Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects QUIC network traffic where the TLS certificate subject and issuer match specific patterns associated with 'RAT System' and 'RAT CA'. This signature indicates potential command-and-control (C2) communication utilizing self-signed certificates for authentication pinning in an attempt to masquerade or secure malicious traffic.
Detects DNS queries to Cloudflare Workers subdomains that mimic the QUICAgent beaconing pattern. Adversaries utilize these workers as dead-drop resolvers to retrieve updated C2 instructions or redirection information, effectively blending in with legitimate traffic to the workers.dev domain.
Detects potential DGA fallback beaconing: repeated lookups (~10 per 5 days) of algorithmically-generated .com domains with a failed-resolution cadence, matching the botking implant's C2 fallback behavior.
Detects network traffic consistent with SynkLoader malware communicating with its C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious TLS SNI requests to known hardcoded domains and HTTP POST requests using the application/octet-stream content type, which are characteristic of SynkLoader C2 beaconing.
Detects DNS queries containing high-entropy domain labels that exhibit patterns common to Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). The rule triggers when a threshold of such suspicious queries is exceeded from a single source within a 60-second window, which is a common indicator of malware beaconing or C2 communication.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity from the TWINLOOT malware, which utilizes Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure to establish a reverse SOCKS5 tunnel. The detection identifies connections to 'worldaz-msit.relay.teams.microsoft.com' followed immediately by a SOCKS5 handshake pattern (05 01 00), indicating encapsulated tunneling within the relay communication.
Detects periodic beaconing and configuration polling by the TWINLOOT implant using Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop mechanism. The rules identify specific TLS SNI patterns and HTTP requests for 'cfg.json' files hosted on Azure Blob storage using non-browser user-agents.
Detects network activity (DNS queries and TLS connections) to the known command-and-control (C2) domain 'vm180012.hosted-by.qwins.co' associated with the PureLogs Stealer malware.
Detects outbound C2 connections to known ACRStealer infrastructure IPs specifically from a process already flagged as hollowed/injected (wab.exe, MSBuild.exe, dllhost.exe) via a companion flowbit, rather than flagging all egress from these processes.
Detects the botking RAT's C2 beacon: HTTPS POST with the 'i am botking' registration marker and form-urlencoded action=check polling, plus associated TLS/DNS indicators.
Detects HTTP traffic to StopAndProtect's compromised-WordPress C2 operational endpoints, heartbeat beaconing, encrypted-archive exfiltration, and victim data directory access.
Detects network traffic indicating potential Command and Control (C2) tasking communication via Microsoft SharePoint. The rule monitors for requests to specific SharePoint paths associated with the TWINLOOT campaign, which leverages legitimate cloud infrastructure for malicious command delivery.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the msaRAT remote access trojan (RAT) as it initializes WebRTC communication. It identifies the initial POST request to a token service and the subsequent response containing Twilio TURN and Google STUN relay server configurations, which are used by the malware to establish peer-to-peer tunnels for command-and-control communication.
Detects TLS sessions to Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Hostwinds C2 infrastructure presenting the exact self-signed certificate issuer string linked to the Mastra/axios campaigns.
Detects the ACRStealer Telegram Dead Drop Resolver handoff: a non-Telegram-client TLS/SNI contact into Telegram's IP range immediately followed by a DNS/TLS/HTTP connection to the resolved C2 domain res.explicittweak.cc.
Detects DNS resolution and subsequent TLS connection to the ACRStealer Telegram-based Dead Drop Resolver domain (res.explicittweak.cc), used to fetch C2 configuration via Telegram's IP range.
Detects network activity associated with the TWINLOOT malware, identifying command-and-control communication through TLS ALPN, custom HTTP User-Agent strings, and specific SNI values for known C2 infrastructure.
Stealer C2 HTTP communication over nonstandard port 8133
Detects JSON-RPC eth_call requests to the UNC5142 EtherHiding C2 configuration contract (0x5d04ed162c548fc4508cbb59266b02afbaf3ebc1, selector 0x1dcf296b) from non-browser clients, indicating the DeviceManager RAT resolving its C2 address via Ethereum smart contract.
Detects XG-Web implant check-in beacons — DNS lookups and HTTP config_*.js fetches — against Jewelbug's typosquatted C2 domain set, the unified panel reported to have logged over one million implant check-ins.
Detects a ClientKing-style beacon abusing internal proxy CONNECT authentication to reach known Jewelbug C2 infrastructure (tarotfree101.top), reusing a compromised organization's own proxy the way Jewelbug reused a major aerospace manufacturer's internal proxy.
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