Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,876 detections
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Detects API access to bulletproof or offshore VPS providers
Detects access to underground exploit sales platforms
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to known malicious infrastructure (supp0v3[.]com), used across all campaign waves for credential theft and remote access.
Detects connections to domains associated with observed ACR Stealer command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects a high volume of network connections (10 or more within an hour) from a single process to remote URLs containing 'artifact' or 'maven' on standard HTTP (port 80) or HTTPS (port 443) ports. This activity could indicate legitimate software development or build processes, but also potentially malicious activities such as supply chain compromise, data staging, or exfiltration of development-related artifacts.
This rule detects processes making a high volume of successful network connections (3 or more within an hour) to domains containing 'codeartifact' or 'artifactory'. This behavior could indicate an attempt to download tools, libraries, or other artifacts, potentially as part of an ingress tool transfer or supply chain attack.
This rule detects processes making a high volume of successful network connections to GitHub's raw content (raw.github.com). This behavior can be indicative of an adversary downloading tools, scripts, or other malicious content from GitHub, potentially as part of a command and control (C2) channel or for staging purposes. The rule counts connections per hour per initiating process filename and flags if the count exceeds 5.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections initiated by an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to non-standard ports. This behavior can indicate a web shell or other compromise establishing Command and Control (C2) communication, potentially for data exfiltration or further malicious activity. The rule specifically looks for successful connections where the remote port is not commonly used for web traffic (80 or 443).
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the URI contains both "firmware" and "update" (case-insensitive) and the HTTP host is an IP address. This combination suggests a firmware update request originating from or destined for an unverified source, potentially indicating a malicious or unauthorized firmware update attempt.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration over TLS to non-standard endpoints. It triggers when a large amount of data (greater than 65000 bytes) is sent from the home network to any destination IP on port 443 (HTTPS). A threshold is applied, triggering an alert if this occurs 20 times within 60 seconds from the same source IP, indicating a high volume of outbound encrypted traffic.
This rule detects HTTP traffic that attempts to impersonate legitimate browser traffic (specifically Chrome on Safari) for command and control (C2) purposes. It looks for a specific User-Agent pattern that mimics Chrome on Safari and a URI pattern consisting of 8 to 16 lowercase alphanumeric characters. A threshold is applied to prevent excessive alerts, triggering if 20 such events occur within 60 seconds from the same source.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the 'Host' header contains common Content Delivery Network (CDN) domains (cloudfront.net, azureedge.net, fastly.net, cloudflare.net) and the 'X-Forwarded-Host' header is also present. This pattern can indicate C2 infrastructure attempting to hide behind CDN fronting, a technique used by adversaries to obscure the true origin of their command and control servers.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication over TCP that uses AES encryption with a hardcoded key pattern. It specifically looks for the byte sequence "41 45 53" (which corresponds to the ASCII string "AES") within the payload of a TCP flow from the internal network to any external destination. The rule further refines detection by checking for a payload size between 100 and 500 bytes and applies a threshold of 20 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source IP to reduce false positives. This pattern is indicative of certain malware families that use predictable AES keying for their C2 channels.
Detects outbound network connections to 'api.masscan.cloud', a known Miasma Command and Control (C2) domain. This rule identifies potential compromise by the Miasma malware family attempting to communicate with its C2 infrastructure.
Detects connections to 'lhr.life' tunnel domains. Miasma utilizes temporary tunneling services to bypass ingress firewalls and establish reverse shells.
Detects network connections from PowerShell or script interpreters to specific Cloudflare Workers or R2 infrastructure observed hosting steganographic payloads, associated with the 'Evil MSI Background campaign'. This rule identifies attempts to download malicious content from known adversary-controlled Cloudflare resources.
Detects Python or curl downloading payloads from the PySoxy staging IP 206.206.103.106. This indicates potential ingress tool transfer or staging activity by an adversary.
Detects outbound network traffic to specific Hong Kong backend fleet subnets (AS398478) identified as being utilized by the 'Borrowed Trust' threat actor. This infrastructure is used to manage redirection and affiliate attribution for their SEO poisoning campaign.
This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts originating from IIS web servers (identified by 'w3wp.exe' as the initiating process) to other internal IP addresses using common lateral movement ports (SMB, RDP, WinRM, SSH). It specifically looks for successful network connections from an IIS server to a private IP address on one of the specified ports, where the remote IP is not the local IP.
Detects instances where Windows screen capture tools (Snipping Tool or Screen Sketch) initiate network connections to external IP addresses on ports commonly associated with Server Message Block (SMB) or Common Internet File System (CIFS). This could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate captured screenshots to an external server.
This rule detects potential Agent Tesla malware activity by correlating process execution with network connections. It looks for processes named 'agenttesla.exe', 'atsvc.exe', or 'atservice.exe' that execute with command-line arguments indicative of data exfiltration (e.g., 'smtp', 'ftp', 'http.post', 'exfil'). The rule then correlates these process events with outbound network connections to non-private IP addresses, flagging instances where multiple process runs and multiple network connections occur within a 30-minute window.
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