Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the use of `GetProcAddress` within PowerShell script blocks, captured via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). The presence of `GetProcAddress` in PowerShell is often indicative of malicious activity, such as process injection or other code execution techniques, as it allows for dynamic resolution of API functions. This behavior is unusual for legitimate PowerShell scripts and suggests an attacker is attempting to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise. Analysts should investigate the full script block and any associated processes.
Detects PowerShell processes executing commands that utilize `Net.WebClient` to download content, indicated by the presence of `new-object`, `net.webclient).`, and `download` keywords in the command line, along with either `string(` or `file(`. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for ingress tool transfer or to fetch additional malicious payloads.
This rule detects the use of various command-line tools and PowerShell cmdlets that can initiate web requests. These include native Windows PowerShell cmdlets like 'Invoke-RestMethod', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'Resume-BitsTransfer', 'Start-BitsTransfer', and their aliases ('irm', 'iwr'), as well as common command-line utilities like 'curl' and 'wget', and .NET framework calls such as '[System.Net.WebRequest]::create' and 'WinHttp.WinHttpRequest'. Adversaries often use these methods to download additional tools, malware, or exfiltrate data from a compromised system.
This rule detects the use of various web request commands and cmdlets within PowerShell script block logs. It specifically looks for common methods used to initiate web requests or file transfers, such as `[System.Net.WebRequest]::create`, `curl`, `Invoke-RestMethod`, `Invoke-WebRequest`, `irm`, `iwr`, `Resume-BitsTransfer`, `Start-BitsTransfer`, `wget`, and `WinHttp.WinHttpRequest`. The rule aims to identify suspicious activity where PowerShell is used to download or interact with remote resources, potentially for ingress tool transfer or command and control. A filter is applied to exclude paths starting with 'C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\', which are likely legitimate system activities.
Detects PowerShell processes launched by web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer) or Windows Explorer, especially when using suspicious command-line arguments like encoded commands, Invoke-Expression, or web download functions. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often initiated through user interaction (e.g., clicking a malicious link or opening a crafted file).
Checkpoint Researchers published an Article with a Behavior Analysis of the Pure Malware Family. This Query is based on the Analysis of the Researchers. thx to Checkpoint.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) that contains obfuscated commands, specifically looking for the presence of '$env:TEMP' and 'ActiveXObject' or a combination of 'split', 'reverse', and 'join' in the command line. This PowerShell execution is correlated with the creation of a .LNK file within a 5-minute window prior to the PowerShell process start, suggesting the LNK file might be used as an initial execution vector for the obfuscated PowerShell command. This pattern is indicative of malware like PureCoder.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) that contains obfuscated commands, specifically looking for the presence of '$env:TEMP' and 'ActiveXObject' or a combination of 'split', 'reverse', and 'join' in the command line. This PowerShell execution is correlated with the creation of a .LNK file within a 5-minute window prior to the PowerShell process start, suggesting the LNK file might be used as an initial execution vector for the obfuscated PowerShell command. This pattern is indicative of malware like PureCoder.
RedCanary recommends to create a Policy wich opens js files in Notepad (https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/notepad-javascript/) to prevent the execution of malicious payloads.
This Query detects instances where 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' are initiated by 'openwith.exe' or 'explorer.exe' and execute a JavaScript file (.js) located within a user's profile directory. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often delivered via user interaction (e.g., opening a malicious file).
This Query detects instances where 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' are initiated by 'openwith.exe' or 'explorer.exe' and execute a JavaScript file (.js) located within a user's profile directory. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often delivered via user interaction (e.g., opening a malicious file).
The analytic detects the execution of "mshta.exe" with inline protocol handlers such as "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About". This activity is significant because mshta.exe can be exploited to execute malicious scripts, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks that execute commands using native Windows shells (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript) or from public folders (Users, Temp, ProgramData). This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's download methods such as "DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest and its aliases "IWR" or "Curl". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity can be significant as such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic detects a Microsoft Office product spawning uncommon processes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt of a malicious macro execution or exploitation of an unknown vulnerability in an office product, in order to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of AutoIt3, a scripting language often used for automating Windows GUI tasks and general scripting. It identifies instances where AutoIt3 or its variants are executed by searching for process names or original file names matching 'autoit3.exe'. This activity is significant because attackers frequently use AutoIt3 to automate malicious actions, such as executing malware. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, system compromise, or further propagation of malware within the environment.
This rule detects common PowerShell download and execution cradles. It looks for command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to download content from the internet (e.g., '.DownloadString(', '.DownloadFile(', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'iwr', 'Invoke-RestMethod', 'irm') combined with immediate execution (e.g., ';iex $', '| IEX', 'Invoke-Expression'). These patterns are frequently used by adversaries to fetch and execute malicious scripts or payloads directly in memory.
The following analytic detects the execution of "rundll32.exe" with inline protocol handlers such as "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About". This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it is often associated with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, bypass security controls, and maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to archive files into a temporary folder. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring for the `Compress-Archive` command targeting the `Temp` directory. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to collect and compress data for exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data access and exfiltration, posing a severe risk to sensitive information and overall network security.
The following analytic detects the execution of a PowerShell script designed to capture screen images on a host. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text patterns associated with screen capture activities. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information by capturing desktop screenshots. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gather visual data from the compromised system, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation.
The analytic detects Microsoft OneNote spawning `mshta.exe`, a behavior often associated with spearphishing attacks. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware families like TA551, AsyncRat, Redline, and DCRAT to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, or further malware deployment. Immediate investigation and containment are recommended.
Detects suspicious command-line activity spawned by the GoAnywhere MFT Tomcat service. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation techniques observed following the exploitation of CVE-2025-10035, as detailed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. The detection looks for specific discovery and execution commands launched via cmd.exe or powershell.exe from the GoAnywhere parent process.
Detects the execution of NeutralinoJS framework components ('neutralino.exe', 'node.exe') from non-standard directories. This behavior is associated with the EvilAI campaign, where threat actors leverage the NeutralinoJS framework to execute arbitrary JavaScript code for covert data access and process spawning. The detection specifically looks for the '--load-dir-res' argument, which is a strong indicator of a NeutralinoJS application launch, and filters out executions from standard application installation directories to focus on anomalous locations, which can indicate malware masquerading as a portable app or running from a temporary/user location.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by the GoAnywhere MFT Tomcat service. This behavior is consistent with post-exploitation activity following a successful remote code execution exploit of CVE-2025-10035, as observed in campaigns by the threat actor Storm-1175.
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