Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of '1.bat' when it invokes administrative or sensitive utilities such as schtasks.exe, reg.exe, or specific executables like LockScreenContentServer.exe. This activity is indicative of a persistence mechanism being established or the initiation of a DLL side-loading chain.
Detects execution of common script interpreters (mshta, powershell, cmd, wscript) from typical UI-based process launch sources (explorer, RunDlg) when the command line includes indicators of malicious activity such as hidden window flags, obfuscated content, or remote URL downloads. This pattern is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
This rule detects the execution of node.exe or a specific binary named 'ProfileQuickHost.exe' spawned by wscript.exe. This activity is indicative of a VBScript-based loader (often referred to as 'ChainScript') executing a staged Node.js RAT or secondary payload from user-writable application folders (AppData).
Detects the execution of batch or command scripts initiated by SQL Server (sqlservr.exe) or in contexts involving command-line utility misuse often associated with SQL Server exploitation, such as xp_cmdshell or certutil, particularly when involving paths like AppData or ServiceProfiles.
Detects a sequence of events where a user clicks a shared link to an AI chatbot conversation followed closely (within 15 minutes) by the execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd) that include suspicious command-line patterns indicative of ClickFix-style social engineering.
Detects a sequence of events where a user clicks a shared link to an AI chatbot conversation followed closely (within 15 minutes) by the execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd) that include suspicious command-line patterns indicative of ClickFix-style social engineering.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
A July 2026 incident used Polygon smart contracts (EtherHiding) for dynamic payload routing/C2 following a ClickFix/FileFix-style lure driven by compromised WordPress credentials.
The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed to execute commands using native Windows shells like PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript or from public folders such as Users, Temp, or ProgramData. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, enabled, or modified. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
Detects a potential WMI-based persistence mechanism by identifying the sequential execution of mofcomp.exe to compile a MOF file located in a temporary directory, followed by the execution of a VBScript payload using cscript.exe with the /e:VBScript.Encode flag. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence via WMI event subscriptions.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects potential unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool installation activities. It looks for common patterns used by adversaries to deploy RMM agents, including silent MSI installations from HTTPS URLs, batch/VBS scripts performing administrative privilege checks prior to silent execution, and PowerShell commands utilizing 'Start-Process' with elevated privileges to download and execute files from the internet.
Detects a sequence of events where a user clicks a shared link to an AI chatbot conversation followed closely (within 15 minutes) by the execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd) that include suspicious command-line patterns indicative of ClickFix-style social engineering.
Detects a sequence of events where a user clicks a shared link to an AI chatbot conversation followed closely (within 15 minutes) by the execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd) that include suspicious command-line patterns indicative of ClickFix-style social engineering.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects the insertion of a PowerShell download cradle command into the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key. This activity is indicative of the 'ClickFix' technique, where a user is socially engineered to copy and paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog box.
Detects the execution of shortcut (.lnk) files located on removable media (USB) that spawn common Windows binaries (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe) with hidden window flags. This behavior is indicative of initial access or lateral movement techniques used by Mustang Panda (Earth Preta) for USB-based malware propagation and DLL side-loading.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Windows), cron jobs (Linux), or systemd timers where the initiating process is a common scripting or runtime interpreter (e.g., Python, Node.js, PowerShell, Java). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms being established by a compromised agent or script-based process.
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