Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
503 detections
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Detects network traffic attempting to connect to known proxy farm fallback hostnames using TLS SNI or HTTP CONNECT methods. These hostnames are often associated with command-and-control infrastructure designed to proxy traffic and mask the true destination of communications.
Detects network activity associated with SectopRAT malware. The rule identifies C2 beaconing behavior on a non-standard port using a custom protocol with a specific 5-byte length header and 16-byte initialization vector, filtering out standard HTTP/TLS traffic.
Detects HTTP beaconing and WebSocket command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the AgtaBackup RAT. This includes identifying specific check-in URIs, hardcoded 'X-Agent-Secret' header authentication, and the initialization of a WebSocket connection.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with known RedFlick command-and-control (C2) infrastructure domains: etia.ca, groy.cc, and secure-dns-hub.com.
Detects TLS traffic featuring certificates where both the subject and issuer common name (CN) are set to 'SLIVER', which is the default configuration for the Sliver C2 framework's self-signed certificates.
Detects the presence of self-signed TLS certificates with the common name 'JDYFJ' in the certificate subject or issuer fields. This pattern has been associated with the KV-Botnet, which has been utilized by the Volt Typhoon threat actor to obfuscate command and control traffic through compromised SOHO routers.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP POST requests to the '/api/t' URI path occurring on non-standard ports. The detection utilizes a threshold-based trigger to identify potential C2 communication heartbeats.
Detects outbound network traffic exhibiting the default self-signed TLS certificate subject and issuer fields 'O=Cobalt Strike' combined with the known default JA3 fingerprint '72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea' associated with Cobalt Strike C2 communication.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 communication patterns such as heartbeat beacons and agent tasking requests occurring over non-standard port 8133.
Detects specific HTTP traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware's FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) reverse-tunneling deployment and C2 status reporting. The rule identifies the sequence of fetching configuration, initiating WebSocket tunnel links, and reporting deployment status to a remote command-and-control server.
Detects outbound network traffic to known public BNB Smart Chain (BSC) data seed nodes using JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods or TLS connections. This pattern is indicative of malware using blockchain infrastructure as a dead drop resolver for C2 command retrieval or configuration updates.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to connect to known infrastructure associated with the VPN-for-X extension, which has been observed acting as a fallback proxy. The rule alerts on specific TLS SNI strings (de8.staticvaultcdn.org, de4.servefaststatic.work, de34.rapidstaticserve.cc) commonly leveraged by this infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with VelvetCake C2 infrastructure, including plaintext authentication, specific inventory request commands, and session termination commands over port 12345.
This rule detects potentially malicious Command and Control (C2) traffic utilizing DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to interact with public resolvers like Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. It identifies both high-frequency, repeated direct-to-resolver TLS sessions and specific HTTP requests to these resolvers that resolve domains associated with known C2 infrastructure, such as the ClickFix campaign.
This rule detects potentially malicious Command and Control (C2) traffic utilizing DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to interact with public resolvers like Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. It identifies both high-frequency, repeated direct-to-resolver TLS sessions and specific HTTP requests to these resolvers that resolve domains associated with known C2 infrastructure, such as the ClickFix campaign.
Detects two-stage network activity associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits. The first part detects the submission of stolen credentials or session data to a local WebDAV panel (xwps.php), and the second part detects the subsequent exfiltration of that captured data to the Telegram Bot API.
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