Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,097 detections
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Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects the modification or creation of the registry key '.mollis' within Software\Classes, which is used by the Star Blizzard (RedFlick) CPL downloader to store an encrypted AES key. This activity is performed by common Windows processes such as control.exe, rundll32.exe, or regsvr32.exe.
Detects the modification or creation of the registry key '.mollis' within Software\Classes, which is used by the Star Blizzard (RedFlick) CPL downloader to store an encrypted AES key. This activity is performed by common Windows processes such as control.exe, rundll32.exe, or regsvr32.exe.
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
Detects unauthorized modification or creation of registry keys under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\ to maintain persistence for remote access/RMM tools during Safe Mode with Networking. This technique is used by Akira ransomware affiliates to evade EDR and security software.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects attempts to bypass or tamper with the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). This rule monitors for command-line arguments indicative of reflection-based patching of AmsiUtils and forced AmsiScanBuffer failures, as well as registry modifications to AMSI providers.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry auto-start keys (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon, or Services) by suspicious processes (e.g., script interpreters, shell, or office applications) or processes running from temporary directories, where the registry value points to paths commonly used by adversaries (AppData, Temp, or ProgramData).
Detects the FileFix (ClickFix) social engineering technique, where an attacker tricks a user into pasting malicious command lines into the Windows File Explorer address bar. The rule correlates a process execution (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) originating from explorer.exe with recent registry writes to shell history artifacts (RunMRU, TypedPaths, or ShellBags) within a 120-second window, identifying the characteristic 'paste-and-execute' behavior.
Detects suspicious command-line fragments being written to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which is used by the Explorer 'Run' dialog to store history. Adversaries may abuse this by injecting malicious command lines that are then executed when a user attempts to run a program.
FileFix execution via the Explorer address bar writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths, a forensic artifact distinct from the Run dialog's RunMRU key, immediately before the malicious child process spawns.
Once a FileFix chain succeeds, StealC and related loaders commonly establish Run/RunOnce persistence to survive reboot shortly after or before exfiltration.
The rule detects correlation between the creation of persistence-related Registry keys (specifically Windows Run keys or Browser Native Messaging hosts) and the execution of the schtasks.exe utility to create or manage a task related to 'psychedelicloveUtils'. This pattern suggests an adversary attempting to maintain persistence by linking Registry-based autostart mechanisms with a scheduled task.
Detects the persistence and execution mechanism of the Lunex Native Messaging Host backdoor. The rule identifies the registration of the 'com.lunex.explorer' native messaging host registry key and the subsequent invocation of PowerShell scripts from browser processes (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) containing specific backdoor command arguments like 'list_drives' or 'run'.
Detects the persistence and execution mechanism of the Lunex Native Messaging Host backdoor. The rule identifies the registration of the 'com.lunex.explorer' native messaging host registry key and the subsequent invocation of PowerShell scripts from browser processes (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) containing specific backdoor command arguments like 'list_drives' or 'run'.
Detects the persistence and execution mechanism of the Lunex Native Messaging Host backdoor. The rule identifies the registration of the 'com.lunex.explorer' native messaging host registry key and the subsequent invocation of PowerShell scripts from browser processes (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) containing specific backdoor command arguments like 'list_drives' or 'run'.
Detects the persistence and execution mechanism of the Lunex Native Messaging Host backdoor. The rule identifies the registration of the 'com.lunex.explorer' native messaging host registry key and the subsequent invocation of PowerShell scripts from browser processes (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) containing specific backdoor command arguments like 'list_drives' or 'run'.
Detects the MSBuild.exe process adding new root or intermediate certificate authorities to the Windows certificate stores. This activity is indicative of potential malicious PKI infrastructure staging, which can be used to facilitate adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks or bypass certificate validation.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run and RunOnce keys by processes other than standard system binaries and known management tools. Such modifications are a common method for achieving persistence by ensuring malicious code executes upon user logon.
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