Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the suspicious retrieval and immediate execution of Agentic AI configuration files (e.g., AGENTS.md, KNOWLEDGE.md) from remote sources using common command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of an adversary injecting malicious agent instructions or unauthorized configurations into an AI environment.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects potential supply chain or local configuration tampering involving the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The rule identifies modification of common MCP configuration files, followed by the execution of a tool runner (node, python, npx) that spawns a scripting shell, which subsequently initiates an unusual outbound network connection.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
Detects evidence of the SCKit supply chain worm within GitHub Actions CI pipelines. The rule identifies attempts to poison the build process by injecting a BASH_ENV path into GITHUB_ENV, which forces the execution of a malicious script (sckit-publish-bridge.sh) during subsequent shell steps. This script is designed to exfiltrate npm publishing credentials (NODE_AUTH_TOKEN) to external infrastructure. The detection logic covers both the injection mechanism and diagnostic output indicators from the bridge script.
The following analytic identifies `node.exe` directly executing a single `.js` script located in the same directory it was launched from, where that directory is an unusual location such as a user profile, PerfLogs, ProgramData, or Temp folder.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
This analytic detects the macOS osascript utility executing JavaScript for Automation (JXA) code, identified by
the "-l JavaScript" interpreter flag, with references to the Objective-C bridge. Adversaries may abuse JXA and
Objective-C APIs to interact with macOS applications, access native system functionality, execute commands, or
perform post-exploitation activity.
the "-l JavaScript" interpreter flag, with references to the Objective-C bridge. Adversaries may abuse JXA and
Objective-C APIs to interact with macOS applications, access native system functionality, execute commands, or
perform post-exploitation activity.
Detects instances where 'rnpkeys.exe', residing within a 'keyroll' directory, initiates suspicious child processes or executes suspicious command lines. This includes triggering common scripting engines like PowerShell or cmd.exe, using execution policy bypass flags, or executing binaries from Temp directories, which are characteristic of malicious post-exploitation or persistence activities.
Detects a specific social-engineering pattern known as 'ClickFix' where a user is manipulated into opening the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) to manually execute commands. The rule identifies suspicious command-line arguments typically associated with initial access (e.g., PowerShell hidden/encoded execution, web downloads) followed by the execution of MSI installers or related malicious binaries (e.g., rnpkeys.exe) within a 30-minute window, indicative of the Sauron Loader infection chain.
Detects various system utilities executing files or payloads staged in user-specific temporary directories (%AppData%\Local\Temp). This pattern is consistent with malware loaders (such as the Sauron Loader) that write payloads to the Temp folder before utilizing trusted Windows binaries (LOLBins) like rundll32, regsvr32, powershell, or wscript for execution. It also tracks potential driver installation or direct process memory access attempts from the same location.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
Detects suspicious command-line execution patterns originating from explorer.exe, characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands into a terminal or Run dialog. The rule monitors for the usage of system binaries (mshta, powershell, rundll32, etc.) combined with network-fetching arguments or suspicious execution flags (hidden windows, encoded commands).
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' or 'Register-ScheduledTask' where the task command path is located in suspicious directories such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData, or where the task is configured to run under the SYSTEM account. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries for persistence.
Detects the use of PowerShell or Windows Script Host to access files within common web browser cache directories combined with indicators of Base64 decoding and pixel data manipulation. This behavior is indicative of extracting malicious payloads hidden via steganography within browser-cached image files, a technique often used in phishing campaigns to evade detection.
This rule detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique where a user is manipulated into manually invoking the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) and pasting a malicious command. The rule monitors for instances where explorer.exe spawns command interpreters like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe with suspicious command-line patterns indicative of encoded payloads, script execution, or remote downloads.
Detects the execution of conhost.exe with the --headless flag, which is commonly observed in Kimsuky LNK-based malware campaigns to execute encoded cmd.exe payloads. This pattern involves the use of certutil or echo commands to deobfuscate and execute embedded scripts, often leveraging hidden windows or process hollowing techniques for persistence and evasion.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
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