Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
988 detections
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Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) certificate enrollment requests where the requester attempts to enroll a certificate with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) identifying a different principal than the requester's own account. This pattern is indicative of the ESC1 ADCS misconfiguration abuse, which can lead to privilege escalation by impersonating other domain entities.
Detects instances where a non-SYSTEM parent process spawns a child process running as SYSTEM, characteristic of 'Potato' family exploits (e.g., JuicyPotato, PrintSpoofer) leveraging SeImpersonatePrivilege to elevate privileges. The rule specifically filters for known legitimate SYSTEM process spawners while highlighting suspicious parent-child process relationships.
Detects attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) using PowerShell's Start-Process cmdlet with the -Verb RunAs parameter, often seen in techniques like Operation Poisson. This method attempts to trigger the Windows consent dialog for privilege escalation, potentially leveraging auto-elevating binaries like fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, sdclt.exe, or cmstp.exe.
Detects Millenium RAT attempting to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by spawning cmd.exe with the 'runas' verb via ShellExecuteExW. The rule specifically looks for cmd.exe processes running in High integrity, spawned from non-standard parent processes, while executing commands such as 'whoami'.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a non-Microsoft signed process running from a user-writable path (e.g., Temp, AppData) spawns a high-integrity or SYSTEM process, followed immediately by persistence activity (modifying Run keys) or the creation of suspicious services/modification of security preferences.
Detects evidence of UAC bypass via ShellExecuteExW runas elevation from medium-integrity processes located in user-writable paths, followed by the creation of a persistent 'MixedSvc' service using sc.exe, as observed in the Operation DragonReturn campaign involving DcRAT.
Detects the execution of known Windows privilege escalation tools commonly referred to as 'potato' exploits (e.g., JuicyPotato, SweetPotato, PrintSpoofer). These tools typically exploit service account misconfigurations or Windows APIs to achieve local privilege escalation to SYSTEM.
Detects potential local privilege escalation (LPE) attempts targeting the AnyDesk adprinterpipe named pipe. The rule monitors for the execution of known malicious indicators, unauthorized access to the adprinterpipe, AnyDesk spawning unexpected processes as SYSTEM, and the creation of services by AnyDesk child processes.
Detects LogonUser API used with token impersonation for privilege escalation
Detects LCRYX ransomware performing UAC bypass by utilizing VBScript to spawn a new wscript.exe process with elevated privileges. The rule monitors for WScript or CScript processes spawning another WScript process where the command line contains the '/elevated' flag, indicating the use of the Shell.Application object's ShellExecute method with the 'runas' verb.
Detects attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by spawning processes from fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, or computerdefaults.exe. These executables are known to be vulnerable to UAC bypass techniques, allowing an attacker to elevate privileges without user interaction.
Detects attempts to exploit the PwnKit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) in Polkit's pkexec. The rule monitors for malicious command-line arguments involving GCONV_PATH environment manipulation, the execution of pkexec by non-root users, and the presence of associated PwnKit payload artifacts, such as base64-encoded strings or specific chunked files.
Detects the spawning of root shells from suid binaries (su) in conjunction with user namespace creation or suspicious parent process execution, potentially indicating exploitation of local privilege escalation vulnerabilities like the pedit COW page cache poisoning (CVE-2026-46331). The detection correlates non-root process activity in suspicious locations with subsequent elevated shell creation.
This rule detects suspicious activity patterns on Linux systems that may indicate privilege escalation or container escape attempts. It monitors three main behaviors: the execution of network configuration tools (tc, insmod, modprobe) for kernel-level manipulations (pedit/actions), the use of 'unshare' to create isolated namespaces, and typical privilege escalation commands (su, id, whoami, bash) executed by non-root users. The rule correlates these events and alerts based on the combination and intensity of these behaviors, flagging high-severity activity when kernel-level tools are combined with namespace manipulation or privilege elevation.
Detects execution patterns associated with the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) exploit, which involves an unprivileged process utilizing user and network namespaces to configure IPsec XFRM Security Associations (SAs) to corrupt the kernel page cache of sensitive binaries such as /usr/bin/su.
Detects a sequence of events consistent with the DirtyClone/DirtyFrag kernel exploit: first, identifying precursor activities such as namespace manipulation (unshare), kernel module loading of networking components (esp4/6, rxrpc), or specific exploit binary execution; followed by an anomalous spawn of a root shell from an unprivileged parent process within a short 5-minute window.
Detects the exploit chain for CVE-2026-43503, an unprivileged kernel exploitation vulnerability. The rule identifies the creation of user and network namespaces by non-root users, followed by the manipulation of XFRM states or policies, and the subsequent loading of ESP kernel modules, which together facilitate privilege escalation.
This rule detects suspicious manipulation of Linux namespaces using the 'unshare' utility or manual modification of user ID mapping files ('uid_map', 'gid_map', 'setgroups') in '/proc/self/'. Such activities are characteristic of container escape attempts or privilege escalation, where an attacker seeks to gain root access on the host or map unprivileged users to privileged IDs within a new namespace.
Detects potential container breakout attempts on Windows systems by monitoring for the launch of privileged containers with sensitive host paths mounted, the execution of host-level processes directly spawned by container runtime binaries (docker.exe, containerd.exe), and direct access to sensitive host filesystems (e.g., C:\windows, C:\etc, C:\programdata) by container runtimes.
Detects the use of command-line arguments associated with Windows token impersonation techniques (e.g., 'SeImpersonate', 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser') initiated by common command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wmic.exe). This activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to elevate privileges by stealing or manipulating access tokens.
Detects anomalous activity involving the Windows consent.exe process, which handles User Account Control (UAC) elevation prompts. Specifically, this rule monitors for instances where consent.exe is spawned from the Temp folder, spawned by msiexec.exe from the Temp folder, or loads a suspicious version of msimg32.dll from a non-System32 directory. These behaviors are often indicative of UAC bypass attempts or DLL hijacking related to privilege escalation.
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