Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

503 detections

Detects HTTP traffic containing a specific session cookie pattern characteristic of PowerShell Empire C2 agent communication, utilizing regex to identify base64-encoded session identifiers.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects network communication to a known command and control (C2) server (23.254.164.123:443) associated with the 'protocal.cjs' backdoor, which is part of the 'easy-day-js' npm supply chain compromise. The detection specifically looks for TLS traffic with a Server Name Indication (SNI) and general IP traffic to this C2 address.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
1014
This rule detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity targeting FortiGate firewalls, specifically looking for internal authentication traffic (LDAP, Kerberos, LDAPS, MS-SQL) originating from a firewall management IP. The rule triggers if there are 5 such connections within 60 seconds, indicating a possible listening post or attempt to intercept credentials.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
008
This rule detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to a known malicious IP address (193.242.184.150) over port 22 (SSH). This behavior is indicative of a reverse SSH tunnel established for C2 communication and the potential exposure of internal RDP services to the attacker.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests that contain a payload matching the signature of Ousaban malware's custom XOR-encoded command-and-control (C2) traffic, characterized by a specific hexadecimal structure.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects DNS TXT queries for the domain '_axiom-config.m100.cloud', which is associated with fileless payload retrieval techniques.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic from a web server to api.telegram.org. This pattern is indicative of the Montana Empire phishing kit using the Telegram Bot API for command and control (C2) communication, allowing the adversary to exfiltrate stolen data or receive instructions.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
This rule detects command and control (C2) communication associated with the 'easy-day-js' backdoor, which is part of the Mastra npm supply chain attack. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the IP address 23.254.164.123 with a spoofed Internet Explorer 8 User-Agent string.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
007
Detects outbound HTTP PUT requests to 'filen.io', which has been associated with command-and-control (C2) communication for the PRISMEX malware used by the threat actor APT28 (also known as Pawn Storm/Fancy Bear).
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects DNS queries for the domain 'screenai.online', which is associated with the Phoenix Backdoor used by the MuddyWater (also known as Seedworm or MERCURY) threat group for command-and-control (C2) communication.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects outbound SOCKS5 negotiation patterns commonly used by the Salt Typhoon threat group's STOWAWAY tool. The rule triggers on TCP traffic initiating a SOCKS5 handshake (represented by the sequence |05 01 00|) to non-standard ports, excluding common proxy ports (1080, 3128, 8080, 8443, 9050). This behavior is indicative of a multi-hop SOCKS5 relay or command-and-control connection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects DNS queries for the domain 'screenai.online', which is associated with the Phoenix Backdoor used by the MuddyWater (also known as Seedworm or MERCURY) threat group for command-and-control (C2) communication.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects outbound SOCKS5 negotiation patterns commonly used by the Salt Typhoon threat group's STOWAWAY tool. The rule triggers on TCP traffic initiating a SOCKS5 handshake (represented by the sequence |05 01 00|) to non-standard ports, excluding common proxy ports (1080, 3128, 8080, 8443, 9050). This behavior is indicative of a multi-hop SOCKS5 relay or command-and-control connection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware, specifically identifying WebSocket upgrade requests directed at the external domain 'canal1zac1a.onrender.com'. This pattern is indicative of a Command and Control (C2) channel initiation.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects HTTP traffic attempting to upgrade a connection to a WebSocket protocol directed towards the known Turla-associated command-and-control infrastructure 'driverx86-adobe.onrender.com'. This pattern is characteristic of the STOCKBROKER component within the STOCKSTAY malware framework, observed in recent phishing campaigns.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware, specifically identifying WebSocket upgrade requests directed at the external domain 'canal1zac1a.onrender.com'. This pattern is indicative of a Command and Control (C2) channel initiation.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike Beacon check-in activity over HTTP. It identifies incoming GET requests where the URI is abnormally short and the HTTP Referer header is missing, which are common indicators of default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects high-frequency DNS queries for long, random-looking subdomains that result in NXDomain responses, a behavioral indicator of malware using Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) for command-and-control beaconing.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot command-and-control check-ins. The rule looks for an 'established' flow to an external network using a POST method, with a request body containing 'qbot' followed by a version string pattern, which is indicative of the malware reporting system info to its C2 server.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects HTTP beaconing activity to a /submit.php URI with a default Cobalt Strike User-Agent string. This is indicative of a default or poorly customized Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profile being used for command and control communication.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects HTTP beaconing activity indicative of Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 communication. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/updates', '/pixel', '/submit.php') in combination with a default User-Agent string commonly used by Cobalt Strike malleable profiles.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
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