Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies when a list of all local users is being enumerated. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to gather user information for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects PowerShell commands that initiate a process on a remote endpoint using the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) protocol. It specifically looks for the use of "ShellExecute" or "ExecuteShellCommand" within PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet `get-localgroup` using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, providing detailed visibility into script execution. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to enumerate local groups, which may be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain insights into group memberships, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege abuse. Review parallel processes and the entire script block for comprehensive analysis.
The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell's Start-Service or Stop-Service cmdlets on an endpoint. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to detect these commands. This activity is significant because attackers can manipulate services to disable or stop critical functions, causing system instability or disrupting business operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security services, evade detection, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential system downtime and compromised security.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`) hosted remotely. This could be an indication of malicious software deployment or lateral movement attempts using Windows Installer functionality. The usage of the WindowsInstaller COM object rather than msiexec could be an attempt to bypass detection.
Process executed from binary hidden in Base64 encoded file. Encoding malicious software is a.
Technique to obfuscate files from detection.
The first and second ProcessCommandLine component is looking for Python decoding base64.
The third ProcesssCommandLine component is looking for the Bash/sh commandline base64 decoding tool.
The fourth one is looking for Ruby decoding base64.
Technique to obfuscate files from detection.
The first and second ProcessCommandLine component is looking for Python decoding base64.
The third ProcesssCommandLine component is looking for the Bash/sh commandline base64 decoding tool.
The fourth one is looking for Ruby decoding base64.
This query searches for a string pattern detected in evasive PowerShell usage. Jupyter or SolarMarker will iterate on this pattern multiple times to read data and call additional processes. This query is not fully specific to Jupyter or SolarMarker, and will also return other malicious malware, but is unlikely to return false positives.
'Identifies when Azure Run command is used to execute a PowerShell script on a VM that is unique.
The uniqueness of the PowerShell script is determined by taking a combined hash of the cmdLets it imports and the file size of the PowerShell script. Alerts from this detection indicate a unique PowerShell was executed in your environment.'
The uniqueness of the PowerShell script is determined by taking a combined hash of the cmdLets it imports and the file size of the PowerShell script. Alerts from this detection indicate a unique PowerShell was executed in your environment.'
Service Accounts Performing Remote PowerShell.
Author: miflower.
The purpose behind this detection is for finding service accounts that are performing remote powershell sessions.
There are two phases to the detection: Identify service accounts, Find remote PS cmdlets being ran by these accounts.
To accomplish this, we utilize DeviceLogonEvents and DeviceEvents to find cmdlets ran that meet the criteria.
One of the main advantages of this method is that only requires server telemetry, and not the attacking client.
The first phase relies on the DeviceLogonEvents to determine whether an account is a service account or not, consider the following accounts with logons:.
Random_user has DeviceLogonEvents with type 2, 3, 7, 10, 11 & 13.
Random_service_account 'should' only have DeviceLogonEvents with type 3,4 or 5.
Author: miflower.
The purpose behind this detection is for finding service accounts that are performing remote powershell sessions.
There are two phases to the detection: Identify service accounts, Find remote PS cmdlets being ran by these accounts.
To accomplish this, we utilize DeviceLogonEvents and DeviceEvents to find cmdlets ran that meet the criteria.
One of the main advantages of this method is that only requires server telemetry, and not the attacking client.
The first phase relies on the DeviceLogonEvents to determine whether an account is a service account or not, consider the following accounts with logons:.
Random_user has DeviceLogonEvents with type 2, 3, 7, 10, 11 & 13.
Random_service_account 'should' only have DeviceLogonEvents with type 3,4 or 5.
Microsoft has observed attackers exploiting vulnerabilities associated with Log4J.
Looks for suspicious base64 encoded registry keys being created.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
References:
https://threathunt.blog/registry-hunts/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
References:
https://threathunt.blog/registry-hunts/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, SQL Server abuse.
SQL Server offers a vast array of tools for automating tasks, exporting data, and running scripts. These legitimate tools can be repurposed by attackers. Because there are so many powerful commands an attacker might exploit, hunting for malicious activity involving SQL Server can be complicated.
This query detects instances of a SQL Server process launching a shell to run one or more suspicious commands.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/sql/relational-databases/security/securing-sql-server?view=sql-server-ver15
SQL Server offers a vast array of tools for automating tasks, exporting data, and running scripts. These legitimate tools can be repurposed by attackers. Because there are so many powerful commands an attacker might exploit, hunting for malicious activity involving SQL Server can be complicated.
