Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks or registry run keys that contain suspicious path indicators or specific file names often associated with persistence mechanisms. It monitors for the use of 'schtasks.exe' or 'at.exe' to create tasks referencing paths like ProgramData, Temp, AppData, or IDM\logs, as well as modifications to the 'Run' registry key with similar suspicious values.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve paths associated with staging (ProgramData, Temp, AppData) or are spawned by suspicious processes like Solid PDF Creator or MediumInstStart. This behavior is indicative of ransomware implant staging or persistence mechanisms used by threat actors.
Detects AT job creation via SMB for remote scheduled execution
This rule detects activities associated with the DRAYN malware, specifically the unauthorized modification of Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) on MSP management platform directory archives using icacls, followed by the creation of a scheduled task to establish persistence.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using names associated with Microsoft Edge or Google update processes to achieve persistence. The rule specifically targets the deployment of known payloads like TinyRCT (vmwared.exe) or PerfWatson.exe at logon with highest privileges, masquerading as legitimate update tasks.
Detects the execution of the VNT tunneling tool disguised as a legitimate VMware executable (vmwared.exe) located in C:\ProgramData\VMware\. The rule also identifies the creation of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate' configured to execute the masqueraded binary at user logon with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation of persistence mechanisms, specifically cron jobs or LaunchAgent plist files, initiated by the OpenClaw agent process tree (openclaw, openclaw-runtime, openclaw-agent). This behavior is associated with ClawHub skills attempting to maintain C2 access after the skill itself has been removed.
Detects the creation, execution, or deletion of Windows scheduled tasks using 'Mozilla' task names (specifically '\Mozilla\UpdateTask' or '\Mozilla\ElevateTask'). The rule identifies tasks created with SYSTEM privileges and 'ONSTART' triggers via schtasks.exe, as well as associated administrative commands to run or delete these tasks, and correlates these with Security Event ID 4698.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'SoftwareProtection' that executes a Python script. This technique is used by the CrashFix variant to establish persistence for its Python-based RAT, mimicking a legitimate Windows service to blend in. The detection specifically looks for the task name 'SoftwareProtection', a command line containing 'python.exe', 'pythonw.exe', or 'run.exe' along with 'udp.pyw', and the path '\windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\', indicating the malware's attempt to masquerade as a legitimate system component.
This rule detects the creation or configuration of a scheduled task named 'GoogleErrorReport' which references 'Fondue.exe' located in the 'C:\Users\Public' directory. This specific pattern is associated with 'Dropping Elephant' malware persistence, where the task ensures the binary executes persistently on the host.
This rule detects various persistence mechanisms and configuration tampering techniques often associated with compromised development environments. Specifically, it monitors for the creation of LD_PRELOAD libraries in common directories, unauthorized modifications to shell profile scripts, suspicious cron job creation by Node/NPM processes, and the poisoning of configuration files for IDEs and AI coding assistants (e.g., Claude, Cursor, VSCode). It also detects the execution of suspicious Node.js scripts used as session hooks.
This rule detects various persistence mechanisms and configuration tampering techniques often associated with compromised development environments. Specifically, it monitors for the creation of LD_PRELOAD libraries in common directories, unauthorized modifications to shell profile scripts, suspicious cron job creation by Node/NPM processes, and the poisoning of configuration files for IDEs and AI coding assistants (e.g., Claude, Cursor, VSCode). It also detects the execution of suspicious Node.js scripts used as session hooks.
Detects multiple techniques associated with Linux post-exploitation and persistence, including LD_PRELOAD environment variable hijacking, suspicious cron jobs, profile.d persistence modifications, systemd service masquerading via prctl, and fileless execution via memfd_create.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the schtasks.exe utility with persistence-related triggers such as system startup or user logon. The rule excludes common trusted processes that frequently interact with the Task Scheduler to minimize false positives.
This rule correlates multiple suspicious activities indicative of ransomware or destructive attacks. It detects a combination of volume shadow copy deletion, bulk file modifications, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, and network connections occurring during periods of high file write activity. The rule triggers when multiple signals are observed or when specific high-fidelity destructive indicators are present.
Detects a suspicious execution chain potentially associated with Deed RAT (used by Mustang Panda/Twill Typhoon), consisting of DLL sideloading by a legitimate signed executable followed by persistence mechanism creation (Registry Run keys or Scheduled Tasks) on the same host. Additionally, it identifies devices exhibiting repeated outbound connections to the same remote public IP over multiple days, serving as an indicator of potential re-compromise or persistent C2.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' with command line arguments that indicate suspicious activity. This includes tasks created in common temporary or user-writable directories, or tasks that involve PowerShell with encoded commands or obfuscated strings, which are often used by adversaries for persistence or execution.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows scheduled tasks using Security Event IDs 4698 and 4702. This rule parses the event data to extract key task information such as task name, command, arguments, and the author of the task.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that involves PowerShell executing commands via IEX and IRM, a technique associated with the DeepLoad malware to maintain persistence.
Detects the creation of a Windows Scheduled Task with command line arguments indicative of the Potemkin Loader, which uses task scheduling to maintain persistence by executing an RMM payload located in the AppData directory upon system startup or user logon.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe, where the command line arguments reference known LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) such as certutil, regsvr32, mshta, wscript, cscript, rundll32, or encoded command execution via cmd.exe. This activity often indicates an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code using trusted system binaries.
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