Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects devices making a high volume of outbound network connections (more than 1000 connections within a one-minute window) to a single remote IP address. This behavior could indicate a network denial-of-service (DoS) attack originating from the device, or potentially other forms of high-volume network activity such as data exfiltration or scanning.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communications over non-standard ports. It identifies devices that make a high number of network connections to distinct remote IP addresses on ports other than common ones (80, 443, 53, 22, 21, 25, 110, 143, 993, 995) and not to private IP ranges. The rule aggregates connection counts and distinct remote IPs over 15-minute intervals and flags activity where there are more than 30 connections and more than 2 distinct remote IPs.
Detects connections to domains associated with observed ACR Stealer command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects an unusually high number of network connections made by common package managers (npm, nuget, pip) to their respective repositories. A high volume of connections within a short period (1 hour) could indicate automated activity, potential supply chain compromise, or an adversary attempting to download numerous packages for reconnaissance, staging, or malicious purposes.
This rule detects an unusually high number of network connections made by common package managers (npm, nuget, pip) to their respective repositories. A high volume of connections within a short period (1 hour) could indicate automated activity, potential supply chain compromise, or an adversary attempting to download numerous packages for reconnaissance, staging, or malicious purposes.
Detects unexpected outbound network connections from the ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe processes. Threat actors use WinGet DSC execution to establish reverse shells or download payloads. Network activity from these processes is highly unusual.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the host header contains a domain with at least 8 alphanumeric characters followed by a common top-level domain (.com, .net, .org), and the URI contains the string 'gate' (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of a hijacked legitimate domain being used for Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects potential Remote Access Trojan (RAT) callbacks occurring after a remote support session. It specifically looks for HTTP GET requests where the URI contains keywords like 'setup', 'install', 'support', or 'remote' (case-insensitive) and the User-Agent header contains 'MSIE'. This combination suggests a possible RAT communicating with its command and control server, masquerading as legitimate remote support or installation traffic.
This rule detects DNS queries that contain unusually long, seemingly random strings (50 or more alphanumeric characters) in the query name. This pattern is often used by malware for Command and Control (C2) communication, where the long string serves as 'junk data padding' to obfuscate the actual C2 data or to make detection more difficult. The rule specifically looks for DNS queries (port 53) and applies a threshold to prevent excessive alerts from a single source, triggering if 5 such queries are observed within 30 seconds from the same source IP.
This rule detects a pattern of dynamic DNS queries that could indicate Command and Control (C2) activity. Specifically, it triggers an alert if a single source IP address makes 50 or more DNS queries within a 60-second window. This high frequency of DNS lookups from a single source is often characteristic of malware attempting to resolve dynamically generated C2 domains.
This rule detects a high volume of Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) video stream traffic originating from the home network and destined for external servers. Specifically, it triggers an alert if more than 100 UDP packets with a data size greater than 1000 bytes are observed from a single source IP address within a 10-second window. This pattern could indicate unauthorized video streaming or data exfiltration.
Detects network connections to known HarborWatch C2 server IPs and associated fake-Amazon infrastructure domains, directly identifying compromised hosts communicating with this threat actor's infrastructure.
This rule detects potential bidirectional command and control (C2) activity leveraging Discord webhooks. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to 'discord.com' with the URI containing '/api/webhooks/'. A threshold of 5 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives and indicate sustained communication, characteristic of C2.
Detects the presence of 'search:' or 'search-ms:' URI schemes embedded in inbound emails. These schemes can be abused to force outbound NTLM authentication and leak Net-NTLMv2 hashes via a single link click.
Detects outbound network activity to the known malicious domain sfrclak.com or IP address 142.11.206.73. This behavior may indicate malware beaconing, command-and-control communication, or interaction with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
Hades Decoy Anthropic Traffic
Cortex XDR
Detects suspicious network connections to the Anthropic API endpoint (api.anthropic.com/v1/api) used as exfiltration camouflage by the Hades campaign. The rule specifically looks for traffic to 'api.anthropic.com' with the path '/v1/api', which is documented as returning 404s, indicating potential misuse for covert communication or data exfiltration.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the 'Host' header matches patterns commonly associated with serverless function domains, specifically AWS Lambda URLs, Azure Websites, and Google Cloud Functions. The rule is designed to identify potential command and control (C2) infrastructure utilizing serverless platforms. It triggers an alert if 10 such requests are observed from a single source IP within a 60-second window.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the 'Host' header contains 'workers.dev'. This domain is associated with Cloudflare Workers, which can be used by attackers to deploy attack infrastructure such as command and control (C2) servers, phishing pages, or data exfiltration points. The rule is configured to trigger a threshold alert if 10 such connections are observed from a single source IP within 60 seconds, indicating potential automated activity or repeated attempts to access or deploy malicious worker scripts.
This rule detects outbound TCP connections on port 9050, which is commonly used by the Tor anonymity network. The rule is configured to trigger an alert if there are at least 3 such connections from the same source within a 60-second window, indicating potential use of Tor. The message suggests this activity is related to accessing an Initial Access Broker market.
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