Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when an AI agent's code execution sandbox (e.g., Python, Node.js, or Shell interpreters) initiates suspicious child processes. This includes the execution of network utilities for potential C2 (e.g., curl, nc, socat), the creation of interactive reverse shells, or the execution of credential harvesting tools (e.g., mimikatz, secretsdump), which suggests the AI agent's sandbox environment has been compromised or abused.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) launched directly from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox). The rule specifically flags common obfuscation techniques such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or attempts to download and execute code (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) while excluding explicit file-based script executions.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) initiates command-line utilities such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe, and further identifies suspicious command-line arguments often associated with post-exploitation activity like discovery, credential gathering, or file manipulation.
This analytic detects suspicious use of 'mshta.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' invoking 'mshtml.dll'
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
This analytic detects script execution (`wscript.exe` or `cscript.exe`) triggered from compressed files opened directly using
`explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`.
When a user double clicks on a ".js" file from within one of these compressed files. Its extracted temporally in the temp directory in folder with certain markers.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data, in order to look for a specific parent/child relationship and an initiated network connection.
This behavior is exploited by threat actors such as Scarlet Goldfinch to deliver and run malicious scripts as an initial access technique.
`explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`.
When a user double clicks on a ".js" file from within one of these compressed files. Its extracted temporally in the temp directory in folder with certain markers.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data, in order to look for a specific parent/child relationship and an initiated network connection.
This behavior is exploited by threat actors such as Scarlet Goldfinch to deliver and run malicious scripts as an initial access technique.
Detects the FileFix execution chain, where victims are socially engineered into pasting a malicious path into the Windows Explorer address bar. This action results in explorer.exe launching suspicious command-line tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe) with suspicious flags or unusually long, potentially obfuscated arguments characteristic of a 'ClickFix' style attack.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
Detects the abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute processes via wmic.exe or WmiPrvSE.exe, often combined with obfuscated command-line arguments such as encoded PowerShell or CMD commands.
Detects execution of encoded commands in macOS terminal environments that originate from clipboard content mimicking a reCAPTCHA verification process. This pattern often involves users being social-engineered into pasting a malicious string that decodes a payload and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter (sh/bash/zsh). The rule monitors for the co-occurrence of base64/openssl decoding commands and shell execution pipes, while filtering out known legitimate software installation patterns.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with arguments pointing to remote URLs or containing JavaScript. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns where attackers use fake CAPTCHA lures to trick users into executing malicious scripts via mshta.exe, often launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., from a downloaded file).
Detects potential 'ClickFix' activity where a browser or file explorer process initiates a shell (e.g., cmd, powershell, osascript) with command arguments indicative of remote script execution, obfuscated commands, or web-based payload downloading. This pattern matches known social engineering tactics that entice users to copy-paste malicious code into a system shell.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698 that involve scripting interpreters (powershell, wscript, mshta, cmd) and suspicious command line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, or network resource access, specifically when executing under the SYSTEM account context.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
This rule detects file and process activity originating from or involving specific directories and filenames associated with 'Agta' software, including temporary files such as PowerShell scripts and XML tasks. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized use of backup or testing utilities for malicious purposes, such as script execution or task manipulation.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects execution of AgtaBackupAgent.msi via command-line tools such as PowerShell or msiexec.exe. This activity is monitored as it may indicate an attempt to install backup software or potential malicious masquerading using the MSI installer, particularly when using silent flags or accessing from temp directories.
Detects execution of AgtaBackupAgent.msi via command-line tools such as PowerShell or msiexec.exe. This activity is monitored as it may indicate an attempt to install backup software or potential malicious masquerading using the MSI installer, particularly when using silent flags or accessing from temp directories.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Windows), cron jobs (Linux), or systemd timers where the initiating process is a common scripting or runtime interpreter (e.g., Python, Node.js, PowerShell, Java). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms being established by a compromised agent or script-based process.
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