Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known MeshCentral Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. MeshCentral is legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software that is frequently abused by threat actors to maintain persistent remote access to victim environments. This rule monitors for established TCP connections on specific ports associated with MeshCentral C2 nodes.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards domains identified as part of Storm-3121/Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These domains are themed around passkey management and single sign-on (SSO) services, likely intended for credential harvesting.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a host is communicating with the Telegram Bot API. The rule identifies high-frequency connections to api.telegram.org and inspects HTTP URIs for signs of Telegram Bot token usage combined with 'sendDocument' or 'sendPhoto' commands, which are common indicators of malicious exfiltration.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a host is communicating with the Telegram Bot API. The rule identifies high-frequency connections to api.telegram.org and inspects HTTP URIs for signs of Telegram Bot token usage combined with 'sendDocument' or 'sendPhoto' commands, which are common indicators of malicious exfiltration.
Detects potential exfiltration activity by identifying HTTP POST/PUT requests to known suspicious domains, including specific operator-controlled hosts and anonymous file sharing services, as well as the use of HTTP Range headers for bulk API data exfiltration.
Detects specific DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) requests made to Google resolvers containing suspicious domain patterns associated with potential C2 infrastructure (QuietRacket). This includes both the identification of the DoH API call for a specific TXT record and the preceding TLS session initiation to the DoH provider.
Detects HTTP GET requests to '/api.php?t=' containing a 13-digit timestamp identifier, followed by a response body containing 'download_link'. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relaying instructions or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects HTTP GET requests to '/api.php?t=' containing a 13-digit timestamp identifier, followed by a response body containing 'download_link'. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relaying instructions or stage-two payload delivery.
This rule monitors TLS traffic for a specific combination of certificate issuer Common Name (CN) matching 'YE1' and Server Name Indication (SNI) hostnames using known disposable or high-risk top-level domains (TLDs). This behavior is associated with the IronToll campaign, often indicative of command-and-control communication or malicious infrastructure staging.
This rule monitors TLS traffic for a specific combination of certificate issuer Common Name (CN) matching 'YE1' and Server Name Indication (SNI) hostnames using known disposable or high-risk top-level domains (TLDs). This behavior is associated with the IronToll campaign, often indicative of command-and-control communication or malicious infrastructure staging.
Detects anomalous outbound HTTP traffic directed to /cli/check containing a specific 'X-CLI-Token' header value. This pattern is indicative of a Command and Control (C2) beaconing mechanism used by a compromised CLI tool or supply chain implant to verify connectivity or receive instructions.
Detects network activity (HTTP, TLS SNI, and DNS) associated with the domain 'noht1ng.top', which is linked to the GRAYRABBIT malware utilized by the threat actor UNC3569.
Detects DNS queries originating from an internal host to 'mail.uaiubifas.top', which is associated with GRAYRABBIT command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects DNS queries originating from an internal host to 'mail.uaiubifas.top', which is associated with GRAYRABBIT command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects rapid ICMP (ping) traffic directed towards specific internal and external hosts, characteristic of the RedTail Linux malware attempting to perform network discovery or validate connectivity to command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects inbound HTTP GET requests to a specific IP address (103.86.86.244) requesting a file named 'deploy.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using PowerShell one-liners (cradles) like 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) to fetch and execute malicious scripts directly from a remote C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects inbound HTTP GET requests to a specific IP address (103.86.86.244) requesting a file named 'deploy.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using PowerShell one-liners (cradles) like 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) to fetch and execute malicious scripts directly from a remote C2 infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known phishing domains that mimic Brazilian financial and government portals, specifically targeting 'gerenciadorcaixa.digital', 'aapj.digital', and 'receitafederal.digital'.
Detects an HTTP GET request to 'dl.php' containing an 'f' parameter (target file) and an 'k' parameter (access token), followed by a response body starting with the 'MZ' header, indicating the successful download of a Windows PE executable as part of a potential phishing campaign stage-2 payload delivery.
Detects sustained beaconing behavior originating from the internal network to known malicious HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies repeated connection attempts (5 or more TCP SYNs within a 180-second window) targeting specific hardcoded IP addresses on non-standard ports (27015/27017), indicative of a compromised host maintaining persistent C2 communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious .ru domains and DNS queries for these domains, indicative of C2 beaconing activity likely associated with a supply chain compromise affecting the Pub.dev ecosystem.
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