Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP requests directed towards known malvertising domains that serve trojanized MSI installers. The rule identifies specific suspicious hostnames and a common URL pattern used for payload delivery.
Detects network access to known repositories hosting the publicly disclosed ShieldBreak Microsoft Defender zero-day bypass PoC/tooling (GitHub, Project Nightcrawler, Church of Malware mirrors) via HTTP host/URI or TLS SNI matching.
Detects DNS queries to UNC6671 vishing-lure lookalike domains (createssopasskey/addssopasskey/passkeyhelpdesk) used to harvest credentials after a helpdesk-impersonation vishing call.
Detects network retrieval of the ShieldBreak exploit PoC or the UnDefend companion tool from their known distribution infrastructure (git.projectnightcrawler.dev, github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/UnDefend) via TLS SNI or HTTP host/URI matching.
Detects a DNS query with a high-entropy label repeated identically as both subdomain and domain (e.g. X.X), used by ACRStealer as a connectivity/canary check prior to establishing C2.
Detects encapsulated C2 traffic over non-standard ports and DNS/HTTP tunneling patterns using entropy/volume thresholds and sustained-pattern requirements to avoid matching ordinary long DNS queries, excluding known legitimate tunneling tools/VPN endpoints.
ClickFix staging domain DNS query - profitnow.io
Detects DNS queries and HTTP traffic to Jewelbug's known typosquatted C2 domains (fonts.chrorne[.]com, fonts.tarotfree101[.]top, robot.avbliud[.]com, www.f1ash[.]org[.]cn) via exact-match logic to avoid fuzzy-matching false positives.
Detects Antino's abuse of trusted cloud services — Microsoft Graph API and Google Docs — as C2 channels, gated on non-standard TLS ports, missing browser User-Agent, and non-HTML response bodies to reduce false positives from the very high volume of legitimate traffic to these domains.
Detects the exact watering-hole script fetch (fonts.chrorne[.]com /dist/js/*.chunk.js) injected into shared government webmail installations, which opens a WebSocket back to Jewelbug C2 and exfiltrates session cookies and usernames.
Detects DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host traffic to the known ClickFix delivery domain karburatorotzhigi[.]com or the exact Cloudflare R2 hosting bucket subdomain pub-b7e3d7ad9f6e4b08a24cde45feeb417e.r2[.]dev used in UNC5142 campaign infrastructure.
Detects HTTP requests to known Storm-2755 Payroll Pirates AiTM lookalike proxy domains that also reference Microsoft authentication infrastructure in the URI, indicating a reverse-proxy phishing kit relaying to real Microsoft login endpoints.
Detects network activity associated with the BumbleBee malware, including domain-generation algorithm (DGA) pattern matches within TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields and direct connections to known C2 infrastructure IP addresses over HTTPS.
Detects TLS SNI and HTTP Host values matching Jewelbug's typosquatted-domain pattern impersonating the OKX and Binance cryptocurrency exchanges, used to drive traffic to cloaked phishing pages.
This rule detects outgoing TCP traffic to port 1082 that initiates or utilizes a SOCKS5 proxy connection, specifically identifying patterns associated with the Myxa VPN tool. The detection monitors for the specific SOCKS5 handshake byte and identifies known hardcoded IP addresses associated with this tool's proxy infrastructure.
Detects a 32-byte ICMP echo request carrying the backdoor's 8-byte bot ID, explicitly excluding the standard Windows ping.exe payload pattern (the dominant legitimate traffic at this size) and rate-limited to reduce alert volume.
Detects HTTP GET requests to a specific Cloudflare Workers domain ('is-01-ast.ols-img-12.workers.dev') used for msaRAT WebRTC signaling, characterized by the presence of spoofed 'Origin' and 'Referer' headers pointing to 'microsoft.com' alongside a 'HeadlessChrome' user agent, indicating malicious command-and-control behavior.
Detects Abyssos RAT C2 traffic via its literal HELLO|...|v2.4F registration banner combined with an AES-GCM-sized payload to two known hardcoded C2 IPs.
Network detection for Sliver C2 framework beaconing, tightened to require JA3/JA3S fingerprints and certificate-field patterns characteristic of Sliver's default TLS templates rather than generic self-signed certificates.
Detects sustained outbound Stratum mining-protocol connections to Monero mining pools from a compromised host (5+ connections within 5 minutes), consistent with post-exploitation cryptomining following Screen Sharing compromise.
Detects HTTP requests for fingerprinted JavaScript/CSS assets shared across UNC6671's cloned SSO and cryptocurrency vault-drainer phishing panels.
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