Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Microsoft Teams External Link Phishing
Cortex XDR
Detects malicious URLs sent via Microsoft Teams direct messages that contain known phishing Top-Level Domains (TLDs). The rule specifically looks for messages in one-on-one chats containing external links with TLDs commonly associated with phishing, such as '.ru', '.dev', '.xyz', and others, which could indicate Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) infrastructure or device code lure paths.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
Detects interactive shell execution within a container in a production, using 'exec'. The execution of `cat`, followed by network connections. This could be communicating with a service that runs arbitrary commands.
Detects a device making an unusually high number of unique outbound network connections to different remote IP addresses within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can indicate various malicious activities such as network scanning, botnet activity, or data exfiltration to multiple external hosts.
Detects outbound network connections from web server processes to steamcommunity.com, which is used by this malware to fetch steganographically encoded C2 payloads from profile comments.
Detects network connections to known CountLoader C2 domains based on McAfee Labs analysis. This rule identifies outbound network traffic from devices to a predefined list of Command and Control (C2) domains associated with the CountLoader malware. The detection logic specifically looks for the presence of these domains in the 'RemoteUrl' field of network events.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communications over non-standard ports. It identifies devices that make a high number of network connections to distinct remote IP addresses on ports other than common ones (80, 443, 53, 22, 21, 25, 110, 143, 993, 995) and not to private IP ranges. The rule aggregates connection counts and distinct remote IPs over 15-minute intervals and flags activity where there are more than 30 connections and more than 2 distinct remote IPs.
Identifies network connections to known C2 and dropper infrastructure associated with the Amatera Stealer 4.0.2 Beta and ClickFix campaign. Network indicators provide a reliable detection mechanism for compromised hosts attempting to download secondary payloads or exfiltrate data.
Detects script engines (wscript.exe, mshta.exe, cscript.exe) making outbound network connections to Cloudflare Workers domains (*.workers.dev). This is a primary C2 channel utilized by Gamaredon for GammaLoad payload delivery and beaconing.
Systeminfo.exe Making Network Connection
Cortex XDR
Detects network connections originating from the systeminfo.exe process. This activity is suspicious because systeminfo.exe is a legitimate system enumeration tool not typically expected to initiate outbound network connections. This behavior has been observed in malware campaigns, such as CountLoader, which injects a cryptocurrency clipper into systeminfo.exe to communicate with C2 servers and the Ethereum blockchain.
Detects the ClickFix paste-and-run initial-access primitive used by KongTuke and other groups. This involves `explorer.exe` spawning PowerShell with defense-evasion arguments (`-NoProfile`, `-ExecutionPolicy Bypass`, `-WindowStyle Hidden`) and a downloader chain targeting cloud file-sharing services. The combination of `explorer.exe` parent (user typing into Run dialog), hidden execution flags, `Invoke-WebRequest`, and `Expand-Archive` in one command line is the defining fingerprint of the technique.
Tycoon2FA Infrastructure IP Connections
Cortex XDR
Detects network traffic to IP addresses confirmed to host Tycoon2FA post-takedown components, including link management, credential harvesting, and kill switch infrastructure.
Detects outbound network connections to known C2 domains associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, used to exfiltrate stolen credentials from developer machines and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known PhantomRaven command and control (C2) infrastructure, including specific domains and IP addresses. The rule also specifically identifies potential data exfiltration attempts to the '/mozbra.php' endpoint.
Detects the Node.js process making external DNS requests to api64.ipify.org, a behavior used by the PhantomRaven payload to discover the host's public IP address.
Detects network connections to known PhantomRaven Wave 5 command-and-control infrastructure. PhantomRaven is an NPM supply chain attack targeting DeFi, Cloud, and AI developers.
Detects DNS queries or network connections to known PhantomRaven Wave 5 command-and-control infrastructure (domains and IP addresses). This rule identifies communication with specific malicious domains and IP addresses associated with the PhantomRaven campaign, indicating potential compromise or attempted communication with adversary infrastructure.
KQL Query
Identifies potential network tunneling, proxying, and reverse shell activities by correlating process creation with outbound public network connections. This rule looks for known tunneling and proxy tool filenames and specific command-line arguments indicative of such activities, then correlates these process events with successful or attempted outbound network connections to public IP addresses.
Detects process executions where the command line contains an HTTP/HTTPS URL with an explicit IPv4 address instead of a domain name. This technique is often used by malware and downloaders to fetch payloads or communicate with C2 servers while bypassing DNS.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of domains commonly associated with data exfiltration services. Monitoring these connections can help identify attempts to transfer sensitive data out of the network.
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