Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
16 detections
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An IOC sweep for scoping, not alerting. It matches the relay domain and IP, the wave artifacts (wupdate_<8hex>.msi, wclient_<8hex>), and the rogue client hash where the hash is populated.
Detects ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe spawning command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, msiexec.exe) pointing to payloads or execution artifacts inside the ScreenConnect client Temp folder (...
ode
ame emp eports or similar), excluding common baseline tooling and self-maintenance tasks.
ode
ame emp eports or similar), excluding common baseline tooling and self-maintenance tasks.
In the CVE-2026-84869 ScreenConnect exploitation chain, the attacker’s script reconfigures the Secondary Logon service (seclogon) to start automatically, then starts it. This lets runas /trustlevel launch the attacker’s rogue ScreenConnect client under a different trust level. This query flags sc.exe setting seclogon to automatic or delayed-automatic start. That change has little legitimate reason on most endpoints. The query only sees sc.exe, so it won’t catch other tools making the same change.
runas /trustlevel:0x20000 starts the payload from a user-writable path (the rogue client in %LOCALAPPDATA%). It follows the msiexec /a step and relies on the Secondary Logon service the actor enabled.
Catches the path-traversal persistence attempt (..\..\..\Startup\Sync.bat). The host client has no legitimate reason to touch a Startup folder. Matches both the long path and the 8.3 short name (STARTM~1) from the traversal string.
The exploit primitive. The host client launches a script or binary from a \Temp\ landing folder that a guest pushed. A legitimate host client doesn’t do this on its own. Covers rebranded builds via the .WindowsClient.exe suffix.
A technician deliberately launching a customer-sent file from inside the client UI (rare). Tune by AccountName.
A technician deliberately launching a customer-sent file from inside the client UI (rare). Tune by AccountName.
Any ScreenConnect client whose launch arguments (h=<relay>&p=<port>) point at a relay you don’t operate. This covers masterdarky[.]com:8041 and any rogue-relay abuse. Populate AuthorizedRelays with your own relay FQDNs first.
Detects unexpected child process execution spawned by the ScreenConnect ClientService. This activity is indicative of the exploitation of CVE-2026-84869, which allows for unauthorized file transfer and arbitrary code execution within the context of the remote support agent without requiring user interaction or confirmation.
Detects unauthorized or potentially malicious file transfer activity within ScreenConnect sessions. The rule flags file transfers occurring on vulnerable versions of ScreenConnect (prior to 26.6.5), transfers that bypass user confirmation prompts, or instances where files are transferred and subsequently executed.
Detects unauthorized child processes spawned by ScreenConnect client binaries. The rule specifically looks for files created or modified within 60 seconds prior to execution, which is indicative of attackers leveraging an authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-84869) to transfer and execute malicious payloads via an active remote access session without requiring additional user interaction or authentication.
This rule monitors IT asset inventory data for instances of ConnectWise (ScreenConnect) software running outdated versions prior to 26.6.5, which are known to be vulnerable to CVE-2026-84869. Identifying these assets is critical for preventing potential exploitation of public-facing remote administration tools.
Detects high-frequency authentication attempts originating from ScreenConnect processes on a single host within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking or authentication bypass attempts targeting ScreenConnect, such as those associated with CVE-2026-84869.
Detects suspicious process execution spawned by ScreenConnect client processes, which may indicate abuse of remote access sessions for arbitrary command execution. This includes both direct child processes of ScreenConnect client binaries and execution of binaries staged within known ScreenConnect working and temporary directories.
Detects repeated HTTP POST requests containing 'ScreenConnect' in the URI, originating from external networks. This pattern is indicative of automated scanning activity attempting to exploit potential authentication bypass or session hijacking vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2026-84869) in ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances.
Detects unauthorized file write operations performed by ScreenConnect client or service processes into client/transfer directories. This activity is indicative of exploitation attempts, specifically CVE-2026-84869, which allows for unauthorized file transfers and potential remote code execution via active ScreenConnect sessions without user confirmation.
Detects anomalous post-exploitation behaviors such as mass file modifications, lateral movement (SMB/RDP), or persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks/services) following ScreenConnect client session activity. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of ScreenConnect to deploy ransomware or move laterally within the network.