Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of 'osascript' to display a deceptive system dialog box mimicking a 'System Preferences' password prompt. This technique is used by malware like the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) to trick users into entering their administrative password for credential theft.
This rule detects activities associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign. It identifies network indicators such as specific C2 domains (jholycf100.ddns.com.br, voulerlivros.com.br, res.cloudinary.com), a specific IP address (152.249.17.145), and a destination port (7000). It also looks for the abuse of CasPol.exe making outbound connections to the identified C2 infrastructure. Furthermore, the rule detects PowerShell processes spawned by WMI (WmiPrvSE.exe) that attempt to fetch content from Cloudinary and load assemblies in memory, indicating potential in-memory execution. Finally, it includes a specific SHA256 file hash (7befeacf0b3480fb675d0cab7767b5b9697edc9d0e05982025a06ead0054afd5) associated with the campaign.
This rule helps you find files that may be part of the EmEditor watering hole incident by looking for a small set of very specific clues that were described in public reporting. It searches for lookalike website names and a repeated campaign marker that appeared in the attacker’s network paths. A match does not automatically prove malware, but it is a strong hint that the file should be reviewed, especially if it is a script, configuration, or installer related content. If you get a hit, confirm where the file came from and whether it is expected for that machine. If it is unexpected, save the file for analysis, check for other related downloads, and look for signs of credential theft or surveillance activity. Also search for the same marker across endpoints, because campaigns often reuse the same identifier on multiple victims. The intent is to give defenders an easy, reliable starting point for triage using human readable clues.
Detects network and endpoint activity associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign, including C2 communication, payload downloads, CasPol.exe making outbound connections, WMI-spawned PowerShell with Cloudinary fetches and Assembly.Load, and a specific file hash.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task configured to execute a VBScript from a user's AppData folder. This technique is used by adversaries, including the Dead#Vax campaign, to establish persistence via an indirect execution flow, often to evade detections focused on direct PowerShell or cmd.exe task actions.
This rule detects activity associated with the DYNOWIPER malware. It identifies the malware through specific SHA256 file hashes, known filenames (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, dynacon_update.ps1, exp.ps1), and process names (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, powershell.exe). Additionally, it flags network connections to or from a set of known malicious IP addresses (185.200.177.10, 31.172.71.5, 193.200.17.163, 185.82.127.20, 72.62.35.76) which are associated with VPN logins or exfiltration reverse proxies used by DYNOWIPER.
Detects the execution of legitimate .NET framework utilities (Aspnet_compiler.exe, RegAsm.exe, vbc.exe) launched by scripting engines like PowerShell or WScript. This behavior is a known TTP for process hollowing, as seen in Agent Tesla campaigns, where malware injects its code into a trusted process to evade defenses.
Detects Microsoft Office applications such as Word or Excel spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe). This behavior is often associated with malicious documents that execute macros to run commands on the victim's system. The MuddyWater group has been observed using this technique in their 'Operation Olalampo' campaign.
Detects PowerShell launching RegSvcs.exe, a technique used by TA584 to deliver the 'P0WER' variant of XWorm via process hollowing. The 'P0WER' variant of XWorm uses a custom .NET loader that starts RegSvcs.exe in a suspended state, which is a strong indicator of process hollowing. Legitimate use of RegSvcs.exe by developers is possible but uncommon from PowerShell.
Detects PowerShell executing a self-parsing command to extract a hidden payload from a batch file. This technique was observed in the Dead#Vax campaign. The malware reads its own batch file content to find a line starting with '@' which contains the next-stage encrypted payload.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks (`schtasks.exe /create`) where the command line arguments contain suspicious executables or paths commonly associated with malicious activity. This indicates a potential persistence mechanism being established by an adversary.
Detects suspicious modification of AI assistant configuration files potentially related to MCP server injection.
Detects a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using WMI to spawn a PowerShell process. This technique is used by malware, such as in the Remcos RAT delivery chain, to break the parent-child process relationship and evade detections based on process ancestry.
Detects the execution of the .NET compiler utility 'Aspnet_compiler.exe' by a scripting engine like PowerShell or JScript/VBScript. This behavior is highly unusual and is a known technique used by malware like Agent Tesla to perform process hollowing, where the legitimate 'Aspnet_compiler.exe' process is hollowed out and injected with malicious code.
Detects the execution of osascript to display a deceptive dialog box mimicking 'System Preferences' to harvest user passwords. This technique was observed being used by the Atomic Stealer (AMOS) malware.
Detects execution of specific Python scripts (modes.py, extentions.py, udp.pyw) using the windowless Python interpreter (pythonw.exe) from user-writable locations. This behavior is a strong indicator of ModeloRAT delivered via the CrashFix/ClickFix campaign using portable WinPython for stealth.
This rule detects PowerShell execution containing keywords related to AES decryption combined with a Base64 encoded MZ header ('TVqQAAM'). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of malicious assemblies in memory, a technique used by malware like Agent Tesla to bypass disk-based defenses.
Detects a PowerShell process initiating a network connection to download an image or text file from domains associated with a Remcos RAT campaign. In this campaign, PowerShell is used to download a steganographic image containing the next stage payload.
This rule detects the behavioral pattern of the dYdX RAT, which executes Python scripts from temporary directories with suppressed output. It looks for Python processes (identified by original filename) executing from common temporary directories while also suppressing output (e.g., redirecting to /dev/null or using CREATE_NO_WINDOW).
This rule detects suspicious entries in the RunMRU (Most Recently Used) registry key that indicate potential persistence mechanisms. It specifically looks for entries containing DNS-related tools (like nslookup, dig, host), other common system utilities (ping, tracert, ipconfig, powershell, cmd.exe, wmic, curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin), or suspicious flags commonly associated with obfuscated or malicious commands (e.g., base64 encoding, web requests, common sensitive paths). The rule also correlates these registry modifications with subsequent process creations to confirm execution.
Identifies a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) creating a JScript (.js) file in a Startup folder. This is a common persistence technique used by malware, including the JScript downloader in the Remcos RAT campaign.
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