Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of specific Object Manager namespace directories and objects used by the ShieldCrash proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414) to hijack the Microsoft Defender scan process.
Detects evidence of PowerShell AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass attempts, including memory patching of amsiContext, usage of known malicious RC4 keys, or reflection-based tampering with AmsiUtils. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and execute malicious scripts undetected.
Detects evidence of PowerShell AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass attempts, including memory patching of amsiContext, usage of known malicious RC4 keys, or reflection-based tampering with AmsiUtils. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and execute malicious scripts undetected.
Detects evidence of PowerShell AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass attempts, including memory patching of amsiContext, usage of known malicious RC4 keys, or reflection-based tampering with AmsiUtils. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and execute malicious scripts undetected.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
Detects when a Node.js process initiates a low-level keyboard hook (WH_KEYBOARD_LL or WH_KEYBOARD) while running from common user-writable directories, which may indicate malicious keylogging activity by a suspicious process.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
Detects instances where a RedTail malware variant enumerates processes via the /proc filesystem to identify and terminate previous instances of itself using a kill signal.
Detects instances where a RedTail malware variant enumerates processes via the /proc filesystem to identify and terminate previous instances of itself using a kill signal.
Detects instances where a RedTail malware variant enumerates processes via the /proc filesystem to identify and terminate previous instances of itself using a kill signal.
Detects instances where a RedTail malware variant enumerates processes via the /proc filesystem to identify and terminate previous instances of itself using a kill signal.
Detects instances where PowerShell is launched with explorer.exe as its parent process, but where the child process's metadata (creation time, logon ID, or account SID) does not align with the recorded explorer.exe process. This discrepancy is a strong indicator of Parent Process ID (PPID) spoofing, a technique often used to evade security monitoring.
Detects attempts to modify or disable the Windows Update service (wuauserv) using command-line utilities (sc.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in a context involving 'LockAppHost.exe'. This pattern is often associated with unauthorized attempts to tamper with security update mechanisms to prevent system patching.
Detects attempts to modify or disable the Windows Update service (wuauserv) using command-line utilities (sc.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in a context involving 'LockAppHost.exe'. This pattern is often associated with unauthorized attempts to tamper with security update mechanisms to prevent system patching.
This rule detects the use of the LockAppHost process to execute suspicious commands associated with tampering with security configurations, including Windows Defender settings, service management (sc.exe), and task scheduling. Adversaries may abuse this process to bypass security controls, disable real-time monitoring, or maintain persistence.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
This rule detects potentially malicious memory manipulation and thread execution activity originating from the ERAAgent.exe process. It specifically identifies when ERAAgent.exe calls VirtualProtect or VirtualAlloc to set memory as PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, followed shortly by a CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread operation. This behavior is indicative of process injection or reflective code loading, where an executable image is manually mapped into memory and executed, bypassing traditional file-based detection.
Detects a suspicious pattern associated with the SLEEPWALKER technique, involving multiple memory write operations followed by a memory protection change within an ERAAgent.exe process. This behavior suggests code injection or dynamic code loading within a process.
Detects the use of common Linux command-line utilities (sed, grep, awk, bash, sh) to perform operations on sensitive system logs or shell history files. The rule targets command strings indicative of log modification, filtering, or removal of audit trails, often associated with an attacker attempting to conceal malicious activity.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
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