Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
678 detections
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Detects interactive or ad-hoc loading of the SCTP kernel module, which can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain kernel-level persistence or capabilities. The rule excludes common system-initiated module loads from package managers and system service managers to reduce noise.
Detects interactive or ad-hoc loading of the SCTP kernel module, which can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain kernel-level persistence or capabilities. The rule excludes common system-initiated module loads from package managers and system service managers to reduce noise.
Detects interactive or ad-hoc loading of the SCTP kernel module, which can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain kernel-level persistence or capabilities. The rule excludes common system-initiated module loads from package managers and system service managers to reduce noise.
This rule detects instances where a process named 'wsc_updata.exe' executing from a Temp directory loads a library named 'wsc.dll'. This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or DLL hijacking, where a malicious or potentially unwanted executable attempts to load a library from a user-writable directory to execute arbitrary code.
This rule detects instances where a process named 'wsc_updata.exe' executing from a Temp directory loads a library named 'wsc.dll'. This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or DLL hijacking, where a malicious or potentially unwanted executable attempts to load a library from a user-writable directory to execute arbitrary code.
Detects execution artifacts of the MovieReaper stage 2 implant, specifically its capability to parse and load COFF modules into memory without writing them to disk. The rule monitors process command lines for 'module_init' and identifies suspicious API activity related to memory-based module loading, such as reflective DLL loading or remote thread creation.
Detects the loading of WMI-related DLLs (wbemcomn.dll, wbemprox.dll) by processes that are commonly abused to proxy execution (LOLBins) such as certutil, mshta, or office applications. This behavior is often associated with WMI-based persistence or execution techniques.
Detects the loading of the 'user32.dll' library into a process named 'firefox.exe' where the process is either unsigned or executing from a suspicious location like 'ProgramData'. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of BabylonRAT, which masquerades as the Firefox browser to perform keylogging by hooking system APIs.
This rule detects instances of a process named 'firefox.exe' that is executing from a directory other than the standard 'Mozilla Firefox' program folders. When this masquerading process loads critical system DLLs like 'kernel32.dll' or 'ntdll.dll', it flags potential dynamic API resolution activity commonly associated with BabylonRAT and similar malware that attempts to hide its capabilities by resolving system functions at runtime.
This rule searches for any process, image load, or file events containing the string 'Stella_Gary' within file names, folder paths, or process command lines. This is a generic hunting rule typically used to identify artifacts, indicators, or files associated with a specific entity or project codename.
This rule searches for any process, image load, or file events containing the string 'Stella_Gary' within file names, folder paths, or process command lines. This is a generic hunting rule typically used to identify artifacts, indicators, or files associated with a specific entity or project codename.
Detects the execution or loading of modules, processes, or command lines associated with the Stella_Gary C# backdoor framework. This framework is utilized by the Kimsuky (APT-C-55) threat group as part of a modular, plugin-based capability loading architecture.
Detects potential keylogging behavior by identifying a process masquerading as firefox.exe that is operating from an unauthorized directory while utilizing keyboard hooking (SetWindowsHookEx) or polling (GetAsyncKeyState) APIs, a technique consistent with the BabylonRAT malware.
Detects high-frequency screen capture activity by monitoring process module loads related to BitBlt, GDI32.dll, and explicit screen capture descriptions. This rule identifies sustained screen scraping behavior (50+ events within a 5-minute window) indicative of the SparroWocky malware surveillance module's screen monitoring functionality.
This rule detects potential reflective code injection or in-memory loading (fileless) where a DLL or PE image is loaded by mshta.exe or powershell.exe, but the module load event lacks a valid file path on disk (or indicates a device path). This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads such as the Amatera loader, where payloads are executed directly in memory to evade file-based security detections.
This rule detects instances where a process named 'wsc_updata.exe' executing from a Temp directory loads a library named 'wsc.dll'. This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or DLL hijacking, where a malicious or potentially unwanted executable attempts to load a library from a user-writable directory to execute arbitrary code.
Detects the loading of reflective (memory-only) DLLs within the chrome.exe process address space. This activity is indicative of memory-based exploit chains, such as those that corrupt WebAssembly module metadata to facilitate arbitrary code execution following a sandbox escape.
This rule monitors endpoint events (file, process, and image load) for a specific malicious MD5 hash or the presence of a specific file name pattern 'Request for Quotation' often used in malicious lures. It provides visibility into potential execution of known malicious payloads.
Detects the loading of WMI-related DLLs (wbemcomn.dll, wbemprox.dll) by processes that are commonly abused to proxy execution (LOLBins) such as certutil, mshta, or office applications. This behavior is often associated with WMI-based persistence or execution techniques.
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Detects instances where WerFault.exe or WerMgr.exe, running with SYSTEM privileges, loads a DLL file from the Windows\System32 directory that was created within 10 minutes of the image load event. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or hijack techniques used to achieve privilege escalation.
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