Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,876 detections
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Detects when RegAsm.exe initiates outbound HTTPS connections to domains associated with Telegram or Cloudflare. This behavior is indicative of malware like Vidar using RegAsm.exe for network communication, potentially for command and control or data exfiltration, leveraging legitimate services as proxies.
Detects the deployment of the Kazuar backdoor, initiated by the Gamaredon group's PteroPaste loader. The rule monitors for a suspicious file creation event where a PowerShell or rundll32 process writes a DLL to a user-writable directory (AppData/Local or AppData/Roaming), followed immediately by the creation of a scheduled task (using schtasks) designed to trigger the execution of the dropped DLL via system binaries such as regsvr32, rundll32, or mshta.
Detects requests to the PeopleSoft listening connector containing loopback, link-local, or private network targets in the URL or captured request fields. This indicates a potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempt.
Detects native Windows command and scripting interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) initiating external network connections to multiple distinct IP addresses, which is often an indicator of automated C2 beaconing or lateral movement activity.
Detects non-browser processes initiating HTTPS network connections to well-known public DNS over HTTPS (DoH) resolvers. This behavior is often associated with command and control (C2) communication, where malware attempts to evade network security controls by tunneling DNS queries through encrypted HTTPS traffic.
Detects non-browser processes accessing sensitive browser data files (such as Login Data, Cookies, or key stores) followed by network activity to known suspicious, cryptocurrency, or potential malware-hosting domains. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and exfiltration by information-stealing malware.
This rule monitors network connection events for outbound traffic to known tunneling, development, and hosting platforms often abused by adversaries for command and control or unauthorized data egress. The rule specifically excludes common browsers, development tools, and package managers to focus on unexpected processes initiating these connections.
Detects outbound network connections to common Azure-related domains originating from suspicious file paths such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData subdirectories. This behavior is indicative of potential malware or unauthorized scripts executing from temporary user locations to reach out to cloud infrastructure.
Detects instances where the Outlook process (OUTLOOK.EXE) initiates a network connection over SMB (port 445) to an external, non-private IP address. This behavior is highly suspicious as Microsoft Outlook should typically not be performing direct SMB connections to external systems, and this is often indicative of an adversary attempting to leverage malicious documents or templates to perform credential harvesting via NTLM relay or SMB authentication captures.
Detects suspicious PowerShell processes initiated by common non-terminal applications (e.g., browser, office, script hosts) that perform in-memory code execution (using commands like IEX or System.Reflection) and simultaneously establish rapid network connections to multiple distinct external IP addresses within a one-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a staged payload download or beaconing activity.
Detects an AI agent performing outbound network connections to the stitch-design.ai domain. This behavior is indicative of a malicious AI agent attempting to fetch dynamically loaded execution instructions at runtime to evade static analysis during security vetting processes.
Detects network connection activity originating from a host to the hardcoded IP 62.102.148.212 on port 37393, which is identified as a command and control (C2) endpoint for Remcos RAT. This communication is often associated with process hollowing where the malware hides within legitimate browser processes.
Detects execution of processes originating from memory-only file descriptors (memfd) or the /proc/self/fd/ path, indicating fileless execution techniques often used by malware like MYRA RAT. This behavior is correlated with outbound network connections on port 4444 within a 2-minute window, which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication.
This rule detects network connections to remote URLs containing specific keywords ('festung', 'germania', 'deutsch', 'prinz', 'eugen') that are indicative of Germany-themed infrastructure potentially associated with the Prinz Eugen Ransomware. This helps identify early communication with command and control servers or data exfiltration points.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by identifying devices that make a high number of network connections (3 or more within an hour) to various remote IPs using common file transfer and email protocols (FTP, SFTP, SMB, SMTP) on their standard ports (21, 22, 445, 25, 587). This pattern can indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate collected data from a compromised system.
Detects outbound network connections to common MQTT ports (1883, 8883) initiated by living-off-the-land binaries, command interpreters, or unknown processes. This behavior may indicate an attacker using MQTT as a covert C2 channel to bypass network filtering by mimicking legitimate IoT protocol traffic.
Detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious usage of the Jam build tool (jam.exe or jamplus.exe). The rule flags when Jam is executed by non-standard parent processes, when suspicious command-line arguments are used, when Jam spawns unexpected child processes, or when Jam initiates network connections.
Detects network connections to gateway, ingest, or egest subdomains of Filen.io, utilized by PRISMEX Covenant Grunts for C2.
This rule detects VBScript execution (via wscript.exe or cscript.exe) that attempts to load WinHTTP objects (WinHttpRequest.5.1, MSXML2.XMLHTTP) or uses generic object creation functions (CreateObject, GetObject). This behavior is often associated with VBScripts establishing command and control (C2) communication or performing data exfiltration.
Identifies outbound C2 connections to domains generated by MLTBackdoor DGA.
This rule detects the execution and network activity of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, and ScreenConnect. It assigns a risk score based on whether the activity occurs outside of defined business hours (8 AM - 6 PM) and whether the tool is initiating an outbound connection on port 443, a common pattern for C2 communication.
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