This query detects instances of a SQL Server process launching a shell to run one or more suspicious commands.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/sql/relational-databases/security/securing-sql-server?view=sql-server-ver15
Expanding on DeviceEvents output with Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rule descriptions.
The ActionType values of the ASR events already explain what rule was matched and if it was audited or blocked.
However, it could still be useful to have a more human-friendly description in the results.
Also, this query is a good example for how you could define your own lookup tables and join with them.
The events in the DeviceEvents table contain a GUID for the various ASR rules rather than a full description of the rule.
This query will create a table which has the description for each ASR rule as per https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.
This table is then joined to the output of a query against the DeviceEvents table and shows a summary count of the events by the newly defined description.
This query shows the ability to use joins and custom dimension tables.
See https://docs.loganalytics.io/docs/Language-Reference/Tabular-operators/join-operator for more information on the join syntax.
For more questions on this query, feel free to ping @FlyingBlueMonki on twitter or mattegen@microsoft.com via email.
First lets start by creating a table of the rule descriptions to rule guids.
The ActionType values of the ASR events already explain what rule was matched and if it was audited or blocked.
However, it could still be useful to have a more human-friendly description in the results.
Also, this query is a good example for how you could define your own lookup tables and join with them.
The events in the DeviceEvents table contain a GUID for the various ASR rules rather than a full description of the rule.
This query will create a table which has the description for each ASR rule as per https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.
This table is then joined to the output of a query against the DeviceEvents table and shows a summary count of the events by the newly defined description.
This query shows the ability to use joins and custom dimension tables.
See https://docs.loganalytics.io/docs/Language-Reference/Tabular-operators/join-operator for more information on the join syntax.
For more questions on this query, feel free to ping @FlyingBlueMonki on twitter or mattegen@microsoft.com via email.
First lets start by creating a table of the rule descriptions to rule guids.
'This query looks for command lines that contain a public IP address. Attackers may use a hard coded IP for C2 or exfiltration.
This query can be filtered to exclude network prefixes that are known to be legitimate.'
This query can be filtered to exclude network prefixes that are known to be legitimate.'
' The query below identifies creation of unusual identity by the Europium actor to mimic Microsoft Exchange Health Manager Service account using Exchange PowerShell commands
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/'
This query offers daily categorization of ASR rules, helping SOC analysts monitor specific categories like office-related activities or WMI among the 16 rules.
It aids in tracking detection rates and organizational trends.
It aids in tracking detection rates and organizational trends.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Sysrv botnet evolution.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances of the Java process being used to execute cmd.exe, and download and execute a PowerShell script.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances of the Java process being used to execute cmd.exe, and download and execute a PowerShell script.
This query looks for common webserver process names and identifies any processes launched using a scripting language (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript), common initial profiling commands (net \ net1 \ whoami \ ping \ ipconfig),or admin commands (sc). Note that seeing thisactivity doesn't immediately mean you have a breach, though you might consider reviewing and honing the where clause to fit your specific web applications.
Those who don't mind false positives should consider also adding database process names to this list as well (i.e. sqlservr.exe) to identify potential abuse of xp_cmdshell.
Those who don't mind false positives should consider also adding database process names to this list as well (i.e. sqlservr.exe) to identify potential abuse of xp_cmdshell.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, EvilQuest signals the rise of Mac ransomware.
As of the time of this writing (October 2020), ransomware designed to target macOS is relatively rare. EvilQuest is one of the few examples of this kind of malware on the platform.
The query below can help locate an attempt to run Python in service of malicious activity by a remote operator. The command the query searches for is associated with, but not definitely indicative of, EvilQuest infections.
Other queries related to EvilQuest ransomware can be found under the See also section below.
As of the time of this writing (October 2020), ransomware designed to target macOS is relatively rare. EvilQuest is one of the few examples of this kind of malware on the platform.
The query below can help locate an attempt to run Python in service of malicious activity by a remote operator. The command the query searches for is associated with, but not definitely indicative of, EvilQuest infections.
Other queries related to EvilQuest ransomware can be found under the See also section below.
This query looks for processes that load an older version of the system.management.automation libraries. While not inherently malicious, downgrading to PowerShell version 2
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
'This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
This behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'
This behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'
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