Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
KQL Query from file: PowerShell Self-Pwn
KQL Query from file: MDE KQL to detect TA571 socialengineering abuse
This rule detects the execution of inline Python code that uses the `os.system()` function to spawn a shell. Specifically, it looks for Python interpreter executables being run with the `-c` argument (for inline code execution) and the command line containing both `os.system(` and common shell paths like `/bin/bash`, `/bin/sh`, etc. This technique is often used by adversaries to gain interactive shell access or execute arbitrary commands on a compromised system.
This rule detects the manual execution of a script from inside a compressed file (ZIP/RAR) on Windows. It identifies scenarios where a user interacts with a compressed file, causing a script to be extracted to a temporary directory and then executed by common scripting interpreters like cscript, wscript, powershell, pwsh, or mshta. The rule covers execution initiated by 7zip, WinRar, or the native Windows File Explorer.
This analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.
This analytic detects the use of `New-CIMSession` followed by `Invoke-CIMMethod` within PowerShell. This combination is significant because it mimics the behavior of `Invoke-WMIMethod`, which is often used for remote code execution, particularly via NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify these cmdlets in the `ScriptBlockText` field. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized remote command execution and system control.
This analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell cmdlet from PowerView. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify instances where this specific command is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates an attempt to enumerate network file shares, which may contain sensitive information such as backups, scripts, and credentials. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network, potentially compromising additional systems and sensitive data.
The analytic detects the execution of the Get-GPPPassword or Get-CachedGPPPassword PowerShell cmdlets, which are used to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text associated with these cmdlets. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to retrieve and decrypt stored credentials from SYSVOL, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network by exploiting exposed credentials.
The analytic detects the use of the `Enter-PSSession` cmdlet to establish an interactive session on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity by searching for specific script block text patterns. This behavior is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise of the network and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
This analytic detects PowerShell scripts that create thread mutexes, identified by the presence of "Threading.Mutex" in PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). This technique is often used by malware to ensure only a single instance of a malicious script runs on a compromised system, which can indicate sophisticated malware or persistence mechanisms. Such activity could allow an attacker to maintain exclusive control over a process, potentially leading to further exploitation or persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command 'Get-Clipboard' to retrieve clipboard data. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify instances where this command is used. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or other confidential data copied to the clipboard. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially compromising user accounts and other critical assets.
This analytic detects the use of the PowerShell Cmdlet `export-certificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the local Certificate Store on a Windows endpoint. Monitoring this behavior is crucial because stolen certificates can be used to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or facilitate further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to encrypted communications and sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.
This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ForestTrust` command, often associated with the PowerSploit framework, via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This activity is significant because `Get-ForestTrust` is used to enumerate trust relationships within an Active Directory forest. Adversaries commonly perform this discovery technique as a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation, aiming to map out the environment for further exploitation and access to sensitive resources. Detecting this command provides visibility into potential reconnaissance efforts by attackers.
This rule detects attempts to establish persistence by modifying Windows Registry Run keys to execute PowerShell commands or scripts. It specifically looks for modifications to common Run key paths (CurrentVersion\Run, Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Policies\Explorer\Run) that contain keywords indicative of PowerShell execution, such as 'powershell', 'pwsh', 'frombase64string', download functions, hidden window styles, no profile, encoded commands, execution policy bypass, and various Invoke- commands (Invoke-Expression, Invoke-Command, Invoke-WebRequest).
This analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell scripts to query Active Directory for domain computers. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) events containing `adsisearcher`, `objectcategory=computer`, and methods like `findAll()` or `findOne()`. This activity is indicative of Active Directory discovery, which adversaries or Red Teams perform to gain situational awareness and identify potential targets for lateral movement.
The analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` by leveraging Script Block Logging. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate certificates from the Windows Certificate Store. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for identifying potential certificate theft, which can lead to unauthorized access and impersonation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to compromise secure communications, authenticate as legitimate users, and escalate their privileges within the network.
This analytic detects the execution of the Invoke-WMIExec utility within PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). This detection leverages PowerShell script block logs to identify instances where the Invoke-WMIExec command is used. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential lateral movement using WMI commands with NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely on target systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.
The analytic detects the use of the `Set-ADAccountControl` PowerShell cmdlet with parameters that disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific command execution. Disabling Kerberos Pre-Authentication is significant because it allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks against user passwords using the AS-REP Roasting technique. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain groups. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]` and group-related queries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the use of the Win32_ScheduledJob WMI class via PowerShell script block logging. This class, which manages scheduled tasks, is disabled by default due to security concerns and must be explicitly enabled through registry modifications. The detection leverages PowerShell event code 4104 and script block text analysis. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate malicious intent, especially if the class was enabled by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment by creating scheduled tasks.
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