Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

4,009 detections

Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects potential supply chain or local configuration tampering involving the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The rule identifies modification of common MCP configuration files, followed by the execution of a tool runner (node, python, npx) that spawns a scripting shell, which subsequently initiates an unusual outbound network connection.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects potential supply chain or local configuration tampering involving the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The rule identifies modification of common MCP configuration files, followed by the execution of a tool runner (node, python, npx) that spawns a scripting shell, which subsequently initiates an unusual outbound network connection.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
000
Detects potential supply chain or local configuration tampering involving the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The rule identifies modification of common MCP configuration files, followed by the execution of a tool runner (node, python, npx) that spawns a scripting shell, which subsequently initiates an unusual outbound network connection.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects instances where msiexec.exe, the Windows Installer utility, spawns cmd.exe to execute a batch file named 'xupdate.bat' located within the 'AppData\Roaming\Traiolx Custom Utils\' directory. This behavior is indicative of malicious persistence or execution mechanisms, often associated with loaders like LegionLoader that leverage installer binaries for evasion.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
005
Detects AI coding assistants and LLM agent frameworks spawning shell processes or interpreters to execute potentially malicious commands. The rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with download cradles, credential access, reconnaissance, or persistence, while excluding standard interactive terminal usage.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
1 month ago
103
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
1 month ago
000
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects persistence attempts via Windows Registry run keys and Startup folders. The rule identifies suspicious modifications to run/runonce registry keys involving common user-writable paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or the execution of PowerShell commands with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc). Additionally, it detects the creation of executable files (.lnk, .ps1, .vbs, .bat) within user Startup folders.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects persistence attempts via Windows Registry run keys and Startup folders. The rule identifies suspicious modifications to run/runonce registry keys involving common user-writable paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or the execution of PowerShell commands with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc). Additionally, it detects the creation of executable files (.lnk, .ps1, .vbs, .bat) within user Startup folders.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects the deployment of suspicious executables or scripts (e.g., .exe, .bat, .ps1, .vbs) via Group Policy (GPO) paths or through GPO-related processes like gpscript.exe and gpupdate.exe. This activity is consistent with using GPOs to distribute and execute malicious binaries across a domain, often a precursor to ransomware deployment.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects Node.js processes executing suspicious command lines that involve fetching and executing remote JavaScript code. This behavior is indicative of a loader or downloader script commonly used to pull and evaluate malicious payloads at runtime, specifically referencing indicators associated with 'GHAPPIER'.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
206
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using native 'wevtutil.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets. The rule monitors for common log-clearing commands and triggers an alert when multiple such events occur on a single host within a 15-minute window, which is indicative of bulk log-wiping often performed by ransomware or during post-exploitation defense evasion.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts 'first.ps1' and 'main1.ps1', which are components of a known credential phishing toolset. This tool displays a fake Windows Update dialog to trick users into providing their credentials, which are then exfiltrated via SMB, DNS, or HTTP.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects modifications to the .zshrc configuration file followed by shell commands interacting with the file, or the execution of commands that source the .repair-run script within a shell environment. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where an adversary modifies startup scripts to maintain access or execute malicious code upon shell initialization.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
202
Detects instances where a Node.js process spawns another Node.js process to execute a JavaScript file located within the node_modules directory. This pattern is commonly observed when malware or malicious scripts attempt to execute payloads from within project dependencies, potentially hiding malicious activity within seemingly legitimate library paths.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
406
This rule detects instances where a Node.js process spawns a child process, also running as node.exe, that attempts to execute a specific JavaScript file path (sharedLoad.min.js or its extended version). This behavior is characteristic of certain Node.js-based applications or potentially malicious scripts using shared loaders for modular execution.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
106
Page 21 of 191