Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
Detects the loading of the kernel driver 'Alinubx.sys', identified as a renamed instance of the 'CcProtect.sys' driver. This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, specifically observed in the context of Rapuncel infostealer campaigns.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
This rule detects modifications to Microsoft Defender antivirus exclusions. Adversaries often add paths or files to the exclusion list to prevent the detection of malicious tools or staging folders during cyberattacks. The rule monitors both command-line execution of PowerShell (Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference) and direct registry modifications related to Windows Defender paths.
Detects suspicious process creation patterns indicative of process hollowing. The rule identifies processes spawned by common script interpreters (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, conhost.exe) in a suspended state, followed by memory operations involving ntdll.dll and APIs such as NtUnmapViewOfSection or ResumeThread, which are characteristic of hollowing injection techniques.
Detects execution of LausivLoader by identifying suspicious process creation patterns typically associated with process hollowing. This includes a parent process (powershell.exe or conhost.exe) launching a child process in a suspended state (CREATE_SUSPENDED), followed by behavioral indicators of memory manipulation and code replacement.
Detects execution of PowerShell scripts attempting to modify Windows Defender settings by adding directory exclusions (including the C:\ drive) via cmdlets like Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference, or WMI/CIM methods, often followed by a forced Group Policy refresh. This pattern is associated with malicious staging activity, including malware loaders like LausivLoader.
Detects attempts to patch ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) functions such as EtwEventWrite within the memory space of PowerShell or PWSH processes. This is a common technique used by attackers to suppress telemetry and evade security monitoring tools, often associated with bypassing AMSI/ETW logging mechanisms.
Detects attempts to patch ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) functions such as EtwEventWrite within the memory space of PowerShell or PWSH processes. This is a common technique used by attackers to suppress telemetry and evade security monitoring tools, often associated with bypassing AMSI/ETW logging mechanisms.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the patching of process memory or tampering with security instrumentation (such as Event Tracing for Windows - ETW) by common scripting host processes. It flags events like 'PatchProcessMemory', 'ProcessInjection', or references to 'AmsiScanBuffer' and 'EtwEventWrite' associated with PowerShell, WScript, or CScript, which are often used in post-exploitation scenarios to evade security controls and telemetry collection.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) via direct memory modification or through script command-line arguments. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for AMSI-specific events (e.g., buffer patching, provider tampering) and looks for common PowerShell and scripting engine command-line patterns indicative of AMSI bypass techniques.
Detects attempts to modify Microsoft Defender settings, such as adding file path exclusions via PowerShell, Registry manipulation, or Scheduled Tasks, as well as disabling Tamper Protection. These actions are commonly used by attackers to evade security monitoring by hiding malicious files or disabling protective features.
Detects a suspicious process chain where an AutoIT loader (originating from temporary directories or associated with charmap.exe command line anomalies) executes charmap.exe, followed by the loading of amsi.dll within that charmap.exe process. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT injection patterns, specifically where charmap.exe is used as a host process to tamper with AMSI via in-memory patching of AmsiScanBuffer.
Detects a suspicious sequence of anti-analysis behaviors on macOS, where a process first checks for the presence of a hypervisor via sysctl (kern.hv_vmm_present) and subsequently invokes ptrace with PT_DENY_ATTACH, a technique often used to prevent debuggers from attaching to a process.
Detects a classic process injection technique where an external process attempts to gain high-level access (OpenProcess with 0x1F0FFF) to charmap.exe. This activity is often a precursor to further injection steps such as VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread, a behavior consistent with malicious payloads like AsyncRAT executed via an abused AutoIT interpreter.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to inject code into legitimate processes (such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe) using direct syscalls NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote or NtSetContextThreadRemote, indicating potential process injection activity.
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