Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects automated HTTP GET requests directed at government or council calendar endpoints (specifically targeting mgCalendarMonthView or GetMeetings parameters) using a common generic User-Agent. This behavior is indicative of an automated scripted client potentially using public infrastructure as a Command and Control (C2) relay.
Detects an abnormally high volume of POST requests to the RubyGems API endpoint used for publishing packages. A sudden burst of these requests from a single source may indicate a mass upload campaign, commonly associated with software supply chain poisoning attempts.
Detects HTTP traffic attempting to download specific known malicious RubyGems packages from rubygems.org associated with the GemStuffer campaign. This indicates a supply chain compromise attempt where attackers distribute malicious code via public package repositories.
Detects a multi-stage communication pattern involving an initial request to a URL-mirroring or shortening service with a long base64-encoded path, followed by a request to a screenshot/rendering API, and culminating in the reception of an image file. This chain is indicative of command and control (C2) communication where command output or exfiltrated data is encoded into images rendered by external web services to bypass traditional network security filters.
This rule monitors for two related scenarios targeting the RubyGems legacy API-key endpoint. First, it identifies suspicious responses indicating an API key might have been served from a CDN cache, potentially leading to cross-user credential leaks. Second, it flags a high volume of requests to the same endpoint using gzip compression, which is a known technique associated with edge-cache poisoning attacks.
Detects HTTP responses containing patterns associated with a malicious HTA stager hosted on Cloudflare Pages. The rule looks for specific URL structures often used in phishing campaigns that attempt to deliver malicious payloads, specifically involving a cloned Gmail attachment widget.
Detects HTTP GET requests to specific domains (microsoft-flash.com or wps-cn.com) attempting to download a file named 'flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe', which is associated with malicious installer activity.
Detects outbound network traffic to domains and infrastructure known to be associated with the UAT-11587 Antino delivery chain. This includes specific Cloudflare Pages/R2 project URLs and CloudFront staging infrastructure often used for malicious payload hosting or staging.
Detects outbound network communication to known malicious hosting infrastructure used for the distribution of Antino Stage 2 payloads, specifically targeting CloudFront and Cloudflare R2 object storage locations.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
Detects HTTP GET requests for the path '/wmglb', which is indicative of a SectopRAT stage-two module download (specifically WbElevation.dll) from a Command and Control server.
This rule detects high-frequency HTTP GET requests containing abnormally long Base64-encoded strings within the URI. This pattern is often indicative of automated payload assembly or exfiltration where data is fragmented across multiple requests, or the use of URL-shortener services to facilitate C2 communication.
Detects network activity associated with the LONGTALE malware family (attributed to APT31/JungleBamboo). This includes identification of specific malicious browser extension IDs in HTTP traffic and signature-based detection of periodic HTTPS/HTTP beaconing patterns indicative of session or cookie exfiltration.
Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, specifically identifying C2 beaconing behavior. The rule looks for HTTPS GET requests to specific URI paths ('/library/zip/') with a WebSocket upgrade header and suspicious cookie patterns, as well as TLS SNI traffic targeting the hardcoded domain 'corp.tripswithengine.com'.
Detects HTTP beaconing and WebSocket command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the AgtaBackup RAT. This includes identifying specific check-in URIs, hardcoded 'X-Agent-Secret' header authentication, and the initialization of a WebSocket connection.
Detects network requests to known domains (acrobat-reader-installer.com, 03webzoominvite.us) masquerading as Microsoft Store resources to deliver malicious MSI installers. This activity is associated with RMM-based RAT deployment chains.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts to the domain 'msfconfig.icu'. It specifically monitors for GET requests to '/tmp/system.txt' and TLS connections using the same domain as an SNI, which are associated with the delivery of ClickFix XMRig miner payloads.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to Vercel subdomains targeting a specific path (/secure.html). This behavior is characteristic of phishing campaigns, specifically those masquerading as RMM-related lures to trick users into providing access codes or credentials.
Detects anomalous network traffic associated with Vidar Stealer 2.0, where an HTTP GET request for a .jpg file is directed to a bare IP address, and the server's response header fails to indicate an image content type despite the requested file extension.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
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