's infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections made to specific non-standard ports (7777, 8080, 8443) where the remote URL contains substrings associated with proxy or tunneling activities ('proxy', 'tunnel', 'hide'). This behavior is commonly associated with malware attempting to evade security controls by routing traffic through unauthorized intermediaries or obfuscated tunnels.
Detects outbound network connections from workstations or servers to common message broker ports (MQTT 1883/8883, AMQP 5672). These protocols are sometimes abused for command-and-control (C2) communication, as they allow for pub/sub messaging patterns that can blend into legitimate network traffic.
Detects outbound network connections from 'squid.exe' to internal IP addresses on port 21 (FTP). This could indicate an attacker controlling an FTP server within the internal network, potentially exploiting a vulnerability like Squidbleed.
Detects network connections from suspicious or unexpected processes to common public webhook and automation services, which may indicate data exfiltration or automated C2 communication.
Detects the execution of a local, polymorphic HTML file that contains AI-obfuscated JavaScript, followed by an HTTP POST request to an external server within a 5-minute window, indicating potential credential exfiltration.
Detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious usage of the Jam build tool (jam.exe or jamplus.exe). The rule flags when Jam is executed by non-standard parent processes, when suspicious command-line arguments are used, when Jam spawns unexpected child processes, or when Jam initiates network connections.
This rule detects VBScript execution (via wscript.exe or cscript.exe) that attempts to load WinHTTP objects (WinHttpRequest.5.1, MSXML2.XMLHTTP) or uses generic object creation functions (CreateObject, GetObject). This behavior is often associated with VBScripts establishing command and control (C2) communication or performing data exfiltration.
This rule correlates multiple low-to-medium confidence signals across file, process, network, and registry events to detect potential ransomware activity. The rule identifies suspicious behaviors including mass file renames, creation of known ransom note file types in multiple directories, shadow copy deletion via system utilities, disabling of antivirus and security monitoring, large archive staging, unauthorized outbound network connections, and suspicious process injection. Alerts are generated based on the aggregation and frequency of these signals, indicating a high probability of ransomware-related malicious activity.
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