Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
597 detections
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Detects the removal of phishing-resistant authentication methods (FIDO2 or Windows Hello for Business) and the registration of weaker, phishable MFA methods (SMS, voice, or phone app) within Entra ID. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to lower the security posture of an account to facilitate future credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects instances where an administrative action involving a password reset or MFA configuration (StrongAuthenticationMethod update) is initiated by a user account that lacks the designated Helpdesk or Password Administrator role. This behavior indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation or credential manipulation by an account not formally assigned to support workflows.
This rule detects a potential vishing attack by correlating suspicious IT helpdesk requests (e.g., password or MFA reset without manager approval or verified callback) with subsequent sensitive Entra ID identity changes (e.g., self-service password resets, MFA device registration, or new device registration) occurring for the same user within a short time window. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to social-engineer helpdesk staff to bypass authentication controls and compromise a user account.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies their MFA phone number, followed within 30 minutes by a sign-in event flagged with 'impossibleTravel' or 'unfamiliarFeatures' risk. This pattern is indicative of potential SIM-swap fraud, where an attacker has hijacked the user's phone number to receive MFA prompts and then attempts to access the account from an anomalous location.
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
Detects instances where a user account modifies security information, registers a new MFA method, or resets a password shortly after a successful sign-in from a country not observed for that user within the previous 30 days. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary adds persistence or MFA bypass methods to a newly compromised account.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects a suspicious sequence of administrative actions where a user's phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) factor, such as FIDO2, passkeys, or certificates, is removed and immediately replaced by a weaker authentication method like SMS, voice call, or TOTP. This behavior, when performed by an administrator account on a different user account, is a common indicator of an MFA bypass attempt often associated with social engineering or insider threat scenarios.
Detects high-privilege OAuth application consent grants occurring shortly after a user identity recovery event (e.g., password or MFA reset). This pattern is indicative of a help-desk social engineering attack where an adversary uses an identity reset to gain access to an account and subsequently establishes persistent access via a malicious OAuth application.
Detects high-risk identity modifications (password or MFA resets) following an IT helpdesk ticket that lacks mandatory security controls, such as callback verification, manager approval, or established ticket history. This behavior is indicative of vishing and social engineering attacks aimed at helpdesk personnel to compromise user accounts.
Detects anomalous large-volume file download or export activity from cloud repositories (SharePoint, OneDrive, or Salesforce) occurring shortly after a help-desk-mediated credential or MFA reset for the same user. This behavior is indicative of account takeover, specifically vishing-to-exfiltration patterns used by threat actors.
Detects suspicious account management activities, such as password resets or MFA re-enrollment, performed by an operator on a high-privileged or administrator account outside of typical business hours (06:00-20:00). This behavior is often indicative of help-desk impersonation or credential takeover attempts targeting Identity Provider (IdP) administrative roles.
Detects instances where an account assigned a help-desk or support role performs an MFA, password, or credential reset on an account tagged as an executive or VIP. This behavior is indicative of social engineering and help-desk impersonation attacks commonly utilized by threat actors to perform rogue MFA takeovers.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events indicating account takeover: a password reset, followed by an MFA factor re-enrollment, and concluding with a successful login from a geographically impossible location compared to recent history. This pattern often signifies a help-desk-assisted account compromise or token theft.
This rule detects high-risk administrative operations in Azure Active Directory (such as role assignment, password resets, and account status changes) that occur within 3 hours of a user's sign-in. This pattern often indicates an account compromise followed by immediate privilege escalation or persistence establishment.
Detects specific administrative actions within Entra ID/Azure AD, including directory role assignments, password resets, and account enablement/disablement. This rule monitors for sensitive identity lifecycle and privilege management events that, if performed by unauthorized actors or in an unexpected context, could indicate account compromise, persistence, or privilege escalation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
Detects anomalous account recovery or MFA reset activity performed by a single help-desk user account. A high volume of reset actions across numerous distinct users within a short duration is a key behavioral indicator of potential help-desk account compromise or insider abuse involving unauthorized account takeovers.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
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