Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a PowerShell command used to read its own batch script container (e.g., rEgX.cmd) to find and extract a hidden, encoded payload. This self-parsing technique is a core feature of the Dead#Vax malware.
Detects a specific PowerShell command pattern used by the DeadVax malware campaign. The malware uses a self-parsing technique to read its own batch script file and extract a hidden, encoded payload from lines starting with an '@' character.
Detects a PowerShell script attempting to read the content of a command or batch file (.cmd) to extract a payload. This technique was observed in the DeadVax campaign where a batch script invokes PowerShell to parse its own content, looking for a line starting with '@' which contains the next stage's Base64-encoded payload.
Detects a PowerShell process reading its own or another script's content to extract a hidden payload. This technique was observed in the Dead#Vax campaign to deobfuscate and execute payloads stored within the script file itself.
Detects the execution of a Windows Script File (.wsf) from a suspicious or non-standard directory, such as temporary folders or removable/mounted drives. This technique was observed in the Dead#Vax campaign where a WSF file was executed from a mounted VHD to initiate the infection chain.
This rule detects various stages of the VOID#GEIST multi-stage Python loader as described in the Securonix blog. It identifies initial batch file execution, Chrome decoy PDF lures, hidden PowerShell relaunching of the batch file, persistence via the Startup folder, curl commands downloading zip payloads, Python embedded runtime downloads, and final Python payload execution. The rule is designed to catch the distinct command-line patterns associated with each stage of this specific malware.
Detects PowerShell commands checking for low system memory (specifically less than 3GB), a common anti-sandbox technique used by the DeadVax campaign to evade analysis environments.
Detects the use of the PowerShell 'Add-Type' cmdlet to dynamically define a C# class containing Win32 API functions commonly used for process injection. This technique is leveraged by the Dead#Vax loader to inject its final payload, such as AsyncRAT, into the memory of legitimate processes without dropping a decrypted binary to disk.
This rule detects the execution of specific Node.js scripts associated with the StegaBin package campaign. It looks for 'node.exe' or 'node' processes executing command lines containing 'scripts/test/install.js' or 'vendor/scrypt-js/version.js'. The intent is to identify the initial phase of a malicious package installation chain, which could lead to further compromise.
Detects the execution of LuaJIT or renamed variants with a single text, log, or JSON file as an argument, a pattern characteristic of the FakeGit campaign's loader. The rule specifically looks for process creation events where the executable name is one of the known suspicious processes (luajit.exe, lua.exe, vm_s390x.exe, init.exe, luad.exe, gcc.exe) and the command line contains a .txt, .log, or .json file extension. It further refines the detection by checking if the command line has a limited number of arguments (2 or 3), which is typical for the malware's simple execution pattern.
Detects the creation or modification of udev rules that execute suspicious commands or scripts from unusual locations. Udev rules are used by the Linux kernel device manager to handle hardware events and can be abused for persistence.
Detects scripts designed for container escape and host persistence
Detects malicious Message of the Day scripts being used for persistence, since these messages are ran at start time and will display to all users
Detects WMI executing script engines as possible persistence mechanism
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity that involves hidden windows, execution policy bypass, and attempts to download or execute files. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched by common parent processes like explorer.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or rundll32.exe, combined with command-line arguments indicative of stealthy execution and payload delivery. The rule identifies two main scenarios: 'Hidden Downloader and Execution' where PowerShell is used with hidden window styles and download commands, and 'Inline Launcher and Payload Delivery' where PowerShell is used with no profile and download/execution commands.
Detects the execution of specific batch scripts (hp.bat, hpp.bat, a.bat) used by the CL-UNK-1068 actor for host reconnaissance and information gathering.
Correlates PowerShell extraction of specific files (steam_monitor, crashhandler, crashlog) with subsequent DLL side-loading where 'crashhandler.dll' is loaded by 'steam_monitor.exe' from a non-standard program or Steam directory, indicating a potential malware infection chain.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a command line containing a specific sequence of strings associated with extracting and executing malware from a ZIP file, as observed in the Steam_Monitor campaign. This typically involves using PowerShell commands like 'Get-ChildItem', '::OpenRead', and 'TaR' in conjunction with a '.zip' file.
Detects the use of PowerShell to disable or weaken Microsoft Defender security features. This technique is commonly used by malware to evade detection before executing malicious payloads, as seen in the referenced Fortinet report.
Detects scripts modifying Windows registry run keys for establishing persistence
Detects the execution of `node` running scripts from a `vendor` directory during an `npm install` lifecycle. This behavior was observed in the StegaBin campaign where malicious npm packages used an install hook to execute a loader from 'vendor/scrypt-js/version.js'.
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