Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network indicators associated with the StealC information stealer, including DNS lookups for identified C2 domains, HTTPS traffic to known C2 endpoints, and suspicious POST requests using multipart/form-data indicative of credential or session data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at a known StealC command-and-control IP address. The rule identifies suspicious beaconing behavior by looking for POST requests that lack a standard User-Agent, do not utilize common HTTP content types, and contain a request body exceeding 16 bytes, suggesting custom binary protocol usage.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at a known StealC command-and-control IP address. The rule identifies suspicious beaconing behavior by looking for POST requests that lack a standard User-Agent, do not utilize common HTTP content types, and contain a request body exceeding 16 bytes, suggesting custom binary protocol usage.
Detects anomalous HTTP CONNECT proxy handshake requests and responses associated with Tengu malware. The rule monitors for 'HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established' and 'HTTP/1.1 407 Proxy Auth Required' responses initiated from internal hosts, as well as outgoing HTTP CONNECT requests containing a 'Proxy-Authorization' header that match established Tengu bot proxy patterns.
Detects the Iron Man System phishing kit via its HTTP fingerprint: a request-header rule (ETag/Server/Via combo) checked on the external server's response, and three request-side rules checking for the kit's hashed asset paths and favicon when an internal host requests them from an external site. Fixed a direction bug on the three request-side rules that had source/destination reversed (they previously required an external host to request the path from an internal server, which would rarely if ever fire).
Detects the Iron Man System phishing kit via its HTTP fingerprint: a request-header rule (ETag/Server/Via combo) checked on the external server's response, and three request-side rules checking for the kit's hashed asset paths and favicon when an internal host requests them from an external site. Fixed a direction bug on the three request-side rules that had source/destination reversed (they previously required an external host to request the path from an internal server, which would rarely if ever fire).
Detects network traffic initiated by the WeaselBiscuit loader targeting api.npoint.io, a known free JSON storage service often abused by adversaries as a dead drop resolver for Command and Control (C2) configurations or secondary payloads.
Detects network traffic initiated by the WeaselBiscuit loader targeting api.npoint.io, a known free JSON storage service often abused by adversaries as a dead drop resolver for Command and Control (C2) configurations or secondary payloads.
Detects HTTP traffic from internal hosts to the 'gapidriver.com' domain, specifically identifying the GapiUpdate stager behavior. The rule looks for authenticated GET requests to '/api/get.php' using a specific Bearer token and User-Agent, as well as status reporting to '/api/rest.php'.
Detects HTTP traffic from internal hosts to the 'gapidriver.com' domain, specifically identifying the GapiUpdate stager behavior. The rule looks for authenticated GET requests to '/api/get.php' using a specific Bearer token and User-Agent, as well as status reporting to '/api/rest.php'.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the HEAVYGRAM malware beaconing to Telegram's API. It identifies HTTP requests to api.telegram.org containing specific URI strings and parameters, which suggests the bot is performing check-in activities or sending status updates via a Telegram bot channel.
Detects network communications associated with the MovieReaper C2 framework. The rule identifies HTTP requests to specific fake cloud UI assets, connections to the domain 'deadhub.org', and fallback communication attempts to a known hardcoded IP address (193.23.118.155).
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the 'itorrents.org' repository for files with the '.torrent' extension, which may indicate the retrieval of malicious payload components associated with the MovieReaper supply chain campaign.
Detects network activity associated with the Handala Loader malware, specifically identifying attempts to download disguised shellcode or malicious payloads from deadhub.org and associated infrastructure. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns mimicking UI assets and fallback communication attempts to known C2 IP addresses.
Detects HTTP POST requests from Android devices identified as RatHat malware, specifically targeting exfiltration of sensitive data including credentials, cipher keys, and ADB certificate/key uploads via the malware's C2 API.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from the internal network to external destinations where the server certificate is self-signed. It identifies connections where both the certificate issuer and subject common names (CN) are present, which is often indicative of opportunistic encryption used by C2 infrastructure or malicious payloads. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by limiting alerts for the same source over a specific window.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards domains identified as part of Storm-3121/Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These domains are themed around passkey management and single sign-on (SSO) services, likely intended for credential harvesting.
Detects potential exfiltration activity by identifying HTTP POST/PUT requests to known suspicious domains, including specific operator-controlled hosts and anonymous file sharing services, as well as the use of HTTP Range headers for bulk API data exfiltration.
This rule monitors DNS queries and HTTP traffic for indicators related to known phishing infrastructure impersonating passkey and SSO providers. The domains detected are associated with Storm-3121/3032 campaigns designed to facilitate credential or session harvesting.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header traffic directed towards known phishing domains associated with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 infrastructure. These domains often use themes related to passkey setup, SSO, or account security to trick users into providing credentials.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
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