Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to disable Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring or behavior monitoring features using PowerShell. It specifically looks for `powershell.exe` executing `Set-MpPreference` with the `-DisableRealtimeMonitoring` or `-DisableBehaviorMonitoring` parameters set to `1`, `$true`, or `True`.
Detects the secondary PowerShell stage explicitly downloading and writing the client32.exe NetSupport Manager RAT binary to disk. This rule identifies instances where a file named 'client32.exe' is created on a device, and the process responsible for this file creation is PowerShell.
Detects PowerShell executing the Add-MpPreference cmdlet specifically excluding the targeted mining executables (RuntimeHost.exe, lolMiner.exe, gminer.exe). This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to disable or bypass Windows Defender's real-time protection for known cryptomining executables, a common tactic in cryptojacking campaigns.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands or script blocks that contain specific de-obfuscation patterns associated with the ErrTraffic/ClickFix malware. It looks for the presence of '-bxor' and '[convert]::ToInt32' within PowerShell command lines or script blocks, indicating an attempt to decode obfuscated content.
Detects the ClickFix clipboard execution (Get-Clipboard or iex) triggered from explorer.exe, specifically leading to the download of the Matanbuchus DLL.
Detects the use of PowerShell to invoke or interact with 'cloudflared', a tool used to create secure tunnels to Cloudflare. This behavior is often associated with the deployment of malicious infrastructure or remote access tunnels for command and control purposes.
Detects PowerShell IEX download cradle used for fileless execution
This rule detects various reconnaissance techniques commonly used to identify network resources, including the execution of SoftPerfect Network Scanner (or renamed binaries), the creation of 'delete.me' files used by SoftPerfect to probe share permissions, the usage of the 'Invoke-ShareFinder' PowerShell script, and the enumeration of network shares using 'net.exe' initiated from PowerShell.
Detects attempts to modify the PowerShell execution policy using 'Set-ExecutionPolicy'. This command can be used by adversaries to lower security restrictions and enable the execution of unsigned or malicious PowerShell scripts.
Detects a sequence of events where PowerShell is used to download files from 'nvidiadriver.net' or with filenames containing 'winPatch', followed by a suspicious file drop (specifically 'winPatch.zip' or 'update.vbs') in a temporary directory within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential initial staging for a RAT or malicious script deployment.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to extract credentials from the Veeam Backup and Replication PostgreSQL database. It identifies malicious activity involving the use of PowerShell to interact with the database, including direct psql.exe command line execution, PowerShell scripts referencing sensitive database keywords, WMI-spawned PowerShell processes, and network connections to the PostgreSQL service port (5432).
Detects unauthorized access to the Veeam Backup PostgreSQL database to extract credentials, a technique observed in Akira ransomware campaigns. The rule monitors for suspicious execution of psql.exe or PowerShell scripts designed to query the 'VeeamBackup' database for credentials, which are subsequently decrypted using DPAPI.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry manipulation. Adversaries often modify these exclusions to hide malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning, a technique used to impair defensive security tools.
Detects mshta.exe spawning PowerShell with hidden execution, web download, archive extraction, and staged process launch behavior, indicative of the UAC-0184 threat actor.
Detects PowerShell processes (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) attempting to execute commands that reference memory manipulation APIs (VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory) or strings associated with AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass techniques (amsiscanbuffe, amsiscanstri, amsi.dll). These techniques are commonly used to disable security controls or inject shellcode into memory.
Detects the use of PowerShell command-line arguments and reflection techniques commonly associated with attempting to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). The rule uses a scoring mechanism to weight various keywords related to .NET reflection and AMSI-specific structures found in the command line.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that attempt to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by using .NET reflection techniques. The detection monitors for common class and method names (e.g., 'AmsiUtils', 'Marshal.WriteInt64') utilized by attackers to disable or tamper with AMSI's memory structures within a running PowerShell process.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks attempting to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) using .NET reflection techniques. It specifically looks for patterns involving the manipulation of internal AMSI fields, such as 'AmsiUtils', 's_amsiInitFailed', and 'DynamicMethod', which are common indicators of malicious attempts to disable or evade script content analysis in memory.
Detects the execution of PowerShell processes where command lines contain references to Nishang framework scripts, 'Invoke-PowerShellTcp' reverse shell patterns, or indicators of attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) such as 'AmsiScanBuffer' or 'amsiInitFailed'.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by searching for common memory patching techniques, obfuscated method calls, and manipulation of internal AMSI/ETW structures (e.g., AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiUtils, Marshal.WriteInt64) within PowerShell Script Block logs (Event ID 4104).
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a command prompt (cmd.exe) launched from a Startup LNK context initiates a hidden PowerShell process with Execution Policy bypass flags. This pattern is often associated with fileless malware execution, specifically linked to UAC-0226 activity, aiming to execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts by reading payloads from memory or staged files.
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