Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,009 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,931
723
350
236
231
Contributors
1,122
652
408
328
198
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
4,009
Platforms
3,584
661
528
41
33
Products / Services
1,156
900
583
581
225
MITRE Techniques
3,297
1,718
1,465
731
551
CVEs
10
5
5
4
4
IDS Classtypes
19
3
2
1
1
IDS Protocols
16
5
2
1
1
Detects the execution of osascript spawned directly from the Terminal application, a pattern identified in Meow RAT campaigns using ClickFix social engineering lures to execute malicious AppleScript in-memory.
Detects a multi-stage npm supply chain compromise, often associated with Operation Friday Harvest or PostCSS typosquatting campaigns. The rule monitors for a sequence of 4 out of 5 behavioral stages on a single host within a 30-minute window: malicious postinstall script execution (npm/node spawning shells), staging of malicious payloads in temp directories, network connections to known command-and-control (C2) or payload-hosting infrastructure (e.g., GitHub, Telegram), execution of dropped binaries, and unauthorized access to sensitive credential files.
This rule detects potential supply chain attacks where a Node.js process (npm, npx, node) triggers an unauthorized shell, scripting interpreter, or network utility (such as curl, wget, powershell, or bash) to execute commands. This behavior, when followed by file creation in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, AppData\Local\Temp) within a 5-minute window, is indicative of malicious npm postinstall hooks, commonly seen in supply chain compromise campaigns.
Detects instances where known Windows binaries vulnerable to UAC bypass (eventvwr.exe, fodhelper.exe, or sdclt.exe) spawn a child powershell.exe process with the '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass' argument. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to elevate privileges without triggering a UAC prompt.
Detects a suspicious pattern consistent with the REF8372 OXLOADER malware delivery, where a batch file (BAT) is executed from the Downloads or Temp directories using cmd.exe, which then spawns PowerShell to download external content from link.storjshare.io.
Detects the TuglaInsaatci steganographic loader establishing persistence via a Windows Run registry key. The rule identifies suspicious PowerShell commands (execution policy bypass, hidden window, hidden file path) pointing to a script located within the AppData\Local\Temp directory, a technique associated with the FortiBleed campaign to deliver the Remcos RAT.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands originating from a batch (.bat/.cmd) script that utilize .NET WebClient methods (DownloadString/DownloadFile) combined with process execution cmdlets (Start-Process/Invoke-Expression/IEX). This pattern is associated with the delivery and execution of the OXLOADER malware via BATPackageBuilderSetup.bat.
Identifies execution of the Linux/macOS bash cradle used by GLASSWORM's WASM loader. It looks for curl fetching the specific OS path structure ('/linux/i/_' or '/darwin/i/_') and piping to bash.
Identifies potential Neo-reGeorg webshell execution by correlating HTTP POST requests to Java Server Pages (.jsp/.jspx) with reflection events (defineClass) in system logs. This specific mechanism is utilized by Operation Escaneo (MexicanMafia) to load AES-encrypted, base64/BLV-encoded payloads in memory.
Detects the execution of Windows script files (JS, VBS, HTA) using wscript.exe or cscript.exe from common staging areas like AppData, Temp, or ProgramData, specifically when the initiating process is not a signed Microsoft binary. This pattern is highly indicative of potential malicious script execution often used in phishing delivery or secondary payload stages.
Hunts for PowerShell scripts natively importing cryptographic classes (AesManaged, CryptoStream) to decrypt secondary payloads directly in memory.
Maps the execution of a VBScript payload decrypting the subsequent stages using hardcoded arrays. This rule specifically looks for VBScript commands that use the 'Split' function in conjunction with 'ChrW', which is a common pattern for obfuscated VBScript decoding routines.
This rule detects suspicious activity indicative of reflective code loading, often used by adversaries to conceal malicious payloads. It looks for specific strings in script content or PowerShell commands, combined with the creation of a 'payload.bin' file or the loading of 'Optimax.dll'. The rule correlates these events to identify potential in-memory execution of malicious code.
Detects the loader interrogating the process list for a specific cluster of sandbox/analysis tools before proceeding with the infection. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell executing and its command line containing at least two of the listed sandbox/analysis tools (apateDNS, tcpvcon, any.run, joeboxserver, Dbgview).
Detects macOS Python processes creating zip archives in temporary or 'collected_data' folders, potentially indicating data collection and exfiltration staging. The rule specifically looks for Python processes that have previously accessed sensitive paths like 'login.keychain-db' or performed data collection/compression activities.
Detects the multi-stage loader's evasion tactic where JScript copies itself from a Temp directory to Public and relaunches. Specifically, it looks for wscript.exe executing another wscript.exe process with a command line containing "C:\Users\Public" and "//nologo".
Detects PowerShell execution with '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File' arguments, combined with specific suspicious file paths or command-line strings often associated with privilege escalation or malicious activity. It also looks for suspicious AppX package management commands.
This rule detects PowerShell execution that uses 'Add-Type' to define types from 'combase.dll' and specific functions like 'DllImport', 'RoInitialize', 'WindowsCreateString', or 'Marshal.GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'. This pattern is often observed in techniques related to COM hijacking, DLL injection, or other forms of process injection to achieve persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the COM activation of 'Windows.Internal.InstallService.Control.InstallServiceControl' by non-SYSTEM processes, which can be abused to invoke 'CreateInstallServiceWork' for UNC-based DLL coercion. It looks for specific strings in process command lines and additional fields in device events, as well as suspicious loading of 'combase.dll' by non-system processes.
Detects PowerShell downloading an archive and expanding it into a user-writable directory with mining-related filenames or parameters.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving the creation of JavaScript or XML files in a specific public user directory, followed by their execution via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, and subsequently, the spawning of curl.exe by these script hosts to download additional content. This sequence is indicative of malware staging and execution, often used for initial access or further payload delivery.
Page 120 of 191