Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell expanding a downloaded archive (winPatch.zip) to %TEMP%\winPatch and subsequently launching the update.vbs bootstrapper via wscript.exe, as observed in the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting campaign distributing a Windows RAT.
Detects the PostCSS typosquatting campaign VBScript bootstrapper (update.vbs) using cmd.exe to extract dll.zip via tar, then launching the renamed Python executable chost.exe with loader.py to initialize the Windows RAT payload.
Detects Windows Script File (.wsf) scripts launching hidden batch (.bat) scripts via cmd.exe. This activity is often part of the ClickFix delivery chain, where wscript.exe (the host for .wsf files) initiates a command prompt to execute a batch file.
This rule detects suspicious execution of VBScript or VBE files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the command line contains keywords commonly associated with financial documents or urgent requests. A high count of such executions within an hour from a single device is flagged to identify potential phishing attempts or malware delivery.
Detects suspicious execution of VBScript (.vbs, .vbe) files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the command line contains keywords commonly associated with financial documents or urgent notifications. This rule specifically looks for multiple occurrences (3 or more) within an hour, indicating potential malicious activity like phishing or malware delivery.
This rule detects the execution of specific Python scripts associated with the 'FortiBleed' campaign. These scripts include 'spray_da.py' (domain admin password spray), 'smb_test.py' (SMB validation/lateral movement), 'spider.py' (Active Directory crawler), and 'ad_full_audit.py' (Active Directory full audit). Detection is based on the Python executable (python.exe, python3, etc.) running with these script names in the command line or as the executed file.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' executes 'protocal.cjs' from a 'NodePackages' path and subsequently spawns child processes that perform host reconnaissance activities. These activities include PowerShell registry queries, process listing, and querying installed applications, which are indicative of an adversary gathering system information.
Detects Office applications or PDF readers spawning scripting engines or network-connected processes, which is a common tactic used by the Lazarus Group in fake job offer social engineering campaigns targeting developers. This rule specifically looks for processes like winword.exe, excel.exe, powerpnt.exe, acrord32.exe, acrobat.exe, foxit reader.exe, msedge.exe, chrome.exe, or firefox.exe initiating the execution of scripting tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe) or network utilities (certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe, curl.exe, wget.exe).
Detects a script process creating files in a specific HP-themed path and then creating a Run key for persistence, indicative of the Turla Kazuar VBScript dropper.
This rule detects the execution of specific Python scripts associated with the 'FortiBleed' campaign. These scripts include 'spray_da.py' (domain admin password spray), 'smb_test.py' (SMB validation/lateral movement), 'spider.py' (Active Directory crawler), and 'ad_full_audit.py' (Active Directory full audit). Detection is based on the Python executable (python.exe, python3, etc.) running with these script names in the command line or as the executed file.
Description: Detects the Stage 2 C2 tasking loop from the malicious Next.js developer-targeting campaign.Stage 2 spawns a child Node.js process and executes attacker-supplied JavaScript via STDIN ('-') or eval ('-e'), sourced from a parent Node process that previously beaconed to Vercel staging infrastructure. Trojanized assets involved include jquery.min.js and env-setup.js loaded from
known malicious repo structures.
known malicious repo structures.
This rule detects instances where common command and scripting interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe) are launched by unusual parent processes. The rule specifically looks for these interpreters being spawned by processes other than explorer.exe, notepad.exe, mspaint.exe, or svchost.exe, and triggers if this occurs at least twice within an hour on the same computer by the same user.
Detects the execution of processes with filenames commonly associated with malicious scripts, exploits, or malware. This rule monitors Windows Security Event ID 4688 (process creation) for specific filenames such as 'malware.ps1', 'payload.vbs', 'exploit.js', 'attack.bat', 'backdoor.cmd', 'dropper.exe', 'loader.exe', and 'injector.exe'.
Detects PowerShell command-line executions that utilize the '-enc' (encoded command) parameter, combined with common Base64 encoded string prefixes. This technique is frequently used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts and evade detection.
This rule detects the execution of processes where the original file name contains 'autoit' but the current file name does not, which can indicate obfuscation or malicious use of AutoIt scripts.
Detects PowerShell or .NET code modifying ServicePointManager or certificate validation callbacks so later downloads accept untrusted certificates. This behavior is often associated with malware like InstallFix to bypass security measures during C2 communication or payload delivery.
Detects a script constructing a URL or request path from hostname, username, machine GUID, or volume serial information before downloading a second stage. This behavior is associated with the InstallFix malware.
Detects the creation of an inbound allow firewall rule by 'netsh' or 'powershell' when launched from a user-writable location (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData, Users\Public). This rule aims to identify potentially malicious activity where an attacker might be establishing persistence or enabling command and control communication by modifying host firewall settings.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a remote .7z file as an argument. This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity where mshta is abused to execute script content disguised as an archive file from a remote source.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a remote .7z file as an argument. This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity where mshta is abused to execute script content disguised as an archive file from a remote source.
Detects the creation of an executable file in temporary directories (temp or appdata\local\temp) that is then executed by cmd, powershell, or another executable. This pattern is often observed with malware downloaders that stage and execute their payloads in temporary locations.
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