Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,081 detections
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Detects attempts to modify AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) provider registry keys or tampering with the amsi.dll file. These actions are indicative of efforts to disable or blind security instrumentation, often as a precursor to or during malicious code execution.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects potential process injection attempts by unidentified executable files originating from suspicious directories (AppData or Temp) targeting critical system or service processes (e.g., explorer.exe, svchost.exe). The rule monitors CreateRemoteThread events and excludes signed dotnet host processes, characteristic of Hannibal Stealer behavior.
This rule detects instances where AutoIt (AutoIt3.exe) is observed performing process injection or launching suspicious binaries (RegSvcs.exe or mobsync.exe). Attackers frequently use AutoIt for process automation and to execute malicious payloads, and leveraging legitimate binaries like RegSvcs.exe is a known technique for bypassing defenses.
Detects instances where msbuild.exe is spawned from suspicious parent processes without valid project files and subsequently receives cross-process injection activity (such as CreateRemoteThread or WriteProcessMemory) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to use MSBuild to proxy malicious code execution.
Detects instances where msbuild.exe is spawned from suspicious parent processes without valid project files and subsequently receives cross-process injection activity (such as CreateRemoteThread or WriteProcessMemory) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to use MSBuild to proxy malicious code execution.
Detects instances where msbuild.exe is spawned from suspicious parent processes without valid project files and subsequently receives cross-process injection activity (such as CreateRemoteThread or WriteProcessMemory) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to use MSBuild to proxy malicious code execution.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or query Microsoft Defender configuration settings or status using legitimate Windows management tools (PowerShell/WMI) by processes other than authorized Defender executables (MsMpEng.exe, MpCmdRun.exe).
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
Detects execution of Android shell commands associated with power management and Doze mode exemptions (e.g., dumpsys deviceidle whitelist, pm grant) initiated by or involving a file named liblocal-service.so, which is characteristic of the Go Agent binary.
Detects instances where the MSBuild.exe process is subjected to image replacement or tampering, a behavior often associated with process hollowing or malicious code injection techniques aimed at evading security defenses by masquerading as a legitimate developer utility.
Detects potential process injection attempts using PowerShell or CMD to execute memory manipulation operations. The rule identifies processes initiated in a suspended state that subsequently invoke Windows API calls such as WriteProcessMemory, NtUnmapViewOfSection, SetThreadContext, or ResumeThread, which are commonly associated with process hollowing or thread execution hijacking.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts into browser processes (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe) characterized by direct NT API syscall invocation (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) originating from a non-browser parent process. This behavior, often associated with the Remus infostealer, bypasses standard user-mode API hooking by using direct syscall stubs to chain injection actions.
Detects instances where a process directly reads ntdll.dll from the disk (e.g., C:\Windows\System32). This behavior is a common technique used by malware to bypass EDR hooks by reading a clean copy of the DLL to restore original syscall stubs, commonly known as hook removal or unhooking. The rule excludes common system processes and trusted security software paths.
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