Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies wscript.exe executing a JavaScript file from a user directory and subsequently spawning a PowerShell process with execution policy bypass (-nop) and encoded command (-enc) flags, indicative of potential MonoGlyphRAT staging activity.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to download and execute the official Deno installation script. This behavior is abused by threat actors, such as the operators behind the DinDoor backdoor, to silently prepare an endpoint for fileless JavaScript malware execution.
Detects mshta.exe spawning PowerShell with hidden execution, web download, archive extraction, and staged process launch behavior, indicative of the UAC-0184 threat actor.
Detects PowerShell script block telemetry (Event ID 4104) containing P/Invoke declarations targeting advapi32.dll's CredEnumerate function or related Credential Manager APIs (CredRead, CredWrite). This technique bypasses standard cmdlets that may be monitored or restricted, providing direct API access to stored Windows credentials including RDP sessions, web service credentials, and enterprise application tokens. Generalizes well beyond specific campaigns to most PowerShell credential-theft families.
Detects PowerShell executing certutil.exe to decode base64 files, specifically when a hidden window style is used. This behavior is indicative of the JSE dropper routine employed by the Kimsuky threat group to decode malicious payloads to disk.
Detects variable splitting technique in cmd.exe to obfuscate PowerShell invocation.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving PowerShell downloading content (using Invoke-WebRequest, iex, or DownloadString) followed by the creation of specific suspicious files (Browser Update.exe, update.zip, update.msi) on the same device within a 10-minute window. This correlation suggests a potential ingress of malicious tools or updates.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to overwrite the amsiContext buffer using Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.WriteInt32 to disable AMSI scanning.
Detects the immediate persistence mechanisms (VBScript and Startup shortcut) established by KongTuke's ModeloRAT within minutes of initial execution. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell execution that contains commands to create both a VBScript file named 'scriptA.vbs' and a Startup shortcut named 'StartManagerB.lnk', which are highly specific indicators of this threat.
Detects the initial PowerShell command users are instructed to paste and run from the Windows Run dialog following a Microsoft Teams social engineering lure to deploy ModeloRAT. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell execution that downloads content from 'dropbox.com' using 'iwr' (Invoke-WebRequest), extracts an archive using 'Expand-Archive', and targets the 'appdata' directory.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with PowerShell logging mechanisms (Script Block Logging, Module Logging, Transcription) by modifying or deleting specific registry keys or setting their values to disable logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects the ClickFix paste-and-run initial-access primitive used by KongTuke and other groups. This involves `explorer.exe` spawning PowerShell with defense-evasion arguments (`-NoProfile`, `-ExecutionPolicy Bypass`, `-WindowStyle Hidden`) and a downloader chain targeting cloud file-sharing services. The combination of `explorer.exe` parent (user typing into Run dialog), hidden execution flags, `Invoke-WebRequest`, and `Expand-Archive` in one command line is the defining fingerprint of the technique.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with PowerShell logging mechanisms (Script Block Logging, Module Logging, Transcription) by modifying or deleting specific registry keys or setting their values to disable logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects PowerShell utilizing the Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet to download the 'syncobs.exe' payload, a known indicator for the PHANTOMPULL loader stage in the REF6598 campaign (PHANTOMPULSE RAT).
Detects the variable splitting technique in cmd.exe specifically designed to obfuscate the invocation of PowerShell (e.g., set x=pow&&set y=ershell). This technique is used in the InstallFix campaign to bypass static command-line monitoring.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to overwrite the amsiContext buffer using Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.WriteInt32 to disable AMSI scanning. This technique was notably observed in the InstallFix campaign delivering RedLine Stealer.
Detects cmd.exe spawning PowerShell to download a file using System.Net.WebClient to the Windows Temp directory. This pattern was observed in the DAEMON Tools supply chain attack to drop secondary payloads.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate' that leverages PowerShell to download and execute a payload. This technique was observed in an Iranian-Nexus operation against Oman's government.
This rule detects suspicious command-line patterns indicative of obfuscation, encoding, or stealth techniques often used by adversaries. It scores various characteristics such as hidden window styles, variable manipulation, string operations, and decoding functions (e.g., Base64, Gzip, Deflate). The rule filters out known legitimate processes and command-line boilerplate to reduce false positives and classifies detections based on the highest scoring obfuscation category.
This rule detects common PowerShell patterns used for downloading content from the internet and then executing it. It looks for a combination of download-related commands/objects (e.g., DownloadString, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient) and execution-related commands/objects (e.g., IEX, Invoke-Expression, Invoke-Command, ScriptBlock) within PowerShell command-line activity. This behavior is frequently observed in malware and adversary tradecraft for initial access, execution, and persistence.
This rule detects PowerShell commands indicative of reflective code loading, specifically looking for the use of 'Assembly' and 'Load' or 'GetType' and 'Invoke' within PowerShell command arguments. It filters out common noise associated with legitimate PowerShell operations like PSGet, Cursor, and internal Microsoft PowerShell modules to reduce false positives.
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