Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,009 detections
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Detects the creation or modification of a registry value within the Run key that points to wscript.exe executing a .js file, which is a primary persistence mechanism for JS.MonoGlyphRAT. The rule specifically looks for modifications to user-level Run keys and checks for 'wscript.exe' and '.js' within the RegistryValueData, accounting for potential additional arguments after the .js file path.
Identifies wscript.exe executing a JavaScript file from a user directory and subsequently spawning a PowerShell process with execution policy bypass (-nop) and encoded command (-enc) flags, indicative of potential MonoGlyphRAT staging activity.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to download and execute the official Deno installation script. This behavior is abused by threat actors, such as the operators behind the DinDoor backdoor, to silently prepare an endpoint for fileless JavaScript malware execution.
Detects PowerShell script block telemetry (Event ID 4104) containing P/Invoke declarations targeting advapi32.dll's CredEnumerate function or related Credential Manager APIs (CredRead, CredWrite). This technique bypasses standard cmdlets that may be monitored or restricted, providing direct API access to stored Windows credentials including RDP sessions, web service credentials, and enterprise application tokens. Generalizes well beyond specific campaigns to most PowerShell credential-theft families.
Identifies package managers (like npm or yarn) executing suspiciously placed setup binaries from hidden or unconventional folders (e.g., tools/setup, .github/scripts/precheck) indicative of IronWorm preinstall hooks.
KQL Query
KQL Query
This rule detects the download of JavaScript (.js) or HTML Application (.hta) files followed by the execution of scripting interpreters like mshta, cscript, wscript, node, or powershell with encoded commands on the same device within a one-hour window. It assigns a score based on the count of downloaded files and executed scripts, triggering an alert if the combined score exceeds 2. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution, often seen in initial access or execution phases of an attack.
Detects the Deno runtime executing an in-memory script passed as a Base64-encoded Data URI, effectively bypassing disk monitoring. This technique is utilized by threat actors (e.g., DinDoor) to execute fileless malware payloads.
Detects PowerShell executing certutil.exe to decode base64 files, specifically when a hidden window style is used. This behavior is indicative of the JSE dropper routine employed by the Kimsuky threat group to decode malicious payloads to disk.
Detects variable splitting technique in cmd.exe to obfuscate PowerShell invocation.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe attempting to download and execute a remote payload masquerading as an msixbundle file.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks (`schtasks.exe /create`) where the command line arguments contain suspicious executables or paths commonly associated with malicious activity. This indicates a potential persistence mechanism being established by an adversary.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe with the '--update' command-line flag, a technique used by the FrostyNeighbor JavaScript dropper to transition to its second execution phase (PicassoLoader).
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to overwrite the amsiContext buffer using Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.WriteInt32 to disable AMSI scanning.
Detects the execution of scripts (.vbs, .js, .wsf, etc.) proxied through explorer.exe or rundll32.exe (via shell32.dll).
Threat actors embed these commands in .LNK files to bypass direct cscript/wscript detections and break process tree lineage. Because the user executes the LNK from the GUI, the desktop explorer.exe acts as the parent, mimicking normal user activity.
Threat actors embed these commands in .LNK files to bypass direct cscript/wscript detections and break process tree lineage. Because the user executes the LNK from the GUI, the desktop explorer.exe acts as the parent, mimicking normal user activity.
Monitors for Windows cmd.exe executions leveraging '//c' to run hidden batch files. This matches the Metasploit module's evasion technique for bypassing MSYS2 mangling on Windows Gogs installations during the argument injection exploit.
Detects processes utilizing ${IFS} in conjunction with Base64 decoding. This technique is used by the Gogs argument injection exploit to bypass Git branch name space restrictions while delivering encoded shell payloads.
Detects RunOnce registry modifications calling wscript.exe to execute an .icl script silently. This is indicative of GammaLoad malware establishing persistence.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity involving several Windows executables (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, wmic.exe, ssh.exe) when combined with specific keywords. It looks for wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs', wmic.exe executing 'process', 'call', or 'create', or ssh.exe using 'ProxyCommand'. Additionally, the rule filters for command lines containing keywords like 'gal', 'i*x', 'gcm', '*stM*', 'jsdelivr.net', 'github', or 'powershell', which are often associated with malicious activity, obfuscation, or external resource loading.
Detects the immediate persistence mechanisms (VBScript and Startup shortcut) established by KongTuke's ModeloRAT within minutes of initial execution. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell execution that contains commands to create both a VBScript file named 'scriptA.vbs' and a Startup shortcut named 'StartManagerB.lnk', which are highly specific indicators of this threat.
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