Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Python interpreter activity associated with the LegionLoader malware, specifically monitoring for Python execution from within the 'AppData\Roaming\Traiolx' directory, or outbound network connections from Python processes to known malicious infrastructure such as 'birdeemusic.com' or other suspicious outbound HTTP/HTTPS communication.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with Emotet malware by monitoring for successful network connections to suspicious remote ports frequently used by the malware. The rule flags endpoints that establish connections to at least three of these high-risk ports within a one-hour window, which is indicative of automated C2 beaconing behavior.
This rule detects network connections using the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol to external IP addresses. GRE is often used for tunneling and can be leveraged by adversaries for command and control or data exfiltration to bypass network filtering.
This rule detects outbound network connections to WhatsApp (whatsapp.com or wa.me) initiated by common scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). Such activity from these processes is anomalous in typical enterprise environments and may indicate the use of scripts for account compromise, C2 communication, or exfiltration via messaging platforms.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from user-writable AppData\Roaming directories initiating external network connections. This behavior is consistent with the execution of LegionLoader malware and its associated _socket.pyd Python C2 module.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity associated with LegionLoader by monitoring for outbound network connections to 'birdeemusic.com' domains initiated by Python or AppData/Roaming-based processes, following a precursor process launch (msiexec.exe or from AppData/Roaming) on the same host within 10 minutes.
This rule detects outbound network connections from devices to a specific remote IP address (62.102.148.212) on a set of suspicious remote ports (37393, 45839, 38471, 12345, 4444, 5555). This pattern is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration to a known malicious endpoint.
This rule monitors network, proxy, and DNS traffic for connections to the domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. It identifies potentially suspicious activity by aggregating requests and distinguishing between general outbound traffic and traffic to specific endpoints, such as search queries that may indicate data exfiltration or reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of specific suspicious binaries (tcc.exe or LuaJit.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of shellcode loading, followed by a network connection to known C2 infrastructure (IP 207.56.8.166 or Port 18848) from the same host within 15 minutes.
Detects evidence of a malicious browser extension, identified by extension ID flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd, designed to redirect search traffic through a typosquatted domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. The rule monitors for file-system creation of the malicious extension, modifications to browser preferences files, manipulation of system registry keys to enforce the search provider, and outbound network connections to the malicious domain from major web browsers.
Detects indicators of the BeepRAT malware (associated with Operation DragonClone), including specific process execution patterns of HFY.exe, LuaJit.exe, or tcc.exe, network connections to known C2 infrastructure on port 18848, keylogger file creation, and malicious task scheduling or TCC loader execution techniques.
Detects network communication associated with BeepRAT, specifically identifying direct TCP connections to a known command-and-control IP address on a non-standard port or DNS requests directed at a specific malicious domain.
Detects network and DNS indicators associated with BeepRAT, including connections to known C2 IP addresses on port 18848, resolution of known C2 domains, and suspicious DNS queries to 'doh.pub' from known loader processes (tcc.exe, HFY.exe).
This rule monitors for the presence of a specific malicious browser extension (by identifier) on the file system and simultaneously tracks outbound network connections to a known typosquatted domain ('perplexity-ai.online'). It alerts on the potential presence of an adversary-controlled browser plugin or user navigation to a malicious domain often used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects anomalous network activity originating from Firefox (firefox.exe). The rule flags connections to port 8765 (associated with specific browser-based exfiltration PoCs) and any outbound connection on non-standard ports (excluding common browser ports: 80, 443, 8080, 8443, 8888, 53) directed to public IP addresses.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with Djinn Stealer malware beaconing to a hardcoded C2 IP address (96.126.130.126) on port 58942. The detection specifically monitors for HTTP POST requests containing the malicious User-Agent 'telemetry-client/1.0' and 'application/octet-stream' content-type, which are characteristic of this stealer's exfiltration activity.
This rule detects the installation and activity of a malicious Google Chrome extension used to hijack the browser's default search provider. The rule triggers on a multi-stage process involving the creation of a specific malicious extension directory, modification of the Chrome Preferences file to change search settings, tampering with the 'PreferenceMACs' registry keys to bypass browser-based integrity warnings, and subsequent network communication with a known malicious C2 domain associated with the search hijack.
Detects the installation of a malicious Chrome extension (identified by its extension ID) that abuses declarativeNetRequest permissions to intercept and redirect user search queries through the 'perplexity-ai.online' domain. The detection correlates the creation of the extension's directory on disk with a high volume of network connections from the browser to the malicious intermediary domain.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity or data exfiltration by monitoring for first-time DNS resolution of known typosquatted domains targeting 'Perplexity AI', followed by persistent outbound network connections from common web browsers to the same domain family.
Detects a malicious browser extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) that masquerades as Perplexity AI. The rule identifies the extension installation followed by a two-hop network redirect sequence: the browser is first directed to a malicious domain (perplexity-ai.online) which logs user metadata, then immediately redirected to a ZIP file download lure on a different domain. This behavior is correlated within a 30-minute window for a specific browser process.
Detects potential BeepRAT malware activity characterized by a process executing from a non-standard directory, writing suspicious artifacts like images or encrypted files to the AppData folder, and initiating frequent outbound network connections typical of command-and-control beaconing.
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