Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain associated with the SnappyClient RAT (Operation Turb00). The detection logic correlates: 1. Execution of known malicious processes (AlphVector, WizardDa42, VirtualAr, or Crisp); 2. Persistence mechanisms including specific registry keys (CadenceOptimizer) or file artifacts (shortcut links, scheduled tasks, Mayanex data dir, or CorsairUtil DLL); and 3. Outbound network traffic on ports 3333 or 3334 to external IP addresses.
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe identified by the specific command-line string associated with 'CrysomeLoader', configured to execute every 5 minutes.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility. The rule flags tasks that are created from suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, ProgramData), tasks executing common script extensions (vbs, ps1, bat, hta, js), or tasks that masquerade as legitimate Windows or System update tasks.
This rule detects the creation of Windows services or scheduled tasks that reference known file paths, names, or command-line indicators associated with the Turb00 loader, HijackLoader, SnappyClient, or Vidar malware families. It utilizes Windows Event logs (4697/4698) and Sysmon process creation events to identify persistence mechanisms being established by these threats.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe by processes that are not digitally signed by Microsoft Corporation, as well as the loading of taskschd.dll by non-standard/unsigned processes. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or unauthorized task scheduling activity.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the Windows schtasks utility, specifically looking for common adversarial naming conventions or patterns such as 'MiniJunk' or recursive task names, often used to establish persistence.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the command line contains the specific strings 'MiniJunk' or 'MiniBrowse'. This pattern is often associated with the installation or persistence mechanisms of specific malicious software.
Detects creation of scheduled tasks followed by execution of pcalua.exe on the same endpoint. This combination was observed by Huntress during RedCurl intrusions and is uncommon in legitimate enterprise activity.
Detects a persistent loading pattern attributed to the Kimsuky threat group. The rule monitors for the creation of a hidden scheduled task named 'Edge Updater' that triggers a wscript.exe process executing a disguised VBScript file named with an 'OfficeUpdater' naming convention. This detection covers both the task registration (Event ID 4698) and the subsequent execution of the malicious script via wscript.exe.
Detects the process Crisp.exe creating a legacy AT-style scheduled task job file in the C:\Windows\Tasks directory while simultaneously loading mstask.dll. This behavior is indicative of persistence establishment, specifically associated with the Operation Turb00 HijackLoader sideloading chain which utilizes legacy task scheduling to re-execute AlphVector.exe.
Identifies the loader cementing persistence by creating a scheduled task that executes the RMM payload upon user logon or system start. Specifically looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task with a name that is not alphanumeric and a task run command pointing to an executable in the AppData directory.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task, either via schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698, where the task content points to a suspicious, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, AppData). It correlates this activity with the presence of known Loader/Stealer process indicators (HijackLoader/Vidar) occurring within a 15-minute window on the same host, indicating likely persistence establishment by malicious software.
Detects specific persistence artifacts associated with LARP53RAT, including unauthorized file shortcuts in the Startup folder, modifications to RunOnce registry keys for system recovery, and suspicious scheduled task creation masquerading as Microsoft Edge updates.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns on Linux systems commonly associated with post-exploitation activity, including the establishment of reverse shells, encoded payload delivery via DNS, and manual modifications to crontab or SSH authorized_keys for persistence.
Detects the creation of Windows scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the executable being registered or the task itself is associated with suspicious directories like %LOCALAPPDATA%, %APPDATA%, or %TEMP%. The rule further filters for specific suspicious strings often used in malicious task configurations, indicating potential persistence or malicious command execution.
Detects signs of persistence via suspicious scheduled task creation or local user creation/group escalation, and C2 activity involving a specific IP address or unauthorized connections to the Telegram bot API.
This rule detects potential malicious scheduled task creation behavior linked to the Windows Package Manager (WinGet) and Desired State Configuration (DSC) components. It monitors for two primary indicators: first, the 'schtasks.exe' process being spawned by WinGet-related binaries (or via PowerShell in that context); second, Windows Event ID 4698 (a new scheduled task) where the task creation context involves WinGet binaries and specifies paths commonly used for temporary or user-writable locations (e.g., Temp, AppData). This is a common pattern for attackers to achieve persistence or execute payloads by masquerading through trusted package manager components.
Detects persistence establishment via the Windows Package Manager (WinGet) Desired State Configuration (DSC) engine. The rule identifies instances where 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe' or 'WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe' spawns 'schtasks.exe' or uses PowerShell to create scheduled tasks. It correlates process execution events with Security Event ID 4698 to identify unauthorized scheduled task creation within the WinGet DSC context.
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