Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
116 detections
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Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'CreateObjectTask' via schtasks or PowerShell, which is associated with spawning 'dllhost.exe' as a child process under high-privileged parent processes (svchost, taskeng, or schtasks). This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or privilege escalation techniques leveraging system tasks.
Detects a low-privileged account manually triggering the 'CreateObjectTask' scheduled task, which is a known technique to force the 'Shell Create Object Handler' (dllhost.exe) to start under the SYSTEM context. This behavior is often associated with pre-exploitation steps for privilege escalation vulnerabilities, specifically those involving OBJREF marshaling targeting specific COM objects.
Detects suspicious behavior where an identical executable (same path and SHA256) is launched twice within a short window (60 minutes) following a system reboot, utilizing two distinct persistence methods: one triggered via the Task Scheduler (under svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and one via a user logon autostart mechanism (spawned by explorer.exe).
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'CreateObjectTask' via schtasks or PowerShell, which is associated with spawning 'dllhost.exe' as a child process under high-privileged parent processes (svchost, taskeng, or schtasks). This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or privilege escalation techniques leveraging system tasks.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects suspicious behavior where an identical executable (same path and SHA256) is launched twice within a short window (60 minutes) following a system reboot, utilizing two distinct persistence methods: one triggered via the Task Scheduler (under svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and one via a user logon autostart mechanism (spawned by explorer.exe).
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftMusicLibrariesPackageTaskMachine' and the invocation of specific associated file names 'codeflush.exe' or 'settingenv.cat', which are indicators of persistence used by the threat actor APT37.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects unauthorized modification of system cron files by the redis-server process, indicative of rogue redis replication exploitation, followed by the execution of a cron job associated with the XMRig cryptocurrency miner.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage specific tooling for scheduled task enumeration, commonly used for discovery or persistence management. The rule flags usage of 'Get-AccessibleScheduledTask' in conjunction with flags associated with tools like NtObjectManager or OleViewDotNet.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation or execution of scheduled tasks named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore' that exhibit suspicious behaviors, specifically those marked as hidden, tasks utilizing a LogonTrigger, or tasks executing wscript.exe with specific command-line arguments (e.g., //B, //Nologo) often associated with malicious script execution patterns.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts are executed via the Windows Task Scheduler from within potential staging directories (ProgramData with randomized folder names). The rule identifies execution that uses common PowerShell obfuscation flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand) and requires secondary hardening bypass flags (e.g., -WindowStyle hidden), followed by correlated network activity to a specific suspicious C2 domain.
Detects suspicious behavior where an identical executable (same path and SHA256) is launched twice within a short window (60 minutes) following a system reboot, utilizing two distinct persistence methods: one triggered via the Task Scheduler (under svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and one via a user logon autostart mechanism (spawned by explorer.exe).
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