Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
260 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
111
37
36
21
15
Contributors
72
35
28
28
14
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
Platforms
223
37
4
2
1
Products / Services
84
73
67
48
34
MITRE Techniques
117
98
85
84
77
CVEs
4
2
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
6
1
IDS Protocols
7
Detects attempts to stop or disable critical security, backup, and logging services on Windows systems using command-line utilities (net.exe, sc.exe) or PowerShell. Adversaries frequently perform these actions to impair defensive monitoring, bypass security controls, or prepare the system for destructive activities like ransomware deployment.
Detects evidence of log deletion, logrotate configuration modification, or syslog daemon termination (rsyslog, syslog-ng, journald) occurring within 30 minutes of suspicious child process activity from common web application interpreters (e.g., python, node, java, php). This correlation pattern is a strong indicator of post-exploitation activity aimed at clearing tracks or impairing host logging services.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes or stop security-related services using common administrative tools like taskkill.exe, sc.exe, net.exe, or net1.exe. This activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring and protection software to facilitate further malicious actions.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender Antivirus through various methods, including modifying registry policies, stopping the WinDefend service, executing PowerShell commands to alter preferences, or adding arbitrary exclusions via WMI.
This rule detects potential tampering with security software processes and services, as well as the execution of suspicious batch scripts (i.bat). It identifies when administrative tools like sc.exe, taskkill.exe, or net.exe are used to stop or delete security agents such as Sysmon, Filebeat, SentinelAgent, or antivirus services. It also monitors for the execution of 'i.bat' via command shell, which is commonly associated with malicious automation or persistence.
Detects the execution of batch files that perform multiple actions to impair or disable security tools, including Windows Defender, Sysmon, Filebeat, and IIS logging components. The rule monitors for a pattern of suspicious process commands (stop, config, delete, kill, Set-MpPreference) originating from a .bat file, flagging hosts where two or more distinct impairment actions are executed by the same parent process.
Detects anomalous activity where a process or user attempts to stop or disable multiple security-related services (e.g., Windows Defender, Sysmon, EDR agents) within a short window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defensive monitoring and protection tools during a compromise.
Detects evidence of the BeepRAT malware (via known file names, loader behavior, and specific command-line arguments) and attempts to tamper with security software through process termination, service modification, or the addition of Windows Defender exclusions.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Windows security products and logging mechanisms. This includes stopping security services, clearing event logs, using PowerShell to modify security preferences (e.g., Windows Defender exclusions or real-time monitoring), and modifying registry keys to disable security features.
This rule detects multiple distinct attempts to tamper with security products on a host. It identifies processes attempting to stop security-related services (via sc.exe or net.exe), processes attempting to kill security-related applications (via taskkill.exe), modifications to Windows Defender registry keys, or the use of PowerShell Set-MpPreference to disable security features. The rule triggers when two or more of these evasion events or types occur within a 5-minute window on the same host.
Detects coordinated security defense evasion activities by the Lambsys cryptominer campaign. The rule triggers when a shell process (bash, sh, or dash) is used to stop or disable security services (auditd, ClamAV, osquery, Falco, CrowdStrike Falcon), forcibly terminate their processes using pkill or kill -9, and delete or shred critical system security and audit logs (auth.log, syslog, audit).
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes or stop security services using common Windows command-line utilities such as taskkill, tskill, or the net stop command. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defensive measures on a compromised system.
Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with Windows Defender services (WinDefend, SecurityHealthService, wscsvc) by stopping or disabling them. It covers actions performed via 'sc.exe' commands, 'Set-Service' PowerShell cmdlets, and direct modification of registry keys related to these services. The rule specifically filters out legitimate system and TrustedInstaller processes when detecting registry modifications to reduce false positives.
Detects the use of common Windows system administration tools (cmd, powershell, net, sc, taskkill, wmic) to stop, delete, or terminate known backup software agents. This behavior is highly characteristic of ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to inhibit system recovery by destroying backup infrastructure.
Detects attempts to exploit the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) for privilege escalation and domain compromise. This rule monitors for a high volume of Netlogon secure channel failures (Event ID 5805), machine account password resets to a zeroed/blank state (Event ID 4742 for computer accounts with specific password indicators), anomalous Netlogon service restarts (Event ID 7036), and Azure AD Identity Protection risk events referencing Zerologon or Netlogon anomalies. These indicators collectively suggest an active exploitation attempt of the Zerologon vulnerability.
Detects JFMBackdoor activity where a sideloaded fltMC.exe executable located in a temporary directory initiates process enumeration using tasklist.exe or performs service lifecycle management operations (delete, start, stop, create, or query) using the sc.exe utility.
This rule monitors system logs for attempts to disable or stop the Linux Audit daemon (auditd) or modify its configuration via auditctl or system management commands (systemctl, service). Disabling the audit system is a common technique used by adversaries to hide malicious activity from security monitoring.
Detects multiple concurrent attempts to inhibit Windows system recovery, a common behavior observed in the TrymeLocker ransomware family. The rule triggers when at least two distinct malicious activities occur on the same host within a 120-second window, including the disabling of the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) via bcdedit, deletion of shadow copies via vssadmin or wmic, disabling of the Windows backup service (wbengine) via sc, or disabling of System Restore via registry modification.
Detects execution patterns where security tools such as Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, and Filebeat are intentionally impaired or disabled using service control commands (sc.exe) and PowerShell cmdlets (Set-MpPreference), consistent with adversary activity aimed at bypassing security monitoring.
Detects attempts to disable Microsoft Defender security features. The rule monitors for PowerShell cmdlets (Set-MpPreference), service control operations (sc.exe stopping WinDefend), and registry modifications to the 'DisableAntiSpyware' policy key, which are common methods used by adversaries to impair host-based security defenses.
Page 7 of 13