Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,443 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects evidence of common Impacket tool execution (e.g., psexec, wmiexec, smbexec, ntlmrelayx), unauthorized access to sensitive SMB administrative shares (ADMIN$, IPC$), creation of suspicious services often used for remote execution, and lateral movement via NTLM network logons.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with security software, including Windows Defender, Windows Firewall, and various third-party antivirus agents, via PowerShell commands, service management utilities, or registry modifications.
Detects PowerShell-based malware stagers used by ErrTraffic ClickFix campaigns that download and execute second-stage payloads using encoded commands and common download cradles. It also detects certutil.exe used for decoding.
Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer. The rule specifically alerts when the utility is executed with the '-snapshot' flag and targets a file with a .dat extension, which is a technique used to perform unauthorized Active Directory enumeration and offline extraction of sensitive directory data.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using either the built-in 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' cmdlet. Attackers often clear these logs to remove evidence of intrusion activities, such as persistence mechanisms, account creation, or privilege escalation.
Detects instances where common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, IE) act as the parent process for scripting interpreters such as PowerShell or cmd.exe. This behavior is highly irregular for standard browsing activity and is often indicative of malicious code execution, such as a drive-by download or browser exploit triggering secondary payload execution.
Detects VBScript-driven reconnaissance using wscript.exe that executes WMI queries to enumerate running processes via Win32_Process or identifies installed antivirus products via the SecurityCenter2 namespace. This behavior is often associated with early-stage malware reconnaissance activities.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe using VBScript features such as 'FileSystemObject' and 'Shell.Application' to perform directory enumeration. This pattern is commonly observed in malicious scripts used by threat actors, such as Kimsuky, to discover files and system information during the reconnaissance phase of an attack.
Detects suspicious command-line execution of cmd.exe involving specific patterns like 'MiniJunk' or 'MiniBrowse', or command-line activity spawned from common file types (e.g., .exe, .doc, .pdf, .zip). This rule is designed to identify potential multi-stage payload execution or malicious dropper activity associated with the UNC1549 threat actor.
This rule detects the execution of a Windows command shell (cmd.exe) spawned by Windows Explorer occurring within a 10-second window of network traffic identified as socket.io or websocket communication. This behavior often suggests a potential reverse shell or C2 connection where a command shell is invoked through or in conjunction with web-based communication channels.
Detects the execution of cmd.exe triggered by explorer.exe shortly after a network connection is established to the Peyara Remote Mouse service on TCP port 1313. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote command execution via synthetic keystroke injection, bypassing standard interactive session protections.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe which are commonly used to execute VBScript files for performing host reconnaissance tasks such as process enumeration via WMI and file system discovery using Scripting.FileSystemObject.
Smbexec Lateral Movement
YARA-L
Detects the command line pattern characteristic of Impacket's SMBExec, involving echoing a payload to a temporary batch file, executing, and deleting it.
Detects the spawning of root shells from suid binaries (su) in conjunction with user namespace creation or suspicious parent process execution, potentially indicating exploitation of local privilege escalation vulnerabilities like the pedit COW page cache poisoning (CVE-2026-46331). The detection correlates non-root process activity in suspicious locations with subsequent elevated shell creation.
This rule detects suspicious activity patterns on Linux systems that may indicate privilege escalation or container escape attempts. It monitors three main behaviors: the execution of network configuration tools (tc, insmod, modprobe) for kernel-level manipulations (pedit/actions), the use of 'unshare' to create isolated namespaces, and typical privilege escalation commands (su, id, whoami, bash) executed by non-root users. The rule correlates these events and alerts based on the combination and intensity of these behaviors, flagging high-severity activity when kernel-level tools are combined with namespace manipulation or privilege elevation.
Detects evidence of the MYRA Linux RAT, which uses LD_PRELOAD hijacking via a malicious library located at /usr/local/lib/.libcache.so for persistence or execution flow hijacking. The rule also identifies the malware's practice of masquerading as the 'systemd-userdbd' service, often launched from a Node.js-based environment.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments, including obfuscation techniques like base64 encoding, attempts to hide the console window, and strings associated with Pterodo-related tools or backdoors.
Detects execution patterns associated with the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) exploit, which involves an unprivileged process utilizing user and network namespaces to configure IPsec XFRM Security Associations (SAs) to corrupt the kernel page cache of sensitive binaries such as /usr/bin/su.
Detects a specific execution pattern where node-gyp.exe spawns node.exe to execute an 'index.js' file. This behavior is associated with the 'Miasma' or 'Mini Shai-Hulud' threat campaigns, which utilize malicious 'binding.gyp' files within npm packages to bypass standard lifecycle script (preinstall/postinstall) security scanners.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where 'node-gyp' is observed spawning 'node' to execute 'index.js', characteristic of a 'Phantom Gyp' malicious pattern, followed immediately by the execution of a temporary JavaScript payload via the 'bun' runtime. This pattern is indicative of a multi-stage loader often used in supply chain attacks involving obfuscated payloads.
Detects a sequence of events consistent with the DirtyClone/DirtyFrag kernel exploit: first, identifying precursor activities such as namespace manipulation (unshare), kernel module loading of networking components (esp4/6, rxrpc), or specific exploit binary execution; followed by an anomalous spawn of a root shell from an unprivileged parent process within a short 5-minute window.
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