Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects persistence activities initiated by Postgres-related processes or users involving scheduled tasks and system services.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the task name matches commonly abused names such as 'WinUpdate.exe', 'SoftManager.exe', or 'LockAppHost.exe'. These names are frequently used by adversaries to masquerade as legitimate Windows processes to achieve persistence.
This rule detects the use of the LockAppHost process to execute suspicious commands associated with tampering with security configurations, including Windows Defender settings, service management (sc.exe), and task scheduling. Adversaries may abuse this process to bypass security controls, disable real-time monitoring, or maintain persistence.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
Detects the creation of a Windows Scheduled Task (Event ID 4698) that uses the 'InteractiveToken' LogonType, where the user specified to execute the task is different from the user who registered the task. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or lateral movement techniques, such as those used by tools like 'atexec' or to facilitate PRT (Primary Refresh Token) theft.
Detects the registration of a new scheduled task occurring within a network logon session (LogonType 3). This behavior is characteristic of lateral movement techniques where attackers use remote service execution tools (such as Impacket's atexec or PRTremote) to register and execute tasks on a remote host via SMB/RPC. The rule correlates Windows Security Event 4698 (Task creation) with network logon events and validates the action using Task Scheduler operational logs.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects the registration of a new scheduled task occurring within a network logon session (LogonType 3). This behavior is characteristic of lateral movement techniques where attackers use remote service execution tools (such as Impacket's atexec or PRTremote) to register and execute tasks on a remote host via SMB/RPC. The rule correlates Windows Security Event 4698 (Task creation) with network logon events and validates the action using Task Scheduler operational logs.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task named 'TaskHandler' using the schtasks.exe utility. The task is configured to execute a specific file, 'F7u00ex.exe', on system startup under the 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' account. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism, often associated with the Spark RAT malware, which attempts to maintain a foothold on the system with high-level privileges.
Detects instances where a Windows Scheduled Task is created (Event ID 4698) and subsequently deleted (Event ID 4699) within a very short timeframe (less than 120 seconds). This behavior is often indicative of an adversary creating a temporary task for execution and immediately cleaning up evidence to avoid detection.
Detects the creation of a Windows Scheduled Task (Event ID 4698) that uses the 'InteractiveToken' LogonType, where the user specified to execute the task is different from the user who registered the task. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or lateral movement techniques, such as those used by tools like 'atexec' or to facilitate PRT (Primary Refresh Token) theft.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task where the initiating process is not the standard 'schtasks.exe'. It monitors for activity associated with COM objects (CLSID_TaskScheduler, ITaskService) typically used by applications to interact with the Task Scheduler API programmatically, which is a common technique for persistence or execution in non-standard ways.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task where the action involves executing pythonw.exe with a specific script named 'ss.py'. This rule specifically looks for task registration events (Event ID 4698) where the action command line contains both 'pythonw.exe' and 'ss.py', while excluding tasks created by 'schtasks.exe' to focus on non-standard creation methods often used by malware or living-off-the-land techniques to register persistence via the COM interface.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task named 'TaskHandler' using the schtasks.exe utility. The task is configured to execute a specific file, 'F7u00ex.exe', on system startup under the 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' account. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism, often associated with the Spark RAT malware, which attempts to maintain a foothold on the system with high-level privileges.
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