Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,876 detections
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Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts exhibiting characteristics of PowerShell-based download cradles, such as specific User-Agent strings or URL patterns associated with IEX DownloadString or Invoke-WebRequest.
Detects outbound network traffic established by a client using the default self-signed TLS certificate generated by Metasploit for Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS sessions. The rule looks for the common default subject fields 'CN=metasploit' and 'O=msf' within the TLS handshake.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests containing patterns commonly associated with Emotet command-and-control (C2) communication, specifically identifying the use of an application/octet-stream content type combined with a specific, randomized URI path structure consisting of alphanumeric segments.
This rule detects potential bulk data exfiltration by monitoring for outbound HTTP POST requests to non-standard ports where the Content-Length header indicates a transfer of over 10 megabytes. This behavior can be indicative of an attacker exfiltrating large amounts of sensitive data from the network to an external server.
Detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot command-and-control check-ins. The rule looks for an 'established' flow to an external network using a POST method, with a request body containing 'qbot' followed by a version string pattern, which is indicative of the malware reporting system info to its C2 server.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length is at least 10MB and the Content-Type header indicates the transfer of archived data (zip or x-tar). This pattern is often associated with the staging and exfiltration of compressed sensitive data from an internal host to an external network destination.
This rule monitors for HTTP POST requests to external networks containing 'gtag=' in the URI, which is a known technique used by the TrickBot malware to exfiltrate its group identifier during C2 communication.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity to a /submit.php URI with a default Cobalt Strike User-Agent string. This is indicative of a default or poorly customized Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profile being used for command and control communication.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity indicative of Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 communication. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/updates', '/pixel', '/submit.php') in combination with a default User-Agent string commonly used by Cobalt Strike malleable profiles.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with specific URI patterns (/rob/ or /ins/) that are indicative of TrickBot malware command and control (C2) check-in activity.
Detects outbound ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets that contain an abnormally large payload (greater than 64 bytes). This behavior is characteristic of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within the payload of ICMP packets to bypass network security controls or establish covert command and control communication.
Detects the initial handshake communication pattern associated with AsyncRAT, characterized by a specific base64-encoded configuration blob sent to external non-standard ports (6606, 7707, 8808) as identified by the Snort rule logic.
This rule detects potential bulk data exfiltration by monitoring for outbound HTTP POST requests to non-standard ports where the Content-Length header indicates a transfer of over 10 megabytes. This behavior can be indicative of an attacker exfiltrating large amounts of sensitive data from the network to an external server.
Detects outbound FTP STOR (Store) commands directed to external networks. This indicates that a host inside the local network is attempting to upload data to an external server. The rule uses a threshold to filter out isolated commands, triggering when 3 or more STOR commands are detected within 120 seconds, which is characteristic of data exfiltration or staging behavior.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity related to the Qakbot malware. It specifically monitors for established outbound TLS traffic over non-standard ports (ports other than 443) where the Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains a numeric IPv4 address instead of a domain name, which is a characteristic behavior of Qakbot C2 infrastructure.
Analyzes HTTP network events to detect the Komari agent executing HTTP POST requests with large data payloads, indicating data exfiltration. This rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests combined with recent file access events for common archive file types (zip, rar, 7z, db) on the same device and by the same initiating process.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by a specific URL pattern consisting of two segments of 4-16 alphanumeric characters, typically observed in Emotet C2 traffic. The rule specifically matches requests with a Content-Type header set to application/octet-stream, which is indicative of malicious binary payload transfer or communication.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts to external destinations consistent with default Cobalt Strike HTTP Beacon communication patterns. It specifically looks for GET requests containing URI paths commonly associated with default Cobalt Strike profiles (ca, submit.php, updates.rss) combined with a specific, hardcoded User-Agent string associated with Cobalt Strike's default configuration.
Maps the TiFlux agent initiating outbound SMB (port 445) connections to other local administrative shares, indicating active lateral movement.
Identifies Node.js or IDE-related processes initiating connections to the Solana mainnet RPC endpoint. This behavior is associated with GLASSWORM's WASM loader performing dead-drop C2 resolution via blockchain transaction memos.
Identifies mstsc.exe initiating outbound TCP connections to external, non-private IP addresses over port 3389, indicating a potential connection to an attacker-controlled Terminal Server.
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