Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
503 detections
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This rule detects network communication (DNS queries and TLS connections) to known actor-controlled Slack workspace subdomains, as well as the presence of a specific hardcoded public key in Slack API traffic, suggesting the use of Slack as a Command and Control (C2) channel.
Detects a sequence of Tox P2P protocol packets consisting of a Cookie Request, Cookie Response, and Crypto Handshake within a single network flow. This pattern is indicative of the Tox P2P protocol, which is sometimes abused by malware (e.g., AvisLoader) for command-and-control (C2) communications to evade traditional network inspection.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the SCKIT MemTensor worm establishing a command-and-control (C2) beacon. The detection identifies TLS connections where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches a specific pattern of a 12-character hexadecimal string followed by .skyleen.fr.
Detects repeated TLS connections to a known suspicious IP address that masquerades as gitlab.com using the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. This pattern is indicative of potential command and control (C2) traffic from compromised or unauthorized GitRunner infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the ORAX control-plane panel and management service. The rule identifies HTTP traffic containing OraxManage or OraxRDP service strings, SignalR negotiate handshakes directed to common ORAX management ports, and connections to identified ORAX C2 infrastructure domains and IP addresses.
This rule detects a specific HTTP request pattern associated with the JWR-family Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. The detection looks for a WebSocket handshake initiation (GET request with specific URI segments 'webSocket/QT/' and a known hardcoded string) and an 'Upgrade' header, which are indicative of a command-and-control (C2) channel establishment.
Detects network activity associated with the SilkParasite botnet. The rule identifies inbound/outbound HTTP heartbeat check-ins using a specific URI pattern (/ping?h=) and direct TCP connections to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects network activity associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware command-and-control (C2) communication patterns. The rule identifies specific API endpoints used for task polling, heartbeat pings, check-ins, and task acknowledgement, as well as connections to a known malicious C2 infrastructure, all characterized by the presence of a specific 'X-API-Key' header.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal hosts to known command and control infrastructure associated with the SilkParasite campaign and the SpiceRAT malware family.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal hosts to known command and control infrastructure associated with the SilkParasite campaign and the SpiceRAT malware family.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts directed toward identified Exvicy command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP addresses. This includes both general beaconing attempts and established TLS handshake sessions potentially linked to post-ClickFix malicious activity.
This rule detects a raw TCP authentication handshake associated with the VelvetCake malware family. It specifically monitors for established connections to a known malicious C2 IP address (111.92.246.145) over port 12345 containing the specific hardcoded 'PASSWORD' string used for initial communication.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at etherscan.io containing 'eth_call' in the request body. This pattern is indicative of the GHAPPIER / PolinRider malware family utilizing the Ethereum blockchain's public JSON-RPC interface as a dead-drop resolver for command-and-control communication.
Detects PIVOTPIPE malware beaconing activity indicative of peer-to-peer (P2P) lateral movement between internal hosts. The rule monitors for sustained established TCP traffic with specific small packet size characteristics, suggesting command-and-control heartbeats or tunneled traffic within the internal network.
Detects network traffic consistent with PIVOTPIPE command-and-control activity and potential Cobalt Strike beaconing to known malicious infrastructure on specific ports.
Detects specific command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the VelvetCake malware. The rules identify initial authentication with a hardcoded password string, module enumeration requests, and session termination signals transmitted over TCP.
Detection of network traffic associated with VelvetCake (Konni) malware, identifying communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, domain lookups, and exfiltration attempts via HTTP/TLS and raw TCP protocols.
Detection of network traffic associated with VelvetCake (Konni) malware, identifying communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, domain lookups, and exfiltration attempts via HTTP/TLS and raw TCP protocols.
Detects outbound network traffic, including DNS lookups, TLS connections, and HTTP requests, directed towards IPRoyal or LightningProxies. These services are commonly used as residential or datacenter proxies and may be leveraged by adversaries for command-and-control (C2) communication, including traffic tunneling for services like Telegram.
Detects network traffic associated with NarwhalRAT malware utilizing the pCloud API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or dead-drop resolver. The rule monitors both HTTP requests containing specific folder identifiers and authentication parameters, as well as TLS SNI indicating connections to api.pcloud.com.
Detects network traffic associated with the AdaptixC2 framework agent check-in process. The rule looks for specific HTTP GET request patterns, including URI paths commonly used by the agent, session-related cookies, and Content-Type headers set to application/octet-stream.
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