Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to impair or disable security defenses on Windows systems. It specifically monitors for three categories of malicious behavior: PowerShell-based AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass techniques, commands to stop security-related services (e.g., Windows Defender, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike Falcon), and the use of 'reg' or 'PowerShell' to modify registry keys associated with disabling antivirus or real-time monitoring.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
Detects suspicious cross-process access (Sysmon Event ID 10) and remote thread creation (Sysmon Event ID 8) targeting sensitive processes such as lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe, which are indicative of process injection or hollowing techniques used for evasion or persistence.
Detects the use of PowerShell script blocks that attempt to bypass or disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) by interacting with internal .NET objects or DLLs, a common technique in phishing-delivered payloads.
Detects OnyxC2 RunPE injection behavior where a process drops or loads a suspicious sideloaded DLL (specifically borlndmm.dll) and immediately initiates a secondary process instance, indicative of process hollowing or memory unpacking of a malicious payload.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the loading of a known malicious 136KB browser injection helper DLL (SHA256: 75018b06c7105a1dca391805d17b402aed35ebd515b92d461236eafbd606cb40) into Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge processes. The rule further correlates this activity with command line arguments indicative of abusing the browser's elevation service, which is a technique often used for process injection or local privilege escalation.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) to modify Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths, processes, or extensions). This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to evade security detection by excluding malicious files or processes from being scanned by Microsoft Defender.
Detects the stopping or modification of critical security and backup services on Windows endpoints. This behavior often indicates an attempt by an adversary to impair defensive capabilities or disable logging to facilitate malicious activity.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
This rule detects the deletion of critical Windows Defender security files (such as drivers and executables) by the System process. This behavior is highly indicative of an attempt to tamper with or disable security features on a host.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects parent process ID (PPID) spoofing associated with RMMCRAT and other HVNC malware, where an injected process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) spawns child processes while spoofing explorer.exe as the parent. The rule monitors for a mismatch between the reported parent (explorer.exe) and the actual creator (smartscreen.exe) and focuses on burst activity of common shell and browser processes.
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
Detects the DeepLoad malware staging process injection by spawning trusted Windows binaries (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, or Magnify.exe) in a suspended state from an unauthorized parent process. This behavior is indicative of an APC-based injection sequence where malicious code is written into the suspended process before execution.
Detects behavior consistent with the RevStealer malware, specifically focusing on cross-process operations against web browsers originating from hidden AppData subdirectories and the creation of its unique single-instance mutex.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
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