Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
Detects the addition of a 'DailyFitnessTracker' entry to the HKCU Windows Registry Run key, which is a technique used by Golang-based RATs to establish persistence. The rule monitors both 'reg.exe' command-line operations and PowerShell 'New-ItemProperty' cmdlets targeting this specific registry path.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences by adding exclusion paths, processes, or extensions shortly after the creation of Registry Run keys. This sequence is characteristic of post-exploitation activity where an adversary establishes persistence and subsequently attempts to neutralize security software monitoring of their malicious payloads to avoid detection during future execution.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that utilize hidden window styles and encoded payloads, specifically when the command line or image path references 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to hide malicious scripts and potentially interact with logs in an attempt to masquerade or tamper with Windows Update processes.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (hidden window, no profile, or encoded commands) spawned directly from a web browser process (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Explorer). This behavior is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into copying and executing malicious PowerShell commands via the Win+R Run dialog or terminal.
Detects PowerShell execution containing multiple command-line arguments indicative of environment discovery, such as checking system uptime, hardware specifications, or specific memory-related delays. These patterns are commonly used by malware to detect virtual machines, sandboxes, or analysis environments to alter execution or exit.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving compression commands (e.g., Expand-Archive) within APPDATA, correlated with the execution of hypersnap.exe with hidden window arguments, and the creation of persistence via scheduled tasks. This pattern is indicative of automated staging or malicious tool execution and persistence setup.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window arguments from explorer.exe, typically indicative of ClickFix social engineering where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
Detects instances where a GitLab Runner process (gitlab-runner-windows-amd64.exe) spawns PowerShell with flags commonly associated with bypassing execution policies and executing non-interactive commands. This behavior may indicate an attacker using a CI/CD runner as an entry point for lateral movement or command-and-control.
Detects PowerShell command lines that perform suspicious string manipulation using the .Replace() method on specific obfuscated characters, followed by a Base64 decoding operation. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to reassemble and decode fragmented or obfuscated payloads on the fly to evade static analysis.
Detects suspicious PowerShell commands involving node.js, hidden window styles, and file downloads or transfers.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects instances where cmd.exe spawns a powershell.exe process with the execution policy set to bypass. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts while bypassing local security restrictions on script execution.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
This rule detects potential staging activity for ClickFix or Vidar malware campaigns. It identifies the creation of files or folders in directories mimicking Windows Diagnostics infrastructure (WDI) or known payload paths, correlated with the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands or archive-related utilities within a 30-minute window on the same device.
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