Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell scripts that create TCP listeners and accept client connections, which is indicative of tunneling activity. The rule specifically looks for the use of '[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]', 'System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener', and 'AcceptTcpClient' within the script block text.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution where the 'WindowStyle Hidden' option is used. Adversaries often use this technique to conceal malicious activity from users by preventing the PowerShell window from being visible. The rule specifically looks for the combination of 'powershell', 'WindowStyle', and 'Hidden' within the script block text. A filter is applied to exclude legitimate Amazon WorkSpaces configuration scripts that use this option.
Detects usage of the Get-ADUser cmdlet to collect user information and output it to a file. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance phases where attackers enumerate Active Directory users for further targeting.
This rule detects the execution of JavaScript code using 'mshta.exe'. Mshta.exe is a legitimate Windows utility that can be abused by adversaries to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and JavaScript or VBScript, often to bypass application control solutions or browser security settings. The rule specifically looks for 'mshta.exe' as the image or original filename and the presence of 'javascript' in the command line arguments.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell download cradle that leverages nslookup to extract payloads from DNS TXT records. This technique is often used for defense evasion by adversaries to retrieve malicious code or data over DNS.
This rule detects the execution of the Perl interpreter using the `-e` or `-E` flags. These flags allow for inline execution of Perl code directly from the command line, which can be leveraged by adversaries to launch reverse shells, execute arbitrary commands, or run malicious scripts without needing to write a Perl file to disk. This technique is often used in post-exploitation scenarios for stealthy command execution.
Detects the execution of the PHP interpreter using the "-r" flag, which allows for inline execution of PHP code. This method can be leveraged by adversaries to execute arbitrary PHP code, potentially for launching reverse shells or other malicious activities.
Detects attempts to capture audio using PowerShell cmdlets, specifically looking for commands related to the 'WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet' module or similar audio device manipulation cmdlets. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to record sensitive conversations or gather information from the compromised system's environment.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64 encoded 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) cmdlets. Adversaries often encode malicious PowerShell scripts in base64 to evade detection and obfuscate their intentions. The rule specifically looks for patterns indicative of base64 encoded 'IEX' calls, including variations with 'New-Object' and different casing, as well as UTF-16 LE encoded versions of common 'IEX' patterns.
Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process". This technique can be used to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by identifying PowerShell processes (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) that are not spawned by typical user-facing graphical interface processes such as explorer.exe. This rule aims to identify PowerShell execution that is not directly initiated by a user through interactive means, potentially indicating automated or malicious activity. It includes filters for known legitimate parent processes like those associated with Windows updates, VS Code, and Windows Terminal to reduce false positives.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell scripts attempting to copy the Security Account Manager (SAM) database. It specifically looks for PowerShell command lines that include both a reference to a volume shadow copy (e.g., '\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy') and the SAM file path ('System32\config\sam'), combined with common PowerShell copy commands or .NET file copy methods. This activity is indicative of an adversary trying to extract credentials by accessing the SAM database, often from a shadow copy to bypass file locks.
This rule detects suspicious invocations of PowerShell or PowerShell Core (pwsh.exe) when the parent process is a script engine like wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This behavior is often associated with adversaries using scripting languages to execute PowerShell commands, potentially bypassing direct PowerShell execution policies or obfuscating their activities. The rule specifically filters out legitimate activity from 'Health Service State' to reduce false positives.
Detects the use of the PowerShell "Set-Service" cmdlet to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "manual". This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses or achieve persistence by modifying service configurations.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell command-line patterns indicative of downloading and executing remote content. Specifically, it looks for the use of `IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString` or `(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile` which are commonly abused by malicious scripts, stagers, and downloaders to fetch and run payloads from the internet.
Detects PowerShell command line contents that include suspicious abnormal casing in the 'Net.Webclient' string (e.g., 'nEt.WEbCliEnT') as used in obfuscation techniques. This rule specifically looks for base64 encoded variations of 'Net.Webclient' with mixed casing, indicating an attempt to evade detection.
Detects the use of the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet to enumerate Active Directory user information and export it to a file or pipe it to other cmdlets for further processing, which can be indicative of reconnaissance or data staging by an attacker.
Detects attempts to tamper with the PowerShell execution policy by modifying registry keys via the command line. This technique is often used by adversaries to bypass script signing requirements, allowing the execution of unsigned or malicious PowerShell scripts.
Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance. This behavior is often associated with defense evasion techniques, where adversaries use legitimate Windows utilities to execute malicious code or bypass application whitelisting.
Detects the execution of the built-in Windows script "gatherNetworkInfo.vbs" which is commonly used to collect network configuration details and other system information. This activity can be indicative of reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects the execution of suspicious scripts (PowerShell, MSHTA, WScript, CScript) from common temporary directories. Adversaries often stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary folders to evade detection and blend in with legitimate system activity. The rule specifically looks for these script interpreters being launched with command lines that include paths to temporary directories, while filtering out some known legitimate activities.
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